Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (S.C. 2000, c. 24) [Link]
Access to Justice
Criminal Interference | Denial of Recourse | Obstruction of Justice | Abuse of Process | Miscarriage of Justice | Censorship
A Framework of Third-Party Influence
Materially related to the Zersetzung accounts, a prima facie case of shareholder fraud concerning the Director of a Canadian Commercial and Government Entity ("CAGE") was reversed into a $445,489.50 award of special costs to the perpetrator. This disposition remained unchecked despite Canadian Constitutional Law and jurisprudence. The scope, consistency, and characteristics of this scandal, involving multiple courts and police agencies across three provinces, precludes consideration of the CAGE Director as an independent perpetrator. Because one CEO cannot disrupt a country's justice system to this extent, an inexorable inference of third-party tampering is occasioned.
FIFTY Social Influencers | FIVE Courts | THREE Police Agencies | ONE Scandal
An Encyclopedia of Obstruction:
The Scandal as it Pertains to the Courts
On September 18th, 2020, the Director of a federally-sponsored Commercial and Government Entity (“CAGE”) is alleged to have made an attempt to acquire my investment holding in the same entity through a generic Share Transfer and Power of Attorney agreement, unlinked to a specific share purchase transaction and dollar amount. This agreement was bundled alongside draft materials for a M&A share purchase acquisition. The same acquisition was linked to a shareholder agreement I was not governed by, and the Share Transfer and Power of Attorney Agreement was precluded from the digital signature record containing the remainder of materials germane to the transaction. In retrospect, this document reassigned ownership of my shares without remuneration. I was asked to sign the documents in this bundle on extremely short notice, and I did so, whereas I trusted the Director. Following sign-off, nothing happened and the CAGE entity remained silent.
Following three months of attempted outreach, the CAGE Director claimed this transaction had been blocked by a tech company the CAGE entity had a partnership agreement with at the time, and that the scope of their partner agreement prevented further share purchase acquisitions until December 2022, in alignment with the BC Statute of Limitations Act. I was advised there would be no option at any material time for a discretionary share buy-back.
The CAGE Director refused to disclose shareholder records for seven months, including a threat of consequences for contacting his records office (a shareholder right per section 46 of the BC Business Corporations Act, “BCA”). Four more months of silence followed, and whereas the CAGE Director was eventually compelled to disclose these records by way of Order of the BC Registrar on May 3rd, 2021. The CAGE entity’s employee roster page was deleted a day after the disclosure order of the BC Registrar.
The immediate findings of the records disclosure were compelling. The CAGE entity’s Central Securities Register (“CSR”) records shows a cessation of all shareholder activity on April 2020, five months prior to the proposed M&A transaction date. At the time, the entity had over 70 employee stock option holders, with at least 41 who had completed their initial vesting cycles, whom the CAGE Director had likewise referred to as shareholders. Per the CSR historical records, employee stock option holders are shown to exercise their options at predetermined intervals, and were expected to continue doing so beyond April 2020. The CSR however listed only 19 shareholders, all of whom had ceased activity on April 2020. The initial records disclosure omitted the CAGE entity’s audit report for FY2020, which was previously disclosed between February and April in each prior year.
The initial records deposit further revealed that the CAGE director had created a shareholder agreement for me specifically, dated July 27th, 2016. A materially different governing shareholder agreement was visible for the remainder of shareholders in the same Common Non-Voting class, dated July 25th, 2016, with each shareholder named. This was shown to be linked to the 2020 M&A share purchase memorandum. CSR records revealed a significant share transfer from the CAGE entity to a holding company dated July 27th, 2016.
A subsequent record request was made on July 1st, 2021, following the CAGE entity’s Annual Reference Date. I was advised that the 2020 fiscal audit report, required to be published per section 42 of the BCA and still not published three months after its customary release date, was “awaiting signature” by a regional CPA firm the company had retained. When this record was obtained on July 9th, 2021, the audit report contained a derecognized asset policy, which would effectively conceal any share transfers which may have occurred in 2020. The audit report further omitted reference of currency data, and yielded a $1.5 million delta in trade values compared to consistent values in previous years. The updated CSR, dated July 9th, 2021, reflected the same data as the original record obtained on May 3rd, 2021, with one exception. The CAGE entity's former VP Finance, who had resigned as an employee shortly following the disclosure order, was listed in the Common Non-Voting CSR and the Common B Non-Voting CSR on May 20th, 2021. No other activity is recorded on any CSR beyond April 14th, 2020.
Routine Activities Stopped in April 2020.
Empty CSR, save for VP Finance, who resigned three days following the disclosure order.
Derecognition Policy
FY 2020 Share Transfers Remain Hidden
Shareholder Oppression Matter
Whereas no discretionary buy-back was available, and in view of ten months of oppressive behavior and glaring concerns yielded in the CAGE entity’s shareholder records, I retained a local law firm in New Westminster BC and opened a Petition in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, seeking an investigation and the full value of my shareholding. This matter is characterized by willful negligence in counsel, bad faith negotiations, and had resulted in a forced settlement.
My counsel was retained to compile, analyze, critique, file, and serve originating documents on the CAGE entity and its Director. This firm compiled an 830-page initial Affidavit which was suffused with shareholder records and business information germane to the CAGE entity. This was filed alongside a Petition on August 4th, 2021. However, the firm did not file an Application to seal these materials alongside the pleadings, in consideration of a confidentiality clause common to all CAGE shareholder agreements, including mine. I was not made aware of this act of negligence, having retained the firm to act in a fiduciary capacity in researching, creating, reviewing, filing, and serving my materials on my behalf, and whereas I trusted the firm to do likewise. I likewise had no legal training. This act of gross negligence, a serious mistake trained lawyers are not expected to make, had jeopardized the file.
After the law firm filed and served the originating documents, counsel for the CAGE entity advised of an interest in sealing the file, citing the same confidentiality clause, though advised there was no rush. CAGE counsel subsequently presented an offer to settle at a dollar amount significantly less than the value of my shares. The CAGE Director, communicating directly at that point, advised the offer amount reflected the correct share value. In response, I advised I was willing to settle pending a due-diligence review of the derecognized audit records. I further cited several Bible passages and section 2(a) of the Charter in that it was contrary to my core values to accept an expedient settlement without investigating what might be a matter of systemic wrongdoing. The CAGE Director agreed to take steps toward an investigation.
The file was sealed on August 27th, 2021 on consent of the parties by way of redaction. On September 13th, 2021, I received a notice of default from counsel for the CAGE entity, indicating that failure to seal the file on the initial application on August 4th, 2021 breached the shareholder agreement, and whereas the settlement offer was “off the table”. I was advised my shares would be “automatically bought back for $3.60/share”, effectively collapsing the value of my shareholding. On hearing this, my retained counsel advised they were unwilling to help further in the matter (their act of negligence had paved the way for this event to begin with). Furthermore, my counsel filed redacted pleadings beyond the scope adjudicated by the judge in removing reference to the investigation sought in the pleadings, whereas their redacted copies suggested my lawsuit may have been unnecessary or vexatious (CAGE counsel had incorrectly asserted I had a discretionary buy-back option). My counsel then refused a request to file corrected redactions which aligned with the scope adjudicated by the judge. I ended up filing this myself. These events invite consideration of potential collusion.
I asked the CAGE director to withdraw his notice of default, in keeping with his prior commitment to a settlement based on due-diligence, and whereas the file had already been sealed two weeks prior. The Director responded in repeating his initial offer without an investigation, and asserted that the settlement agreement be signed within two weeks to avoid default. In view of these developments and the previous letter I sent the CAGE Director regarding the importance of an investigation, I retained a different law firm in Surrey, BC in a request to conduct due diligence on the CAGE Director's settlement affidavit I had argued for over the course of several days, and assume the file.
After signing the retainer and placing a deposit, the new firm was unresponsive for the following week. Four separate communications were sent regarding due-diligence, and all four were ignored. One day before the CAGE Director's deadline, my new counsel advised they could not send an official recommendation letter. The unofficial email I did receive admitted expert business valuation was required to properly vet share value, but urged me to sign the agreement immediately without any due diligence. Exhausted by the forgoing exploits and facing an immediate deadline without any identifiable recourse to address the concerns of the matter, I signed the settlement agreement CAGE counsel drafted.
A number of irregularities followed in the next few weeks including an un-cashable settlement check, differing file numbers in my retainer and specific files used in the case, and a statement of services from my counsel which omitted reference to the conclusion of the settlement and its payout. Following another two weeks of follow-up requests that the entirety of the events be documented, I received a subsequent service record from this firm indicating events germane to the completion of the settlement had been “written-off’. While it’s unlikely anyone would complain of saving $987 in legal expenses, the occurrence of this discount and the omission of closure events in the official record statements is an outlier.
My Retained Legal Counsel Filed Confidential Shareholder Records at the Public Registry Without My Knowledge, Instruction, nor Consent. The CAGE and I Agreed on a Sealing Order Remedy. The CAGE Then Issued a Default Notice Following Seal Entry. My Counsel Claimed Bad Faith, and Withdrew.
The Same Counsel Scrubbed Incriminating Details in the Public Record
Settlement Affidavit
Following events in September and October 2021 concerning the foregoing, it became evident that there were a series of false statements in the CAGE director’s sworn Settlement Affidavit. The first involves a statement that CAGE employee stock option holders can only become shareholders when their employment relationship ends. This statement was shown to be false due to an empty securities register beyond April 2020 as compared with the tenure of former employees. At the time the settlement affidavit was sworn, ten (10) qualified former employees which are expected to appear in the securities register were absent. In an event the CAGE director’s sworn statements were true, these ten former employees would have exited the company without exercising stock options. That number grew as additional data became available. Throwing away money is unrealistic, whereas suggesting that groups of people would throw away money is sufficient to raise alarm. Because the CAGE entity removed the employee roster on its website following records disclosure on May 3rd, 2021, information concerning former employees was sourced through linkedin, archive.org recordings of the CAGE entity team page, and other credible third party sources which were subsequently validated.
The settlement affidavit also contains two differing accounts of the same event. Namely, termination of the CAGE entity’s partner agreement with a different tech company; which is the event the 2020 share purchase cancellation was predicated upon. A 6-month difference in termination dates between these differing accounts yields a 6-month revenue delta, which invites tax enforcement audit review pursuant to section 222 of the Income Tax Act. These records can be introduced in civil proceedings under sections 241(3)(b) and (3.1) of the same Act (also see Slattery (Trustee of) v. Slattery, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 430 at part V, paragraph 3). The date given by the CAGE director regarding this partnership matches the two-year Statute of Limitations Act for the Province of British Columbia. CRA was made aware of this through a subsequent court-ordered Application to join S-220956, though it became evident through their counsel that CRA had no interest in enforcing the Act or testifying in the matter.
The problems in the settlement agreement and the events which led up to it triggered ethical consideration and further concerns germane to my core beliefs and values as protected under section 2(a) of the Charter. As such, and without making mention of the same, I began researching options for the feasibility to test the settlement, and located relevant jurisprudence in Hawitt v. Campell, (1983) 148 D.L.R. (3d) 341, 46 B.C.L.R. 260 (C.A.) [Hawitt CA], with an intention to explore the matter at an appropriate time through proper channels. This authority maintains a settlement can be reviewed if there is an issue to be tried as to whether there was fraud, collusion, limitation, or misapprehension in relation to the settlement. The shareholder oppression matter evidenced all of these. Redacted visuals are included in the exhibit section further down this page. Likewise, an account is furnished in Exhibit D of my Redacted Affidavit (pages 98 through 153), linked here.
Two Accounts of Perjury in the CAGE Director's Settlement Affidavit
Paragraph 10, Settlement Affidavit
"While options for Common Non-Voting Shares continue to vest, the decision to exercise options is a decision of each individual optionee. Individual optinonees are not required to exercise options as they vest."
