In July 2024 and again in April 2025, I was held in civil contempt for opposing the effects of a scandal that was facilitated through the BC court, and enforced in NS without discretionary guardrails (Colburne v. Frank, 1995 NSCA 110 at paragraph 9; Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416, 2003 SCC 72 at paragraph 220; inter alia), while being denied customary appellate recourse, including at the SCC.

Both times, the NSSC rejected the valid legal defense of necessity as described by Wilson J. in Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232, which in this case applies as both an excuse and as a justification.  At pages 270 & 279 in Perka;
 

"As Dickson J. points out, although the necessity defence has engendered a significant amount of judicial and scholarly debate, it remains a somewhat elusive concept.  It is, however, clear that justification and excuse are conceptually quite distinct and that any elucidation of a principled basis for the defence of necessity must be grounded in one or the other.  Turning first to the category of excuse, the concept of “normative involuntariness” stressed in the reasons of Dickson J. may, on one reading, be said to fit squarely within the framework of an individualized plea which Professor Fletcher indicates characterizes all claims of excusability.  The notional involuntariness of the action is assessed in the context of the accused’s particular situation.  The court must ask not only whether the offensive act accompanied by the requisite culpable mental state (i.e. intention, recklessness, etc.) has been established by the prosecution, but whether or not the accused acted so as to attract society’s moral outrage.  [...]  Where the defence of necessity is invoked as a justification the issue is simply whether the accused was right in pursuing the course of behaviour giving rise to the charge."

At paragraph 220 in Beals;

“The trial judge held that the public policy defence should be expanded to incorporate a “judicial sniff test” that would allow enforcing courts to reject foreign judgments obtained through questionable or egregious conduct (Jennings J., at p. 144).  It has also been suggested that excessively high punitive damage awards should be unenforceable in whole or in part as a matter of public policy; see, e.g., J. S. Ziegel, “Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Canada, Unlevel Playing Fields, and Beals v. Saldanha: A Consumer Perspective” (2003), 38 Can. Bus. L.J. 294, at pp. 306-7; Kidron v. Grean (1996), 48 O.R. (3d) 775 (Gen. Div.)”

At paragraph 9 in Colburne;

"...Under these headings of wrong principles of law and patent injustice an Appeal Court will override a discretionary order in a number of well‑recognized situations.  The simplest cases involve an obvious legal error.  As well, there are cases where no weight or insufficient weight has been given to relevant circumstances, where all the facts are not brought to the attention of the judge or where the judge has misapprehended the facts.  The importance and gravity of the matter and the consequences of the order, as where an Interlocutory application results in the final disposition of a case, are always underlying considerations.  The list is not exhaustive but it covers the most common instances of appellate court interference in discretionary matters.  See Charles Osenton and Company v. Johnston (1941), 57 T.L.R. 515; Finlay v. Minister of Finance of Canada et al. (1990), 1990 CanLII 12961 (FCA), 71 D.L.R. (4th) 422; and the decision of this court in Attorney General of Canada v. Foundation Company of Canada Limited et al. (S.C.A. No. 02272, as yet unreported). [emphasis added]"

Finally, it is worth noting the case law in Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, 2007 SCC 22 at paragraph 88 concerning the rejection of the SCC docket;

"We note parenthetically, as much stress was laid by the appellants on the refusal by this Court of leave to appeal the Optima case, that refusal of leave should not be taken to indicate agreement with the judgment sought to be appealed, from any more than the grant of leave can be taken to indicate disagreement.  In the leave process, the Court does not hear or adjudicate a case on the merits."

On July 4th, 2025, I was advised on a scheduling teleconference that I should expect to be taken into custody should I refuse to comply with the 737.7-hour billing scandal (ie., the boeing 737.7, or the “cost delta” scandal).  Those comments, accessible in the audio link above, had preempted any filed submissions concerning the penalty hearing.  Hence, a reasonable person would surmise that a second custodial sentence was decided in advance.  The court was privy to my NS health records, which were introduced into the file on January 9th, 2025.  Later in this page, the machine-learning models, on review of the entirety of the court file and the applicable jurisprudential guardrails, found the same judge to be partial in the same capacity.  

Given this, the court had advised that the enforcement of the billing scandal, being one component among the many issues outlined on this site, was of greater importance than exercising its residual and inherent discretion in refusing to enforce an obvious scandal, and likewise, that a custodial sentence was appropriate irrespective of the fact that there is compelling evidence on file that suggests doing so would place me in an environment of proximate physical harm.  These characteristics reinforce an inference concerning the presence of extraneous interests.