Ie., they collectively threw away money.
Missing from Central Securities Register
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8 Verified Tier-1 Former Employees
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13 Verified Tier-2 Former Employees
Common Non-Voting CSR is empty beyond April 2020 with one exception; the former VP Finance, who resigned shortly after the May 3rd, 2021 disclosure order. The Common B Non-Voting CSR is empty with the exception of the same individual.
Employee Roster webpage
deleted on May 3, 2021
Onset of Zersetzung: November 2021 through February 2022
In late November 2021 I began experiencing progressive disruptions in my life on a day-to-day basis. These included daily on-heels stalking, vehicle break-ins, home invasions, a series of computer hijackings, unauthorized bank transactions, and threats of abduction, torture, and death. These threats were delivered both online through hijacked PC events, and in person through strangers who approached. Depictions of the CAGE Director were delivered through these remote computer intrusions alongside a host of consistent actors. These same actors made a regular appearance in youtube channels following the initial event, likely delivered via algorithm, whether I was logged into my google account or otherwise. Day-to-day physical events were telegraphed by the same actors. Alarmingly, one occasion of remote access featured a prominent actor showing video footage of the interior of my condo residence in Surrey, BC.
Attempts were made to implicate me in public during that time, including an attempt to collect fingerprints and implicate me at a local church in New Westminster, BC in mid-December 2021. On a given day, I could not walk through my condo building, walk down the street, or go anywhere in public without being stalked and photographed. These events were further telegraphed by the online group. Concurrently, my Mother back in Nova Scotia began receiving phone calls from people purporting to impersonate my nephew, seeking bank and personal information while using proprietary language only known to family, and not used or known elsewhere.
Concurrent with the same events were disruptions in my ability to secure contract and full-time work. Typical business engagements began to consistently run awry between meetings without any triggering events I was aware of. Beginning November 2021, and amid daily online and on-heels stalking, every source of income I had, including any pending opportunities in the pipe, had collapsed disruptively without due explanation. I have been out of work and out of income since November 2021. A similar and consistent trend manifested in my efforts to obtain new legal counsel, including ProBono programs I had met criteria for on paper. A wide variety of rejections from private law firms were a priori in nature, and prior to any engagement that disclosed subject matter. An account of these events was first sworn in an Affidavit on May 20th, 2022.
At this time and in view of the same, I made diligent attempts to seek recourse with local law enforcement, namely the Surrey RCMP detachment. An officer wearing a mental health badge asked to speak with me outside the office and listened to my account, but declined to open a file or offer further investigation and support. Record of my RCMP visits is furnished in a FOIPOP report later obtained from Halifax Regional Police. It became evident that I would not receive customary relief in this capacity, and whereas I was living alone in Surrey, BC under terrifying daily conditions.
On February 8th, 2022, following a series of home break-ins, and following a significant remote PC access event which took control of my laptop, featuring a caricature of the CAGE Director uttering threats of death and identity theft, I filed S-220956 at the Vancouver Registry with a draft petition, and an Affidavit I had sworn a few weeks prior on January 24th, 2022 regarding a settlement test and proof of perjury. Aforementioned living conditions notwithstanding, I did not intend to open a file (S-220956) without legal representation and as an unemployed person. Review of my living habits and BIO would likewise preclude any assumption that I am given to reckless decisions. I determined that in the absence of customary recourse to police, and by way of an intent to open a file at some point under reasonable conditions, filing evidentiary materials in a formal institution was a cautionary act. Although the caricature of the CAGE Director triggers consideration of section 3.2 of the settlement agreement, the January 24th, 2022 Affidavit detailed shareholder evidence and the CAGE Director's Settlement Affidavit.
Several days later on February 16th, 2022, again having failed to secure customary recourse from the RCMP, and following a series of break-ins, PC hijack events, and continued harassment, with one such threat claiming I would be abducted that night because maintenance workers had covered my windows and adjacent units with opaque tarps, I decided to relocate. I collected what belongings I could into my car, including a hardcopy of my Affidavit in S-220956, and began a trek across Canada in mid-winter. Four days and three tow truck rescues later in blizzard conditions, I was fortunate to have arrived in Halifax, Nova Scotia, where I currently reside with my Mother. I made arrangements with my landlord for an early termination to the lease.
Two days following my arrival in Halifax, the owner of a local computer specialty shop preemptively referred to me as a “political target”, and within the same 40-minute conversation, suggested it would be a waste of time to remove a “specialty program” from my laptop. Online harassment followed me to Nova Scotia, whereas on-heels activity resumed within two weeks after my arrival in March 2022. Early that same month, I was approached and threatened by an individual claiming to be a Canadian Armed Forces ("CAF") member. This individual, holding a smartphone on a live call, placed me on speakerphone while another individual, likewise identifying as CAF, disclosed personal and private details concerning harassment incidents in British Columbia. The foregoing events and more are detailed in my May 20th, 2022 Affidavit.
My May 20th, 2022 Affidavit, containing the first notarized account of these events besides RCMP records, was sent from Halifax to Vancouver BC via courier the same day it was notarized. While enroute to BC, counsel for the CAGE entity threatened to strike Petition S-220956 with no apparent explanation. Neither CAGE counsel or any other third party was made aware of the existence of this Affidavit besides the notary that commissioned it (Exhibit A, August 23rd, 2023 Affidavit here). At that time, S-220956 was three months old with an outstanding order to provision audit discovery. I withheld the filing of the May 20th, 2022 Affidavit which linked the CAGE Director to the events that initiated the filing of the Petition. CAGE counsel did not subsequently act on their threat to strike. Once these materials were added to the file in July 2022, CAGE counsel henceforth insisted on a seal of the entire file including public exhibits, which was granted. Treatment of these events were muted in chambers.
In my consideration and conceptualization of the same, I refer to the term Zersetzung as defined in Wikipedia. Further detail germane to the nature and sophistication of Zersetzung as it applies in this matter are furnished in the Affidavit appended to this website made May 12th, 2023, and as on this site's Testimony and Zersetzung pages. These activities remain ongoing. Initially and at face value, I contemplated an inference that the CAGE Director had engaged in retaliatory actions following the settlement, with the help of social influence contractors. Yet, the scope, sophistication, consistency, and characteristics of these components of the scandal preclude an ability to consider the same inference independent of other components pertaining to the scandal.
Zersetzung (pronounced [t͡sɛɐ̯ˈzɛt͡sʊŋ], German for "decomposition" and "disruption") was a psychological warfare technique used by the Ministry for State Security (Stasi) to repress political opponents in East Germany during the 1970s and 1980s. Zersetzung served to combat alleged and actual dissidents through covert means, using secret methods of abusive control and psychological manipulation to prevent anti-government activities. People were commonly targeted on a pre-emptive and preventative basis, to limit or stop politically incorrect activities that they may have gone on to perform, and not on the basis of crimes they had actually committed. Zersetzung methods were designed to break down, undermine, and paralyze people behind "a facade of social normality" in a form of "silent repression".
PsyOp | Cyber | Mischief | Zersetzung Began Shortly Following the Shareholder Settlement [Link]
"Trust Account"
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The RCMP Did Not Respond
They Were Aware
Per the adjacent Affidavit excerpt and a report pulled by local police cited below it, I made multiple attempts to solicit RCMP support in response to the events that began following the 2021 CAGE shareholder dispute. The RCMP appeared to have a priori knowledge of these incidents, and could have taken a few easy steps to address the ongoing and serious crimes involved. Namely, they could have obtained CCTV video footage from the condo building I was living in at the time. These would have demonstrated the ongoing break-ins which were occurring. Likewise, they could have assigned their cyber team. I have not been able to secure any help for almost three years, despite diligent solicitation. The RCMP was not asked to play the role of a judge, notwithstanding the fact that their negligence had occasioned the filing of S-220956, and an emergency relocation across Canada in mid-winter. Having said that, the RCMP must investigate crimes related to civil proceedings, being the same perpetrators, and likewise, investigate the conduct of public registry employees pursuant to CCC 139. Finally, it must recognize a clear matter of criminal interference.
I was Consistently Denied Fiduciary Legal Support, Including ProBono, from November 2021 Onward
S-220956: Feb 2022 through Nov 2022
In February 2022 at the onset of S-220956, irrespective of the conditions initiating the same, I had a basic expectation of a fair and impartial judicial system. A chronicle of the entirety of proceedings in S-220956 is furnished in the first and third Affidavits of S-229680, Exhibit E in both. This section will outline specific highlights.
Mindful of negligence by my retained counsel in August 2021 in failing to apply for a seal of the shareholder oppression affidavit at its onset, I had asked the court to temporarily seal the file on submitting the pleadings with a hand-written application on February 8th, 2022, which it agreed to on consent of the parties.
The first milestone hearing in this file involved a request to furnish the evidentiary record with derecognized and privileged audit data to accompany the basket of shareholder records and evidence germane to the CAGE Director's false settlement affidavit. This request was made in consideration of Hawitt v. Campell, (1983) 148 D.L.R. (3d) 341, 46 B.C.L.R. 260 (C.A.) [Hawitt CA], and the commentary of justice Frank Iacobucci, former deputy Attorney General and Minister of Justice in Slattery (Trustee of) v. Slattery, 93 DTC 5443, [1993] 3 SCR 430, [1993] 2 CTC 243 (part V, analysis, section 2). The basic premise is that, as Iacobucci, J. mentions, securing tax audit records may be required to ensure the correct disposition of litigation, similar to using the appropriate tools to repair a vehicle motor.
The court, presided by Master Cameron on April 1st, 2022, agreed with this analysis and jurisprudence, and made an order that my pleadings and supporting materials be served on Canada Revenue Agency ("CRA") along with my application for disclosure of relevant audit records pursuant to sections 241(3) and 222 of the Income Tax Act. Furthermore, the court ordered that the parties seek direction on the mode of service to three private entities related to the proceeding in an event the parties could not agree among themselves. These included the CAGE director’s CPA accounting firm, the holding company identified as the acquiring company for the September 2020 share purchase memorandum, and the tech company that the CAGE Director predicated the same M&A cancellation upon. Counsel for the CAGE Director vigorously opposed the pronouncement. The same adjudicator was said to have retired shortly after the hearing on April 1st, 2022.
This order, expected to achieve the relief sought in the matter through disclosure, was subsequently suppressed through a series of chambers hearings and extrajudicial authorizations that followed, and whereas the petition was subsequently dismissed in my absence in October 2022 as a summary matter in contempt of a discovery order that remained outstanding. The two hearings that followed the April 1st, 2022 pronouncement were held in private rooms in violation of Rule 22-1(5) of the BC Supreme Court Civil Rules, and evidenced direct collusion via the aforementioned online group. Counsel for the CAGE director, in a hearing on June 27th, 2022, sought and was awarded a restraining (protection) order over the file, which was already sealed, in an absence of any evidence it was required.
Justification for the June 2022 protection order was predicated on unfounded and speculation admitted by CAGE counsel that sealed materials in the file might be disclosed prior to the parties seeking direction on modality. The chambers judge was provided documented evidence that I had followed the April 1st, 2022 order to first seek direction on mode of service before serving materials, including a letter to CAGE counsel affirming an intention to do likewise on April 27th, 2022. The judge, in her oral reasons, advised that based on an opinion I had about Rule 16-1(3), cited as jurisprudence in support of the April 1st, 2022 Application, a protection order was "reasonably required to ensure the seal over the file could properly function". Each subsequent chambers judge ordered and/or extended protection orders over case files based on this ruling. The judge refused to discuss a mode of service on the three related private entities which might testify in accord with the April 1st, 2022 order. The June 27th, 2022 ruling required I first seek leave of the court to action an order which was already pronounced, and initiated a long list of biased pronouncements which continued to apply obstacles to discovery. The April 1st, 2022 discovery provisions were eventually smothered through compounded technical encumbrances.
Concurrently, counsel for Canada Revenue Agency vehemently opposed the April 1st, 2022 court order to disclose tax information germane to the CAGE entity, and, alongside counsel for the same, faxed a letter to the BC Supreme Court Chambers Division demanding that the Application be added to an existing 30-minute short chambers hearing in August 2022 alongside three other interim Applications filed by CAGE counsel. I sent a response letter to the court shortly thereafter advising that the Application was not ready to be heard due to an outstanding order to determine the mode of service on private entities related to the matter, and that the scheduling demand was further disproportionate to the importance of the issues considered. Notwithstanding that court staff have no authority to determine an Applicant’s scheduling dates, the request was granted, and the motion to introduce testimony by CRA officials was dismissed by a referral judge who admitted to having no prior knowledge of the file. Per the transcript furnished in my first S-229680 Affidavit, oral submissions concerning ITA provisions were cut short. Furthermore, CAGE counsel's pre-drafted orders were signed, which authorized the petition to be determined as a summary judgment. The same is in direct contempt of the order for discovery made April 1st, 2022. The referral judge, who claimed to be unfamiliar with the file, was reminded of the same in oral submissions.
I filed an Appeal of the foregoing order citing the April 1st, 2022 order and sections in the Income Tax Act provisioning testimony by CRA officials. Because CAGE counsel scheduled a summary petition hearing shortly after the August 12th appearance, I filed an Application to stay further proceedings until the April 1st, 2022 order was carried out. The Appeal chambers judge ignored these components and dismissed the stay application. The judge abruptly closed chambers when I broached ITA 241(3) and 222 and the Iacobucci argument for audit disclosure.
I subsequently advised CAGE counsel that in accord with the April 1st, 2022 ruling, the Petition could not be properly tried absent audit data lawfully provisioned under ITA 241(3)(b), and that action items pursuant to the April 1st, 2022 order still remained outstanding. CAGE counsel opposed this and filed an Application to seek permission to hold a summary hearing of the petition in my absence. I filed a response outlining the foregoing, citing the outstanding discovery order, whereas my participation in a summary hearing would validate the notion that a previous outstanding order made in the same court should be re-litigated. In a five-minute appearance, the court ignored the outstanding requirements of the April 1st, 2022 ruling, and granted a summary hearing before CAGE counsel alone.
S-220956 was dismissed as a “fishing expedition” by the same judge that ordered an investigation of an entire law firm in A Lawyer v. The Law Society of British Columbia, 2021 BCCA 437, initially based on speculation gleaned from a routine compliance audit. The entirety of this transcript is furnished in the Third Affidavit of S-229680, Exhibit E, whereas the entirety of shareholder records are ignored, including the CAGE Director's second affidavit in S-220956, which mixes his own statements as deponent with those made by a legal assistant in the same document, including a shareholder agreement I was not governed by. Its dismissal eventually led to a scandal involving retainer fees [see Felony Affidavit].
S-220956: Former Deputy AG & Minister of Justice Frank Iacobucci Authored the Audit Test
Charitable Donations
An actionable vector toward resolving the scandal resides in a CRA tax audit. As shown earlier in the page, the CAGE Settlement Affidavit contains two accounts of perjury, one of which triggers an immediate consideration of section 222 of the Income Tax Act. Forensic audit is likewise expected to address the criminal interference components. The legal test is below.
Audit Discovery
Former Deputy Attorney General and Deputy Minister of Justice Frank Iacobucci set forth the legal test for the authorization of testimony by CRA officials in civil proceedings, using the legislation in section 241(3) of the Income Tax Act as a basis. Section 241(3.1), which provisions testimony without a legal test, is viable by means of the criminal element involved. Per the account in the Litigation page, the BCSC and BCCA suppressed the initial order by a now-retired adjudicator made April 1st, 2022 to introduce testimony by CRA officials. This was obstructed in a manner that ignored relevant legal tests in addition to the framework presented by the former Deputy Attorney General as shown.
ITA Section 241(3), (3.1)
The jurisprudence in Slattery (Trustee of) v. Slattery, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 430 outlines a legal test which refutes the notion that testimony by CRA officials in civil proceedings is limited to matters brought under the Income Tax Act itself. The test is exceptionally broad insofar as a matter need only have some measure of relationship to the enforcement of the Income Tax Act. Per the Litigation page testimony and in the redacted Affidavits, this test was pushed aside in a series of proceedings in 2022 in favor of pre-drafted orders provided by counsel.
Settlement Affidavit
Absent consideration of ITA 241(3.1) as it relates to the criminal mischief surrounding the proceeding, the Settlement Affidavit sworn by the CAGE Director on September 22nd, 2021 contains two accounts of perjury. One involves shareholder materials and CAGE shareholders, and the other involves two conflicting tax accounts concerning a partner entity that the BCSC initially asked to be joined. To that end, the legal test in Slattery is met with respect to the civil matter relating to the enforcement of the Act. That same insight occasioned the initial BCSC order on April 1st, 2022.
“To comply with section 7 of the Charter, the magistrate must make a decision based on the facts and the law. In the extradition context, the principles of fundamental justice have been held to require, “at a minimum, a meaningful judicial assessment of the case on the basis of the evidence and the law. A judge considers the respective rights of the litigants or parties and makes findings of fact on the basis of evidence and applies the law to those findings. Both facts and law must be considered for a true adjudication. Since Bonham’s Case [(1610), 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 77 E.R. 646], the essence of a judicial hearing has been the treatment of facts revealed by the evidence in consideration of the substantive rights of the parties as set down by law” (Ferras, at para. 25). The individual and societal interests at stake in the certificate of inadmissibility context suggest similar requirements.”
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007 SCC 9 at paragraph 48
"Thus, in my view, the powers granted to the Law Society by s. 36(b) of the LPA, and as operationalized by R. 4-55 of the Law Society Rules, should be read broadly to permit the investigation of a member’s entire practice, as that may in certain circumstances be the best means to uncover the truth and protect the public and to determine whether disciplinary action should be taken."
BCSC Chambers Judge Andrew Majawa in A Lawyer v The Law Society of British Columbia, 2021 BCSC 914 at paragraph 63
“Justice is not only about results, it is about how those results are obtained”.
R. v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309 at paragraph 85
The BCSC Agreed With Privileged Discovery. The Proceedings Went Awry Following the Order.
CAGE Counsel sought special costs in their response to S-220956 in March 2022, claiming the matter was frivolous. The BC Supreme Court disagreed on April 1st, 2022, acknowledging that allegations of fraud, perjury, and collusion were evident at face value. Service was ordered on CRA and private entities related to the 2021 dispute. The file was later compromised.
At a Hearing Unlawfully Held in Private [Rule 22-1(5)], a BCSC Judge Encumbered the Discovery Order.
CRA Vigorously Opposed Discovery, Despite a Tax Enforcement Issue in the File [ITA, Section 222]. CRA Counsel Did Not Address the Iacobucci Legal Test. Citizens Understand the CRA to be an Objective Public Agency. BCSC Registry Staff Booked an Early Hearing Date Without the Consent of the Applicant.
There is No Analogue for the CRA Response, nor the Aggressive Pushback and Insistence on Urgency.
Res Judicata: CAGE Pre-Drafted Order Templates Seeking a Proximate Summary Hearing Were Signed
Following the April 1st, 2022 order, a series of chambers appearances were held in private rooms in violation of BSCS Rule 22-1(5). The proceedings were then guided by dishonest and false narratives which the court accepted at face value, ignored legal tests, abuse of process, and the approval of pre-drafted orders which held contempt for the discovery order, and sought to relitigate the matter of audit testimony (Res Judicata). These actions sought to re-write the overarching narrative.
The BC Appellate Court Blocked an Appeal of the Draft Orders Prior to the Summary Hearing
The matter of ongoing criminal interference was precluded from treatment in the file despite the same being obvious. The BCCA replicated the same manner of obstruction. The adjacent transcript depicts an instance where a BCCA judge closed chambers when the issue of CRA testimony was raised in accord with the April 1st, 2022 order, and ITA 241(3.1) concerning criminal offenses.
Abuse of Process, and Indeed, the Prejudicial Disposition of Authority, is a Heinous Violation of Charter Rights in the
Section 7 Level of Analysis. An Incomplete but Relevant List of Applicable Caselaw is Cited in the Authorities Page [Here].
Related & Ongoing PsyOp-Style Harassment | Pop-Ups, Algorithms, & CIMIC Mischief [see Guide]
CAGE Director
Scandal in the S-220956 Dismissal by BCSC Justice Andrew Majawa
Majawa Decision. S-220956 dismissed as a "fishing expedition", despite proof of fraud, perjury, and an outstanding order for audit data. The Decision text is Suffused with glaring falsehoods like this.
As compared to the decision text, there was no service of materials. An order to seek direction on service modality to related entities had already been made on April 1st, 2022, and the Parties had Agreed on the Roadmap (below). The manner of scandal evidenced is not limited to Majawa J.
S-220956 Majawa Decision: "The Evidence Does Not Matter."
Legal counsel was retained to establish a precedent for the Affidavit, review it multiple times, critique it, commission it, file it, and serve it on the CAGE Director. Counsel was aware of confidential information beginning at page 674 of the Affidavit, but did not file an Application for a sealing order. I am not legally trained, and whereas, counsel was retained to act independently on my behalf. Trained lawyers are not expected to make such mistakes in gross negligence. Justice Majawa was aware of these details.
Per Affidavit records, my governing Shareholder Agreement is dated July 27th, 2016. A different governing Agreement for other CAGE shareholders is dated July 25th, 2016. Notwithstanding, an unbiased judge would not claim that a loss of a quarter-million dollars, as a result of an act of gross negligence by retained counsel, following the execution a remedy the Parties agreed on, is germane to the object and proportion of justice.
Per Groberman J., Coast Foundation v. Currie, 2003 BCSC 1781 at paragraphs 13, 15;
“The question of when the court ought to give judgment on an issue, as opposed to on the claim generally, is more complex. The court is justifiably reluctant to decide cases in a piecemeal fashion. In addition to all of the concerns that arise when the entire claim is before the court, there is a multitude of others. The result is that the court must exercise considerable caution before coming to the conclusion that it should grant judgment on an issue in a summary trial [...] The court must also be wary of making determinations on particular issues on a Rule 18A application when those issues are inexorably intertwined with other issues that are to be left for determination at trial: Prevost v. Vetter, 2002 BCCA 202, 210 D.L.R. (4th) 649; inter-relatedness of issues is not always obvious, and caution is necessary whenever a party seeks judgment on an issue as opposed to Judgment generally under Rule 18A: B.M.P. Global et al v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2003 BCCA 534, [2003] B.C.J. No. 2383”
This is the only mention in the Majawa decision that makes any reference to the Zersetzung components related to the file. Likewise, no consideration was made regarding the conditions that occasioned the opening of S-220956 to begin with. Numerous legal tests apply concerning matters substantially related to the proceedings, and the encumbrances imposed on litigants in the absence of fiduciary support;
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Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 470 at paragraph 4;
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Girao v. Cunningham, 2020 ONCA 260 at paragraphs 156, 174, 177;
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Jonsson v Lymer, 2020 ABCA 167 at paragraphs 14, 60, 71, 85, 86.
Macfarlane J.A. promulgated the standard settlement test in Hawitt v. Campbell, [1983] CanLII 307 at paragraph 19;
The judge may refuse the stay if:
1. There was a limitation on the instructions of the solicitor known to the opposite party;
2. There was a misapprehension by the solicitor making the settlement of the instructions of the client or of the facts of a type that would result in injustice or make it unreasonable or unfair to enforce the settlement;
3. There was fraud or collusion;
4. There was an issue to be tried as to whether there was such a limitation, misapprehension, fraud or collusion in relation to the settlement.
The CSR (Central Securities Register) demonstrates that the CAGE Director committed an act of perjury in his Settlement Affidavit. The same Affidavit likewise contains two conflicting tax accounts concerning a company the CAGE entity was formerly partnered with. The remainder of evidence forms a broad compendium including shareholder agreements, communications, audit reports, behaviors, and more (Redacted November 22nd, 2023 Affidavit, pages 98 through 153, as linked here). This is why a (now-retired) BCSC adjudicator ordered service on CRA and related private entities on April 1st, 2022, according to the legal test in Hawitt.
The derecognition of assets clause in the CAGE entity's FY2020 Fiscal Report as shown on page 121 of the Redacted Affidavit reads as follows:
"The Company derecognizes financial assets only when the contractual rights to cash flows from the financial assets expire, or when it transfers the financial assets and substantially all of the associated risks and rewards of ownership to another entity. Gains and losses on derecognition are generally recognized in the consolidated statements of operations."
This would conceal any share transfers in the relevant year (see page 108). The consolidated statements themselves likewise yield relevant deltas (page 122).
This statement by a Federally-Appointed judge concerning the size of a Petition Record binder as a vetting mechanism is as reckless as it is antagonistic to the object and proportion of justice. Likewise, this judge ignored an outstanding mandate set previously in the same court concerning the introduction of audit data by CRA and three private entities related to the shareholder dispute. Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and Section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights require fair proceedings, which require a court to adjudicate matters on all relevant facts and law, and to ensure a fair process;
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Ruffo v. Conseil de la magistrature, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 267 at paragraph 38;
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New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 at paragraphs 73 through 75 and 119;
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Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007 SCC 9 at paragraphs 29, 41, 48;
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United States of America v. Cobb, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 587, 2001 SCC 19 at paragraph 53.
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007 SCC 9 at paragraph 29;
“This basic principle has a number of facets. It comprises the right to a hearing. It requires that the hearing be before an independent and impartial magistrate. It demands a decision by the magistrate on the facts and the law. [...] Precisely how these requirements are met will vary with the context. But for section 7 (of the Charter) to be satisfied, each of them must be met in substance.”
Shareholder records account for a fraction of filed materials. Specifically, they furnish 18.3% of the November 22nd, 2023 compendium Affidavit, and smaller proportions in other documents. Some Affidavits contained none, but were nonetheless sealed. A blanket sealing order over these materials is a violation of settled Constitutional law. Likewise, settlement privilege does not apply when the settlement itself is an issue. An overarching concern in a permanent complete seal is preclusion of this scandal from the public, whereas the same censorship precludes intervention because people are not properly informed about the file. Most importantly, the sealing orders concealed the conditions that occasioned the opening of S-220956, the obstruction of justice within the file, and the external criminal activities related to and impacting it. The sealing orders were made to conceal the scandal.
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Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25 at paragraph 1, 35, 75, 79, 85, 87, 91, 94,
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United States v. Meng, 2021 BCSC 1253 at paragraph 33
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Nguyen v. Dang, BCSC 1409 at paragraph 23
I filed a basket of evidence concerning two accounts of perjury in the CAGE Director's Settlement Affidavit, a basket of shareholder evidence (pages 98-153 in the November 22nd, 2023 Redacted Affidavit), and an order made on April 1st, 2022 in the same court to adduce privileged audit data accordance to the legal test in Hawitt v. Campbell, [1983] CanLII 307 at paragraph 19, as predicated on the merit in the file. More importantly, I gave an account of the conditions that occasioned the inception of the file, and whereas the same events breach section 3.2 of the Settlement Agreement as shown on the Zersetzung page. Yet, this miscarriage of justice resulted in a half-million dollars in special costs awarded to the perpetrators. How, and why?
Justice Majawa Had Set an Opposite Precedent in His Other Rulings
The foregoing closing comments in the S-220956 Majawa decision are diametrically opposed to the precedents he has set in other matters concerning access to justice. S-220956 was no fishing expedition; it was supported with hard evidence including two separate accounts of perjury in the CAGE Director's Settlement Affidavit. This was likewise recognized through an order to obtain privileged audit testimony. With respect to the initial shareholder dispute, the CAGE Director issued a default notice made possible through an act of gross negligence by my retained legal counsel, following the execution of the remedy for the same breach. Whereas this act by counsel is palpable gross negligence, and by means of the behavior of retained counsel following this act, collusion cannot be ruled out. The same likewise would align with the remainder of evidentiary components in this scandal. Notwithstanding that I had no intention to open S-220956 as an unrepresented and unemployed litigant beset by ongoing criminal mischief substantially related to the same Respondents, the file exactly met the criteria set forth in Hawitt. The thesis of third-party interference set forth in this website is supported through a comparison of other precedents set by the same judge. One such example I would cite here is A Lawyer v. The Law Society of British Columbia, 2021 BCSC 914.
In Lawyer, justice Majawa ordered a sweeping investigation of an entire law practice on the basis of a hypothesis by the LSBC. Anneke Driessen, a LSBC staff lawyer, wrote on February 11th, 2022;
"The auditor identified, among other things, that you may have allowed clients to use your trust accounts for the flow of funds in the absence of substantial legal services related to those funds and/or in the absence of making reasonable inquiries," wrote Anneke Driessen, a law society staff lawyer on Feb. 11, 2020.”
The foregoing hypothesis is compared with hard evidence presented in my first Affidavit of S-220956, which BSCS Master Cameron acknowledged on April 1st, 2022 as compelling enough to serve on Canada Revenue Agency, a CPA firm, a former partner company of the CAGE entity, and the holding company contemplated in the 2020 M&A action. Lawyer much more closely resembles a "fishing expedition" by comparison.
In Lawyer at paragraph 63, justice Majawa positioned the principle of fundamental justice as being vectored toward "uncovering the truth" and "protecting the public". He called for a broad rather than narrow disposition of investigative powers, similar to the jurisprudence of Iacobucci J. in Slattery (Trustee of) v. Slattery, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 430 as it relates to the testimony of CRA officials in civil matters (pages 161-162 in the Redacted November 22nd, 2023 Affidavit). With respect to relevant analysis, one must highlight a theme of using the "best means" to enable an outcome consistent with relevant key principles. The BCSC has a different mandate than the LSBC. The question being, did the BCSC use the best means available at its disposal to adjudicate in accordance with fundamental justice, germane to BCSC Rule 1-3? Or, were the powers of the bench used in a capacity opposite to its mandate? S-220956 began on solid footing, but the proceedings were severely and consistently derailed in a way that can only be described as unnatural, and subject to criminal interference which was never addressed in any capacity.
In S-220956, Justice Majawa obstructed justice by ignoring a previous order made in the same court, ignoring hard evidence, ignoring customary jurisprudence and legal tests, ignoring his own jurisprudence, insulating wrongdoers from prosecution, violating Constitutional Law, and awarding special costs to the CAGE Director against every legal test concerning it. Justice Majawa suppressed the truth, and endangered the public, allowing palpable wrongdoing to remain unaddressed, and in fact, rewarding it. As detailed in the Zersetzung page, matters germane to this scandal will and do inexorably victimize other people. Justice Majawa presided over a weaponized bench in S-220956.
At the request of counsel for the Attorney General of Canada, as is detailed in the forthcoming sections, justice Majawa, a BCSC chambers judge, and in violation of nine (9) rules of procedure concerning the BCSC and the Class Proceedings Act, dismissed S-229680 similar to S-220956. He likewise imposed severe and unfounded encumbrances affecting access to justice concerning the matters of this scandal. His actions made it nigh impossible to uncover the truth and protect the public, absent the actions of whistleblowers.
Finally, the jurisprudence in Lawyer is applicable to an investigation of the CAGE Director's trust accounts, as is contemplated further on.
For reasons unbeknownst to me, the court proceedings were not only choreographed; they were politicized. A normal court stamp appears on the left. To its right, the stamp for my motion to justice Majawa contains a feather. Not a smudge; a feather.
Test Criteria: Institutional & Judicial Impartiality
R. v. Lippé, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114 sets forth a legal test concerning bias, impartiality, and integrity is understood to be a matter of perception by reasonable, fair-minded, and informed persons, which has not been set aside.
R. v. Lippé, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114 on institutional impartiality;
“If a judicial system loses the respect of the public, it has lost its efficacy."
S-228567 & S-229680: Oct 2022 through April 2023
By September 2022, it became evident that obstruction of justice in S-220956 was systemic. In lieu of pursuing appeals predicated on S-220956, I opted instead to file a new class proceeding concerning the CAGE Director, the Government of Canada, and harassment actors, the latter whom I dubbed Defendant4 as a class of respondents (Salna v. Voltage Pictures, LLC, 2021 FCA 176). The matter seeks a basket of relief in view of charter, privacy, and human rights violations, systemic obstruction in justice and negligence, and costs initially awarded to the CAGE director in S-220956.
File S-228567 was an immediate predecessor to S-229680, filed in October 2022. Throughout 2022, I had been unable to secure legal counsel, including Government-sponsored Pro-bono programs I met test criteria for on paper. Private law firms would disengage prior to having a discussion about the matter, including those who specialized in law relevant to the matter. Opposing counsel for both parties in the style of cause advised the relief I sought in S-228567 could not be brought by way of petition. Whereas they were correct in this, I filed a notice of discontinuance in S-228567, and then filed S-229680, a Claim brought under the Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996,c.50 (the “CPA”), which is the correct Style of Proceeding to address the scope and subject matter brought forth.
My Affidavit filed in S-228567 did not contain a body of sworn statements and exhibited only social media and web content already available to the public. This file, including the same Affidavit, was sealed by the same judge that approved the hearing of petition S-220956 as a summary matter, ignoring the April 1st, 2022 discovery order. The Application Record for this hearing incorrectly cited counsel for the CAGE entity as counsel for the Government of Canada. The Government's official counsel abstained from upholding its own legislation germane to section 2(b) of the Charter, whereas it did not attend and advised it took no position. In this capacity, the Government of Canada was complicit in censorship.
The pleadings of S-229680 were sealed with a similar protection order by a different judge prior to counsel for the CAGE entity formally accepting service of the pleadings. They subsequently cited the sealing of S-228567 as an authoritative precedent, and again, the Government of Canada took no position. The supporting Affidavit in the originating documents in S-229680 had overlapping public materials. It was later discovered in January 2023 that the originating pleadings in S-229680 had been scrubbed from the electronic court registry.
In January 2023, the BCSC acknowledged my filed request for a case management judge and case planning conference in S-229680 as is required under Practice Direction 5. The same rule was authored by the BCSC Chief Justice, and is related to two other legislative acts governing matters brought under the Class Proceedings Act. Three days later, counsel for the Attorney General of Canada, as depicted in the visual aid below, states that S-229680 will instead be adjudicated by the same chambers judge that adjudicated S-220956 in a manner that had obstructed justice. No less than nine (9) serious and categorical violations of procedure followed, which the BCSC likewise ignored over a ten (10) week period. The court refused to respond to corrective requests, and refused to discuss the matter by phone. The BCSC Chief Justice later replied in April that an unlawful order, made beyond procedural parameters, was in effect, while ignoring a willful account of obstruction in justice, enforceable under section 139 of the Criminal Code. A trial of the common issues was thus prevented from proceeding in the BCSC.
An Overt and Palpable Violation of Procedure Requested by the Attorney General of Canada
Charter Matter S-229680 Was Sealed Extrajudicially at Inception
Pleadings Scrubbed From Registry Database
Declared a Vexatious Litigant for Filing Charter Matter S-229680
The Merit in the File
The excerpts above this section touch on the compelling issues brought before the BCSC. A prima facie account of shareholder fraud exists by means of the materials presented, as well as compelling evidence of collusion with the legal counsel I had retained to manage the 2021 dispute. The CAGE settlement affidavit likewise contains two accounts of perjury. The intent of the CAGE CEO is visible in records dating back to September 2020 both within and beyond courtrooms. This was first acknowledged by the BCSC on April 1st, 2022 per the adjacent, and later by local police prior a false report being filed. The existence of bias and collusion in the proceedings is evidenced through the disposition of litigation in response to the evidentiary record and its applicable legal tests. When the wrong judgments are issued, it evidences corruption. When they are issued repeatedly, it indicates scandal.
PD-27 Corrective Letters
The BCSC ignored five (5) letters sent over ten (10) weeks under Practice Direction 27, in response to the serious Rule violations cited earlier in the page. Each letter was less than five (5) pages. In the adjacent excerpt, Majawa J. treats reasonable corrective efforts as vexatious in character.
An Assertion of Prolix & Convoluted Filings
S-220956 and S-229680 are distinctly different files. The latter is a Charter matter that sought different relief, which counsel from both the CAGE and AG Canada advised could not be brought by Petition, as was the case with S-220956. As a result, S-228567 was discontinued and replaced by S-229680. In scandalous fashion, the latter file was sealed extrajudicially, and dismissed amid rule violations, at the request of AG Canada.
Majawa's assertion of convoluted filings is disingenuous, and is inconsistent compared with the observation of other adjudicators, as is exampled in the adjacent transcript excerpt. Further evidence of the same may be gleaned through CAGE Affidavits filed in an out-of-province court. By means of the excerpt below, it required just thirty-six (36) minutes for CAGE counsel to review a 143-page Affidavit I filed, thus suggesting an ease of review. It likewise underscores the felonious character of the cost scandal which had originated in British Columbia through a CAGE Affidavit in filed in BC. Finally, my academic background should be noted. It is difficult for an accredited institution to sign a postgraduate certificate if the student habitually produces indiscernible trash. Reasonable persons can glean, through the excerpts on this page, that the court had acted in a prejudicial capacity.
Self-Represented Litigants
From November 2021 onward, I was without fiduciary legal counsel despite best efforts to obtain the same. As shown earlier in this page, my retained counsel in the 2021 CAGE dispute had jeopardized the file through disclosing materials without my knowledge nor consent. The SCC held that self-represented litigants are afforded additional protections. In consideration of the same, a series of applicable legal tests are detailed below, and also in the Authorities Page.
Applicable Case Law
Predominantly, and supplemental to the legal test in R. v. Lippé, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114 concerning bias by a Federally-appointed judge, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII), [2019] 4 SCR 653 at paragraph 104 must be contemplated with respect to the reasonableness of the declaration;
“Similarly, the internal rationality of a decision may be called into question if the reasons exhibit clear logical fallacies, such as circular reasoning, false dilemmas, unfounded generalizations or an absurd premise. This is not an invitation to hold administrative decision makers to the formalistic constraints and standards of academic logicians. However, a reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that the decision maker’s reasoning “adds up”.
Concerning the consideration that must be afforded to self-represented litigants (and notwithstanding the fact that I was forced to represent myself at all times), the Supreme Court of Canada held in Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 470 at paragraph 4;
“We would add that we endorse the Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons (2006) (online) established by the Canadian Judicial Council.”
Girao v. Cunningham, 2020 ONCA 260 (“Girao”), Lauwers J.A underscores the foregoing precedent set in Pintea concerning the Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons, at paragraphs 156 , 176, and 177;
“The impression left by the limited trial record is that the trial judge allowed himself to be led by trial counsel’s arguments. Ms. Girao, a self-represented, legally unsophisticated plaintiff who struggled with the English language, was left to her own devices. Fairness required more, consistent with the expectations placed on the trial judge by Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons.” [...] “Ms. Girao was entitled to but did not get the active assistance of the trial judge whose responsibility it was to ensure the fairness of the proceeding. As a self-represented litigant, she was also entitled to, but did not get, basic fairness from trial defense counsel as officers of the court. The trial judge was also entitled to seek and to be provided with the assistance of counsel as officers of the court, in the ways discussed above. This did not happen." [...] I would allow the appellant’s appeal, set aside the judgment and orders, and order a new trial. I would award the costs of this appeal and of the trial to the appellant, including her disbursements.”
Concerning vexatious declarations specifically, Slatter J. wrote in Jonsson v Lymer, 2020 ABCA 167 at paragraph 14;
“Vexatious litigants must be distinguished from self-represented litigants. Merely because a self-represented litigant uses a process that is not in accordance with the Rules of Court, or advances a claim without merit does not mean that they are vexatious. Many self-represented litigants are unfamiliar with court procedures, and are inadequately or inaccurately informed about their legal rights and the limitations on them. Merely because the self-represented litigant excessively or passionately believes in the merit of his or her cause does not make them vexatious.”
Lymer likewise highlights the importance of proper case management, which was absent throughout the scandal. By way of procedural violations in S-229680, which remained in effect and uncorrected at appellate venues thereafter, I was denied the assignment of a Case Management Judge. This provision is mandated under BCSC Practice Direction 5 with respect to the Style of Proceeding in S-229680, which BCSC Scheduling had acknowledged in an email on January 27th, 2023. BCSC Scheduling had subsequently complied with an unlawful assertion by counsel for the Attorney General of Canada that the file would instead be heard by chambers judge Andrew Majawa (the same who had dismissed S-220956), in violation of nine (9) Rules of procedure. Court staff refused to respond to corrective correspondence. Nine Rules of procedure were displaced by the BCSC by its scheduling staff. The matter clearly invites public alarm. Slatter J. writes in paragraph 60;
“This was a case of complex litigation involving a difficult litigant which was already in case management. The issues should have been dealt with in case management. A blanket vexatious litigant order did not address the problem in a proportionate or effective way, and was not an effective or appropriate remedy for contempt. The case management judge should have granted a carefully crafted case management order, and possibly a litigation plan under R. 4.5, instead of a boilerplate vexatious litigant order.”
At paragraphs 85 and 86 in Lymer, the court concludes that self-represented litigants should not be denied access to justice through onerous orders limiting their participation, in an absence of more reasonable and customary provisions;
“Parties are entitled to self-represent, and the court should be sensitive to the challenges faced by self-represented litigants. Vexatious litigant orders should only be made when other procedural techniques have proven to be inadequate and the offensive conduct is persistent. [...] In conclusion, the appeal is allowed. The vexatious litigant order should not have been granted in these circumstances, and in any event the form of order granted was overbroad. The sanction for contempt cannot stand given the failure to afford the appellant a fair hearing. The question of sanction for contempt is referred back to the trial court for a fresh hearing before a different judge."
Whereas the foregoing tests may concern honest mistakes, the concurrence shown in the proceedings, both within and outside courtrooms, must be considered as in the manner of scandal.
Meeting with Halifax Regional Police (“HRP”), December 8th, 2022
Following months of attempts for an audience with the RCMP and Halifax Regional Police (“HRP”), I was eventually able to meet with an HRP constable on December 8th, 2022 at my current place of residence in Halifax County. The meeting lasted one hour and nineteen minutes.
During verbal exchange which included an extensive review of my Affidavit materials concerning the parties and aforementioned events, the constable acknowledged actionable evidence with respect to online harassment as connected to the CAGE director, in addition to the basket of shareholder records germane to S-220956 implicating the same. The constable proposed a roadmap for investigation with milestones.
Following this meeting, the same constable did not return correspondence. I was able to obtain the official police report via FOIPOP request in early January 2023. The same report declared me a "mentally-ill person" and held there was no evidence to conduct an investigation. False reports fall under section 137 of the Canadian Criminal Code (“CCC”). Perjury falls under section 131. Sections 137 and 131(1) of the CCC read:
CCC 137: “Every one who, with intent to mislead, fabricates anything with intent that it shall be used as evidence in a judicial proceeding, existing or proposed, by any means other than perjury or incitement to perjury is guilty of an indictable offense and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.”
CCC 131(1): “Subject to subsection (3), every one commits perjury who, with intent to mislead, makes before a person who is authorized by law to permit it to be made before him a false statement under oath or solemn affirmation, by affidavit, solemn declaration or deposition or orally, knowing that the statement is false."
As cited by current AG David Lametti, MAID (Medical Assistance In Dying), is planned to be provisioned on the basis of mental illness alone in due course. This makes false reports under these conditions all the more sobering, notwithstanding ongoing abuses from harassment actors.
Mindful of systemic denial of recourse throughout 2022 and coupled with the foregoing accounts on this page, I quietly recorded the entirety of my meeting with HRP in accord with section 183.1 of the CCC. I subsequently obtained a true transcript of the entirety of the audio recording from Trint, a UK-based company specializing in voice-to-text transcription. This I furnished in Exhibit B of my third Affidavit of S-229680, along with a brief document comparing important highlights. The original recording remains on my android device with true copies on file.
In the days that followed, I filed an Application to join HRP and Surrey RCMP to S-229680 as parties in accord with the relief sought in the Claim. Surrey RCMP subsequently advised they were already represented by counsel for the Crown. Counsel for the City of Halifax advised that HRP had refused to accept service of this Application in January 2023, despite being served in accord with BC Supreme Court Rules and section 10 of the BC Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act.
Chief Justice Christopher Hinkson subsequently advised the Application to join HRP was dismissed by the same chambers judge that dismissed all files concerning the parties, while ignoring repeated letter correspondence filed under Practice Direction 27 asking the court to enforce its own rules governing the Style of Proceedings. HRP did not respond to a subsequent request for correspondence concerning its false police report. Likewise, as reflected in the SCC Motion for Reconsideration (here), the NS Police Complaints Commissioner refused to process the file.
CAGE Director's Relationship to PsyOp | Cyber | Mischief | Zersetzung Actors Following Settlement [Link]
Shareholder Fraud | Perjury in the Settlement Affidavit
Police Regulator Refused to Act
The meeting with HRP and the false report that followed is another binary example of denial of recourse to public service agencies. The manner and disposition of regulatory conduct must likewise be subject to an overarching investigation of the scandal. Again, the manner, scope, and consistency in denial of safe avenue is among the most compelling data points evidencing a clear case of third-party interference. The first data point with respect to POLCOM as pictured is their unwillingness to adduce evidence relevant to the complaint.
True Audio Transcript
"BEAUTIFUL EVIDENCE" | Implication of CAGE CEO in Criminal Interference & Mischief | Articulation of Next Steps
Official Police Report Obtained via Freedom of Information Request
"LACK OF EVIDENCE" | Pejorative Mischaracterization of Participants | Closure of File
The Commissioner’s comments are beyond baffling in view of a binary difference between the December 8th, 2022 audio transcript and the formal HRP report that followed. These omissions, denials, and dismissals in the face of factual irrefutable evidence are astounding and unnatural. Likewise, they are consistent, and they have not been corrected through customary escalation mechanisms (ie., the Appellate courts in the case of proceedings). My recent supplementary post outlines these observations in more detail (here).
CAGE Director’s Contempt Applications
The CAGE Director applied to find me in contempt of court in October 2022 for the disclosure of a redacted Affidavit designed to locate safe avenue and solicit intervention. This Affidavit was redacted in accord with the open court principle and contained no biographical information nor commercial data (by means of the Sherman Estate legal test, it should not have been sealed to begin with). I attempted to solicit help using this redacted document in the midst of ongoing and relentless online and on-heels harassment connected to the respondents, and in the absence of safe avenue of recourse to law enforcement and customary agencies, and whereas, the court was unwilling to consider the topic in chambers. Canada’s highest court treated circumstances such as these in R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, 2001 SCC 24 and R. v. Hibbert, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973. Per Ruzic at paragraph 29;
"At the heart of this defense is the perceived injustice of punishing violations of the law in circumstances in which the person had no other viable or reasonable choice available; the act was wrong but it is excused because it was realistically unavoidable."
In Ruzic, Paragraph 66 as it relates to the ongoing harassment and covert torture mechanism related to the Respondents, and inexorably evidenced to have state backing; “Notably, at common law, there is no requirement that the threats be made by a person who is present at the scene of the crime. It has been said that the threat must be “immediate” or “imminent” and that persons threatened must resort to the protection of the law if they can do so. While the defense is not available to those who have “an obvious safe avenue of escape”, I agree with Martin J.A. that the operative test is “whether the accused failed to avail himself or herself of some opportunity to escape or render the threat ineffective.”
The court ignored these circumstances in chambers and declared me in civil contempt. The court imposed a fine along with an award of special costs to the CAGE Director, which the BCSC Registrar certified in amount $40,717.53 higher than a comparable out-of-province Application concerning the same Parties, and in other words, an 83x cost multiplier. Counsel for the CAGE Director suggested this amount was justifiable because the CAGE Director’s "usual counsel was away on vacation”, and that overlapping counsel had to be applied to the file with over 90 hours of billable labor to produce a simple 11-page PDF file. These same lawyers were active since the inception of the file, and whereas the same overlap precedent was carried through to seek an award of over a half-million dollars. The court further ignored circumstances in the effect that I am an unrepresented and unemployed litigant beset by daily online and on-heels stalking, all the while being denied help by police and the right to a fair trial. By contrast, a January 2023 article in the Globe and Mail advised the Government of Canada spent over $94 million CAD on hotel rooms for asylum seekers since 2015. From my perch, I have yet to discover a more compelling example of institutional abuse in Canadian history.
On March 23rd, 2023, counsel for the CAGE entity filed an application to find me in “further contempt” of court. This was predicated on a letter I sent to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and a handful of parliamentarians in January 2023, including Conservative opposition leader Pierre Poilievre. The Government of Canada is party to this matter whereas the same document was filed and served on December 2022. Personal outreach to the PM was inspired by a December 2022 interview between the PM and CTV News anchor Omar Sachedina. The transcript reads as follows;
“It's a good thing that we have a system that catches those mistakes, that calls them out that, you know, shares them with Canadians, that that we explain and Canadians get to decide whether it was an honest mistake or whether someone was trying to fill their pockets, I mean, we have a system that has the kind of accountability, transparency, that works and that is clear to reassure Canadians that if someone is taking advantage of the system — either deliberately or by accident — they'll get caught and called out on it. And that's an example of the institutions working.”
- Transcript: CTVnews.ca
Transmission was made via Canada Post Registered Mail and also via email. To date, neither the PM nor any of the other MPs copied responded in any capacity. Canadians should have a basic expectation in the advice of its leadership, and Citizens should not take ownership when Canadian institutions fall short of their mandates.
A second part of the same application for contempt involves my filing of complaints to regulators such as the Canadian Judicial Council, the Canadian Bar Association, and the BC Human Rights Tribunal. Pursuant to section 21(1) in the BC Human Rights Code, any citizen may file a complaint backed by supporting affidavits, and per section (4), the Code prevails over other modalities of legislation should any conflict arise. The same is underscored in the Interpretation Act R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21. Absent an ability to review supporting materials, a regulator could not do its job.
The judge played hardball at the hearing on April 27th, 2023, suggesting that I might be “incarcerated” for failing to pay the fine from the previous contempt hearing. In response, I advised of an intent to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada and outlined background circumstances concerning relentless harassment and denial of recourse. I further highlighted R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, 2001 SCC 24 and R. v. Hibbert, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973 in the requirement of due-diligence, and Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 79, whereas the court did not consider relevant contextual evidence:
In Laiken, paragraph 62: “Contempt proceedings are subject to the standard principles that allow parties to reopen findings in exceptional circumstances to permit consideration of fresh evidence or new facts that were not before the court at the first hearing.”
And in paragraph 35 in Ruzic,
“Without requiring a full mens rea, the Court decided that, generally speaking, absent very clear and explicit language to the contrary, at least a defense of due diligence should be available to the accused. This form of penal responsibility had to be grounded on an element of voluntariness, the choice left to the accused being at least that of acting with due diligence, to avoid convicting innocents (p. 1313)."
The judge subsequently found me in contempt, awarded special costs to the CAGE Director, and published Oral Reasons which denied the existence of filed Affidavit evidence demonstrating judicial and police misconduct. I continue to be systemically harassed, denied justice, denied recourse, and punished for seeking help. All of this has happened, and is happening, in a country seeking candidacy for a seat on the United Nations human rights council.
Seeking Trial of the Issues in S-229680
(The Issues Outlined on this Website)
The Supreme Court of British Columbia, having acknowledged receipt of my submission under BCSC Practice Direction 5 for the assignment of a case management judge and case planning conference on January 27th, 2023, remained silent following the submission of applications by both Respondents in the Style of Cause seeking to dismiss the matter prior to the discovery and trial of common issues. Whereas the BCSC Civil Rules do make provision for irregularities on a case by case basis, provisions are in place to avoid and mitigate these if they may lead to mistrial, and whereas this scenario involves no less than nine (9) procedural violations which include a basket of procedural rules under the Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996,c.50. Despite five (5) corrective letters filed under BCSC Practice Direction 27 requesting that the court simply enforce these rules and request the Respondents to do likewise, the court remained silent for ten (10) weeks while S-229680 was pushed into the ground by the same chambers judge that ignored the discovery order in S-220956. Whereas these rule violations are clear, unacceptable, and involve settled procedural legislation, addressing this matter rightfully involves recourse to an enforcement mechanism as opposed to an appeal judge. The same is reflected in BCSC Rule 9-5(1) and (3), outlining the power of the court and its registrar to address miscarriage in justice in the event it might arise this way.
The BC Human Rights tribunal was approached under section 8 of the Code upon being notified that S-229680 had indeed been dismissed by a chambers judge. The complaint to the Tribunal considered omissions on the part of BCSC court staff in abiding the series of rule violations germane to the foregoing, including accepting Applications from both respondents which outwardly rejected the Style of Proceeding under BCSC Rule 22-3(5) and 22-3(6)(a), and likewise the BCSC Scheduling Manager for failing to process my PD-5 filing following its acknowledgement. Finally, the Registrar was considered in allowing a chambers hearing to be held in violation of PD-5 and section 14(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996,c.50, and allowing orders to be made and entered from this unlawful hearing which violated the remainder of CPA rules furnished in the visual exhibits listed further down on this page. This complaint was rejected during the screening process for lack of supporting evidence. Pursuant to Tribunal rules, I filed an amended Application which included a 111-page supporting Affidavit. This was rejected within seventeen (17) minutes after it was sent.
I had previously informed counsel and the BCCA Registrar of my intention to address these issues and seek a fair trial of the common issues in S-229680, which represent the concerns on this website generally speaking, whereas at no material time have these issues been tried. On receiving a memo from BCSC Chief Justice Christopher Hinkson, which made no mention of procedural violation but had cited the dismissal of my Application to join HRP and RCMP to the file, I advised the BCCA Registrar of an intent to appeal S-229680 in his court. Counsel for the CAGE entity issued a response letter within that same hour, decrying my Notice of Appeal and demanding that the rules be followed. The Appeal notice had been filed four (4) days past the customary 30-day deadline. The Registrar, advising that it would set a poor precedent to regularize a procedural violation, rejected my Notice of Appeal and requested I file an Application to Extend Time to Appeal. I did likewise.
On the hearing of the same Application, both Respondents in the Style of Cause remained silent and offered no oral submissions. I completed my own submissions before the judge which outlined the contextual background and my attempts to properly address an egregious abuse of process. The chambers judge vectored her attention to the previous contempt hearings, one of which took place a day earlier, and denied the existence of the evidentiary records referenced on this website which the same judge was privy to. The chambers judge advised that due to two unfounded contempt orders, it was not in the interest of justice to allow an Appeal of S-229680 to proceed. I subsequently advised the judge that each matter informed the other, whereas, a trial of the common issues in S-229680 would inform the court of issues germane to the circumstances of the contempt hearings which were never discussed nor tried. This counsel was rejected, whereas the BCCA imposed a reverse onus in rejecting the existence of evidence in the contempt hearings, and denying my ability to bring the same evidence before the court in a meaningful capacity.
Immediately following my oral submissions in this hearing and without pause or recess, the chambers judge recited an Oral Reasons document which required over fifteen (15) minutes to read. This document was prepared in advance of the hearing, which inexorably suggested that the decision of the court was made prior to the appearance in chambers that day. This long-form oral reasons recitation claimed that no reasonable direction was given as to why the Notice of Appeal was filed beyond deadline, whereas, copious reference was made to the aforementioned rule violation and contextual background. The long-form oral reasons recitation made reference to the host of online actors to the extent that a trial of common issues in S-229680 might "disrupt lives". This was a remarkable admission. A shortened form of her oral reasons were subsequently posted which omitted reference to the same, but made no mention of the procedural blunders in the lower court nor my efforts to address these issues. Within two business days, the BCCA made two separate accounts mischaracterizing proceedings and positioning me as vexatious.
I secured a transcript of this hearing from a Vancouver-based transcription firm, as I had done so with a number of other chambers appearances. This transcript recorded oral submissions up until the end of my own but did not include reference to the 15-minute recitation by the judge immediately following my submissions. The same company advised only the court could provide oral reasons. I subsequently made four separate requests to the BC Court of Appeal for this long-form oral reasons transcript. I was politely denied each time, and subsequently asked to write a formal letter to its Registrar for disclosure. The Registrar, in violation of sections 1.11.1 and 1.6 of the court's access policy, refused to provide the audio recording and transcript for this recitation. Per the visual exhibits furnished below, I reiterated my legal right to procure these materials, which yielded no response. I subsequently filed a FOIPOP request, and was advised that in Canada, the distinction between the Executive and Judicial branches prevented the actioning of my request. I make special notation here of the SNC Lavalin scandal, and numerous accounts of the executive branch interfering in RCMP investigations.
My efforts to seek trial of the issues on this website were then submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada in Leave to Appeal Applications alongside a Motion for Certiorari, whereas redacted copies of these materials are included near the bottom of this page.
Following Nine (9) Procedural Violations at the BCSC, the BCCA Rejected a 4-Day Extension to Appeal
March 28th, 2023 letter to BCCA & Counsel
Recourse to the BC Tribunal was Immediately Rejected
A Yale Law Study Concerning Corruption (Click to Expand)
The Registrar Refused to Disclose the Oral Reasons
Rules Provisioning the Right of Access.
As exampled above in excerpts concerning BCSC Andrew Majawa, palpable errors in fact such as this are suffused throughout the proceedings, irrespective of the bench they were delivered from. Incendiary comments were often made, such as those at paragraph 49 below concerning respect for the Rules. The BCCA judge ignored testimony concerning the (9) procedural violations in BCSC S-229680.
Dismissal of my Application to Extend Time to Appeal S-229680 by four days. The CAGE and AG Canada remained silent. Oral Reasons were read immediately following my submissions, requiring 15 minutes to recite, suggesting a decision on the Application was made prior to its hearing. No mention was made of the procedural violations in the BCSC by its registry staff, nor my efforts in approaching the BC Tribunal. The judge acknowledged social media harassment actors, and expressed concern that a trial may be disruptive to their interests.
My Request to Obtain a Transcript of the Oral Reasons
2023 Hearings Outside British Columbia
Out-of-province proceedings in 2023 followed the same pattern in British Columbia in various capacities. Over the course of 2023, I had predicated a stay of costs on my Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”). A motion in July 2023 to stay an execution order of $41,217.53 for a BCCA application was dismissed, despite the court recognizing my legal right to a stay, and a balance of convenience in my favor by means of the wealth gap. The court made an obvious and palpable error in stating I was “successfully sued by the CAGE Director in British Columbia’, and whereas, that the same event would not be expected to qualify for a hearing before the SCC. The judge based his decision to dismiss my motion on this palpable error in fact, as is reflected at paragraph (1) of his written decision. It is exceedingly rare for a judge to make such a palpable error when presented with written and oral submissions, including affidavit evidence, that indicated otherwise. This palpable error likewise precluded the public from properly understanding the nature of the scandal.
My appeal of the foregoing ruling was predicated on informing an appellate court of the correct background of proceedings in British Columbia, so it could grant the stay provisioned under the Enforcement of Canadian Decrees and Judgments Act - a very easy Appeal. I was ordered to pay security of costs in this appeal, which was pronounced on the basis that I was declared a vexatious litigant in British Columbia by justice Majawa, without further substance, and irrespective of the Affidavit I had filed which explained the absurdity of the declaration. I paid the security deposit, whereas each aspect of the customary process was followed in the Appeal. In support of the basis of the Appeal, I filed an Affidavit made on August 23rd, 2023 (the redacted copy is linked here), which contains a detailed chronology of events that took place from September 2020 until the date of deposition. The Affidavit likewise contains detailed evidentiary exhibits. The parties agreed on modest redactions in this Affidavit in a motion for confidentiality. In October 2023, an appellate judge advised that she could not decide the confidentiality motion until the hearing of the appeal in December 2023. I reminded the court of my Constitutional right to freedom of expression, and advised that a sealing of the Affidavit might prevent intervention in the SCC matter, because the public was simply not aware of the scandal. Notwithstanding, the judge advised the motion had to be heard before a panel of three judges. The Affidavit was sealed in its entirety, along with any reference in relation to the same Affidavit (including the confidentiality motion), thereby precluding knowledge of it from the public. The same judge set opposite (and correct) precedents concerning Constitutional law in different matters, with one example as quoted; “settled constitutional law cannot be re-litigated”. The judge demonstrated bias in a matter concerning settled Constitutional law, and whereas the same is commensurate with the manner of obstruction observed in the BC courts.
In December 2023, a panel of three appellate judges placed a permanent sealing order over the August 23rd, 2023 Affidavit along with related materials, and advised that the Appeal was "entirely without merit". Again, the basis of the Appeal was simple: all I had to do was rely on the same legal right to a stay pursuant to the Enforcement Act, demonstrate that I was not successfully sued by the CAGE Director in British Columbia, and that the SCC file contained matters of public importance as is required for SCC docket entry. The August 23rd, 2023 Affidavit achieved those objectives. The panel of judges dismissed the palpable error made by the lower court judge as a “slip of the tongue”, whereas the lower court judge had made his declaration in paragraph (1) of his written reasons. The panel then closed the hearing and pronounced judgment, which dismissed the appeal and placed a perpetual seal over the entirety of the August 23rd, 2023 Affidavit. This is included in the visual exhibit section below. The audio recording of these hearings remain on file, whereas the panel appeared flustered in chambers. No written reasons were provided. The violations of Constitutional law involved in this decision and the palpable errors made by all judges involved are exceedingly rare, if not unprecedented. As such, two courts in two Canadian provinces by that time had aligned themselves in obstructing justice, violating constitutional law, and concealing the details of the scandal. I had asked what interest the out-of-province court might have in obstructing justice to this extent, and was not provided with a response.
Mischaracterization | Censorship | Violation of Constitutional Law
Misuse of the Bench, & Grand-Theft Felony Facilitated Through Legitimate Authorities
A number of the most severe discretionary powers of the court were leveraged absent the diligence and restraint required by their legal tests to obstruct a fair process, preclude public visibility, furnish the CAGE Respondents with compensatory monies, and protect them from prosecution, both at the time of judgment and in consideration of future hearings. A number of rulings were made against precedents set by the very same judges. Likewise, none of these miscarriages in justice were corrected at the appellate level.
Censorship
The June 30th, 2022, order of BCSC justice Tucker pronounced a protection (restraining) order over the contents of file S-220956, in the absence of evidence that any such order was required. The same precedent was repeated in the August 22nd, 2022 ruling of BCCA justice Willcock, and in every subsequent Application made concerning materials pertaining to the scandal, without consideration of the appropriate legal tests and Constitutional law. The order served to (1) encumber the outstanding April 1st, 2022 order for audit testimony, (2) prevent public understanding of the matter, (3) preclude intervention, and (4) support a narrative that eventually resulted in an unfounded vexatious litigant declaration. Likewise, the protection order was replicated in S-229680 prior to the CAGE Respondents accepting service of the pleadings. Finally, this precedent was repeated in an out-of-province court by extraordinary means.
Omission of Factual Evidence
As outlined previously, I was found in contempt for issuing a redacted copy of a BCCA Affidavit which detailed events related to the matter up until that time, to relevant government agencies and police, whereas customary safe avenue was consistently unavailable, and whereas obstruction of justice was found to be overt, systemic, and obvious. Criminal mischief and harassment tantamount to covert torture as related to the Respondents continued on a daily basis with no reasonable expectation of reprieve. A relevant analogue is detailed in R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, 2001 SCC 24 at paragraphs 29 and 66. Despite being served written submissions including Affidavit evidence, and notwithstanding a detailed review of relevant context at the hearing, a BCCA judge declared me in contempt of court for issuing a redacted Affidavit which would otherwise be available to the public per the open court principle and settled Constitutional law (Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, Nguyen v. Dang, BCSC 1409, United States v. Meng, 2021 BCSC 1253). The Affidavit likewise disclosed no biographical or commercial data according to the same precedents.
I was found in further contempt by another BCCA judge for sending a letter to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau detailing the obstruction of justice and abuse of institutional power in this matter, one day following an egregious cost certification by the BCCA Registrar. AG Canada was party to the same document attached to the letter as an addendum, and the Respondents’ Application was filed two months following this event, despite them being served a copy of the same letter three months prior. The Application date coincided with an expressed intent on my part to continue seeking relief in S-229680 after its unlawful dismissal involving the violation of nine (9) procedural rules. I made the court aware that the Government of Canada was Party to the file, and likewise the December 22nd, 2022 interview between the Prime Minister and CTV’s chief news anchor Omar Sachedina, where Mr. Trudeau encouraged people to speak out and expose institutional corruption when it occurs (here). During this hearing, the judge denied the existence of affidavit evidence concerning police and judicial misconduct committed over the past year, and reflected this at paragraph 36 of his oral reasons. I was fined $10,000, and the Respondents were awarded over $15,000 in costs. It might be difficult if not impossible to point to another precedent remotely resembling this.
Besides the April 1st, 2022 hearing and its subsequent order, the remainder of proceedings that followed, over a two-year period, had omitted consideration of the gravity of this scandal, and its firm evidentiary record.
Encumbering Access to Justice
On February 23rd, 2023, justice Andrew Majawa, in violation of nine (9) procedural rules in hearing S-229680, declared me a vexatious litigant in direct contradiction to the jurisprudence in Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 470, Jonsson v Lymer, 2020 ABCA 167, and Girao v. Cunningham, 2020 ONCA 260, and without any evidence that the same legal tests were met. As a result, I was precluded from filing any additional materials in the BCSC without leave of the court, including any letters to the court. Likewise, the same order specifically blocked any manner of prosecution against the Respondents and any related people or entities in the Provincial Court of British Columbia (the criminal court). The vexatious declaration was likewise leveraged in every subsequent hearing thereafter as a means to obstruct justice in those matters.
Reverse Onus to Prevent Trial
On May 16th, 2023, a BCCA judge used the aforementioned contempt rulings and vexatious declaration to impose a reverse onus on continued proceedings, thereby preventing a trial of the common issues in S-229680 at the appellate level. I advised the court that a trial of the common issues were required to purge contempt, whereas it was wrongfully declared in the first place (R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, 2001 SCC 24 at paragraphs 29, 66, and 72; R. v. Hibbert, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973 at paragraph 52). This I had contrasted with the notion of being punished by an unjust costs award, made in a hearing that neglected to adduce the evidentiary substance of the matter (Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 79 at paragraph 62). As was the case with the contempt hearings, I was asked to take ownership for serious state-sponsored crimes, and foot the bill as an unemployed and unrepresented Citizen, rather than have the real issues heard and properly adjudicated in accord with the object and proportion of justice (BCSC Rule 1-3).
Immediately following these submissions and without recess, and for the next twenty minutes, the judge read oral reasons which were printed prior to the hearing. The judge advised that a trial of the common issues in S-229680 might “create social unrest’. Following the hearing, the BCCA Registrar refused to provide an audio recording of the judge’s ruling, which had redacted this reference prior to being delivered to the Parties. Deprivation of the original pronouncement is contrary to section 1.11.1 of the BCCA Courtroom Records Access policy. It is exceedingly rare that a court would use its powers to protect criminal activity, or in this case, prevent disclosure of a scandal. In making that pronouncement, the court advised that the state expects me to accept ownership of the crimes it had facilitated, and likewise, that I should accept victimhood. These events question the viability of Canadian democracy at its most basic level.
Perjury, Collusion, and the Retainer Fee Felony Scandal
On February 7th, 2023, the BCCA Registrar awarded the Respondents $41,217.53 in costs in a matter comparable in scope and complexity to the motion heard before an out-of-province judge concerning its execution order. This concerned the first contempt hearing, where the judge had precluded consideration of factual background. At face value, the Registrar approved the Respondents’ submission that the application required 94.14 hours of billable work @ $437.82/hour between three lawyers familiar with the file, to produce an 11-page written argument which resembles an editable template most likely used by the firm’s 500+ other solicitors from time to time. By comparison, the out-of-province judge certified $500 in costs for a comparable amount of work of the same legal complexity, also resulting in an 11-page PDF submission. Subsequently, the same Registrar arbitrarily doubled the cost amount in a hearing on June 11th, 2023, citing a rule which was inapplicable to the file. These are disgraceful abuses of institutional power, which may have no prior precedent in a court of competent jurisdiction, and are exceedingly rare.
A repeat of the same precedent set by the BCCA Registrar occurred in November 2023, at a hearing before the BCSC to assess costs. The hearing was instead held by BCSC Master Scarth as an irregularity and not a Registrar (BCSC Rule 14-1(4)). Master Scarth refused to acknowledge a clear case of miscarriage in justice, and accepted the Affidavit of the CAGE Director’s lead counsel at face value. This Affidavit cited four lawyers involved in the file with egregious accounts of overlap, which Master Scarth likewise acknowledged. Notwithstanding, costs were certified at 100% in an amount of $376,201.97. As detailed in visual Affidavit exhibits, the harassment group related to the Respondents (cited in S-229680 as “Defendant4’), made acute reference to overlap and the recovery of copious monies the same day CAGE counsel issued the cost estimates on June 28th, 2023.
Jurisprudence by the same judge who dismissed my matters amid gross procedural violations, Andrew Majawa, presents justification for the investigation of a lawyer's entire practice in A Lawyer v The Law Society of British Columbia, 2021 BCSC 914 at paragraph 63;
“A key principle derived from these cases is that the investigatory powers of a regulator should not be interpreted too narrowly as doing so may “preclud[e] it from employing the best means by which to ‘uncover the truth’ and ‘protect the public’” (Wise v. LSUC, 2010 ONSC 1937 at para. 17 [Wise], citing Gore at para. 29). Thus, in my view, the powers granted to the Law Society by s. 36(b) of the LPA, and as operationalized by R. 4-55 of the Law Society Rules, should be read broadly to permit the investigation of a member’s entire practice, as that may in certain circumstances be the best means to uncover the truth and protect the public and to determine whether disciplinary action should be taken. Given the context within which lawyers and their trust accounts operate, the broad investigatory power authorizing the Law Society to conduct an “investigation of the books, records and accounts of the lawyer” provided for in s. 36(b) of the LPA and in R. 4-55 should not be distorted to mean something narrower without explicit statutory language suggesting the same: Wise at para. 17.”
Disparity in CAGE counsel’s trust accounts between what the CAGE Director paid, and what his counsel asked of the court would likewise implicate CAGE counsel in perjury. The BCSC acknowledged proof of perjury in the September 22nd, 2021 settlement Affidavit sworn by the CAGE Director on April 1st, 2022, prior to procedural violations obstructing the discovery order made that day. Again notwithstanding the fact that a trial of the common issues was prevented from happening, there is no conceivable way the CAGE Director paid $428,419.50 into an Osler, Hoskin, and Harcourt LLP trust account as a result of the proceedings that unfolded. It can likewise be assumed that the CAGE director has an interest in ensuring an efficient process is followed, as the same would affect any encumbrance of his legal fees. Finally, law firms are expected to maintain best practices around processes to ensure a less burdensome experience for their clients.
The applicable legal test is Bradshaw Construction Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 54 B.C.L.R. (2d) 309 (S.C.), paragraph 44, which maintains;
"Special costs are fees a reasonable client would pay a reasonably competent solicitor to do the work described in the bill".
This test implicates both the CAGE CEO and his BC law firm in felony. The CAGE CEO would not agree to pay an amount 83 times what is customary, and no reputable law firm would charge it. The adjudicator is likewise implicated for certifying it, as are adjudicators in subsequent enforcement-related hearings. Readers are asked to consider the use of the judicial system in this capacity and the governance scandal it invokes.
The same trust account and any related trust accounts must be investigated alongside the remainder of issues in the file. These amounts were predicated on the recovery of the CAGE Director’s settlement funds in 2021, and bonuses for his counsel. The proceedings themselves are evidenced to be entirely choreographed, and formalized through the approval of pre-drafted orders that CAGE counsel had consistently passed to adjudicators for signature. A number of these order templates resembled subject matter which were entirely removed from the substance of the chambers hearing (see Affidavits).
By means of the details in this section, the powers of the bench were used to protect criminal misconduct, obstruct justice, punish victims, defame, conceal, and provision an unlawful pursuit of assets. Likewise, no corrective actions were taken to correct the miscarriage in justice these events have occasioned. The consistent precedent at all levels of court and throughout all related agencies in the face of a compelling evidence and legal tests is exceedingly rare if not unprecedented. The consistency of these events underscores the public interest inherent in the scandal.
A Felony Scandal of this Character is Able to Question the Mode of Governance in Canada
Cost Metrics Comparison Benchmarks: Eye-Rending Arithmetic
Time and Complexity Variables at Par, and Irrespective of the Substance and Disposition of the Files
Out of Province Application: ONE Lawyer Assigned | ONE Hearing | $500 Cost Certification in accordance with the standard tariff.
BCCA Application: THREE Overlapping Lawyers Assigned | ONE Hearing | $41,217.52 Cost Certification | 83x Cost Multiplier
S-220956: SEVEN Overlapping Lawyers & TWO Paralegals Assigned | EIGHT Hearings | $295,581.11 Cost Certification | 65x Cost Multiplier
S-229680: FOUR Overlapping Lawyers Assigned | ONE Hearing | $78,385.36 Cost Certification | 156x Cost Multiplier
S-228567: Precursor to S-229680 with the exact same work involved | ONE Hearing | $1,601.60 Cost Certification in accordance with the tariff.
Per the November 2023 BSCS chambers transcript, CAGE counsel claimed that the CAGE CEO was charged every penny and the Affidavit of CAGE lead counsel accurately reflects the actual time spent and amounts charged. The same Affidavit likewise states the CAGE CEO had accepted and paid retainer fees in these amounts. No reasonable person would, hence the aforementioned legal test in Bradshaw Construction Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia. Besides the remainder of issues involved in this scandal, this presents a clear example of a felony facilitated through legitimate authorities. The bigger question is why it was permitted to unfold, unchecked. The lawyer trust accounts must be investigated.
To recap, the CAGE Affidavit cited a combined total of seven hundred and thirty seven point seven billable hours, 737.7 like the passenger jet, for nine (9) short-chambers hearings between S-220956 and S-229680 (580.8 and 156.9 hours respectively, the latter for one 20-minute appearance). Each hearing required minimal prep time and involved a short-chambers hearing no longer than forty (40) minutes at most. The massive cost delta between S-229678 and S-229680, which required the exact same materials and prep work, is another glaring outlier in the CAGE Affidavit ($1.606.60 vs $78,360.36 for the same file). These costs concern retainer fees and are not compensatory in nature. See Felony Affidavit [here].
*CAGE Retainer Fee Claims*
Eight (8) 30-minute hearings w/ minimal prep.
Seven (7) lawyers assigned to overlapping tasks.
The customary tariff is $4,500 ($500 x 8 hearings).
One (1) 20-minute hearing w/ minimal prep.
Would a reasonable person pay those retainer fees?
S-228567, discontinued prior to S-229680 by way of an improper format, involved the same prep as its successor, and also involved one short hearing. S-228567 was billed at $1,601.60 pursuant to court tariffs. S-229680 was billed at $78,360.36 as above, in a scandal involving special costs. Ie., a "Cost Delta". Special costs align with reasonable lawyer retainer fees per the established legal tests.
"Special costs are fees a reasonable client would pay a reasonably competent solicitor to do the work described in the bill."
- Bradshaw Construction Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 54 B.C.L.R. (2d) 309 (S.C.), para 44
Federal Employees at the SCC Refused to Process Motions to Stay Costs & Expedite File. Court Ignored Legal Tests & Evidence in Refusing to Grant Leave to Appeal.
Docket Entrance Test
In December 2023, the SCC had dismissed my Leave to Appeal Applications, related motions, and my motion for Certiorari without details, as is exhibited near the bottom of this page. No explanation was provided. This is exceptionally concerning, as the matter, which should be obvious to the reader, is suffused with issues of public importance. There is no analogue, and likewise no precedent for a scandal such as this to be precluded from docket entry according to customary jurisprudence and the object of fundamental justice.
The SCC, in R. v. C.P., 2021 SCC 19, has affirmed its basis for inviting appeals evidencing miscarriage in justice. lacobucci J. writes at paragraph 137;
“There is no basis to believe that a serious argument pointing to a miscarriage of justice would not meet the public interest standard for leave to appeal to the Court [...] The Supreme Court would and does exercise its leave requirement in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”
The SCC has affirmed its basis for inviting appeals evidencing unfounded censorship, whereas, the same constitutionally-enriched right to an open court has been violated throughout the lower court files by extraordinary means, including materials expected to be available to the public online. This has severely skewed public perception of the matter, has precluded intervention opportunities, and has encumbered investigation. In Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, Kasirer J. writes at paragraph 1;
“This Court has been resolute in recognizing that the open court principle is protected by the constitutionally-entrenched right of freedom of expression and, as such, it represents a central feature of a liberal democracy. As a general rule, the public can attend hearings and consult court files and the press — the eyes and ears of the public — is left free to inquire and comment on the workings of the courts, all of which helps make the justice system fair and accountable.”
Section 14 of the SCC FAQ page (https://www.scc-csc.ca/contact/faq/qa-qr-eng.aspx#f14) outlines the docket entry threshold as follows:
“In most cases, appeals are heard by the Court only if leave to appeal is given. Such leave, or permission, will be given by the Court when a case involves a question of public importance. There are cases, however, where leave is not required. In criminal cases, there is an automatic right of appeal where an acquittal has been set aside in the provincial court of appeal or where one judge in the provincial court of appeal dissents on a question of law. In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada has a special kind of "Reference" jurisdiction, original in character, given by s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act. The Governor in Council (Federal Government) may refer to the Court, for its opinion, constitutional or other questions.”
This matter, as outlined, likewise concerns criminal violations related to and impacting the matter.
Finally, the SCC has likewise granted leave to appeal following a Motion for Reconsideration where the file concerned genuine and serious questions of law of sufficient public importance. Lamer C.J. wrote at paragraph 36 in R. v. Hinse, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 597;
“In addition to finding that this Court has jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal in this instance, I believe that the applicant's application raises a genuine and serious question of law of sufficient public importance to warrant review by this Court. Therefore, I would grant the applicant’s motion for reconsideration of our previous order refusing leave to appeal, and grant leave. [...] Out of respect for the integrity of the leave to appeal process, and consistent with our established practice of refusing to elaborate our justifications for granting or denying leave to appeal, I would postpone any potential discussion of the substantive issues raised by this case until this Court has become formally seized with the merits of this appeal.”
Federal Employees at the SCC Refused to Process Motions to Stay Costs & Expedite
Pursuant to SCC Rule 47, Mr. Dempsey filed a motion to stay costs in all lower court proceedings on June 9th, 2023 at the SCC. Later that same month on June 29th, 2023, Mr. Dempsey filed a motion to expedite the same motion to stay costs so a stay could be entered quickly. Both motions are independent of Mr. Dempsey's SCC Leave to Appeal Applications, whereas he had likewise filed a motion to join these separate motions to the main file because the subject matter is related. These motions had remained derelict at the SCC Registry in a manner antagonistic to SCC rules and procedures until December 21st, 2023, when they were dismissed without written reasons or explanation. The motions were reintroduced in Mr. Dempsey's SCC motion for reconsideration filed on January 9th, 2024. The text of the SCC rules prescribes an onus on the SCC to advance procedural milestones, without which the proceedings cannot unfold. All Parties had submitted paperwork by the end of July 2023 in regard to the motion to stay costs and expedite, though a Notice of Hearing had not been issued by the SCC Registrar at any time. This is despite a SCC Registry Officer acknowledging the nature of the motions, and the requirements of SCC Rules.
The refusal of Federal employees at the SCC to process my cost-related motions in violation of SCC rules had allowed the CAGE CEO to pursue enforcement efforts concerning the retainer fee felony in earnest. Similarly, the Motion for Reconsideration has remained derelict since its filing, again contrary to SCC Rule 73(5). At this juncture, one can reasonably posit that Federal employees at the SCC had replicated the behaviors of their counterparts in the lower courts to obstruct justice. Police refused to intervene, and OPSIC turned a blind eye despite its mandate and applicable legal tests. The argument concerning state interference is appended to the bottom of this page.
SCC Docket Entry was Refused on December 21st, 2023 Despite the Test Criteria Being Met
Per Justice Iacobucci in R. v. C.P., 2021 SCC 19 at paragraph 137 concerning the Supreme Court of Canada Docket Test
“There is no basis to believe that a serious argument pointing to a miscarriage of justice would not meet the public interest standard for leave to appeal to the Court. [...] The Supreme Court would and does exercise its leave requirement in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”
Collusion & Third-Party Criminal Interference Throughout Proceedings
Côté J. Denied Docket Entry W/O Reasons
Occultic themes are suffused throughout the scandal.
Interest in a Project Occasions Injustice. See the BCI Page Re: 4IR, Cognitive Liberty, & the Dark Web.
“Transhumanist ideology is driven by certain factions within the state and, above all, by mighty multinational corporations that, it is fair to say, have the most to gain from seeing the NBIC revolution unfold without a hitch. [...] These tech giants have already poured staggering amounts of money into the fourth industrial revolution and are currently spending equally eye-watering amounts on political lobbying and social engineering initiatives. [...] There is every reason to fear that the world will launch into the fourth industrial revolution without too much debate over what is waiting in the wings: the global political project that is transhumanism. Today, it is as if the metamorphosis, via the “NBIC Great Convergence,” to a posthuman being, technologically enhanced and fully integrated with the machine, were already written in stone.”
Transhumanism as the Dominant Ideology of the Fourth Industrial Revolution
By Klaus-Gerd Giesen, Translated and edited by Cadenza Academic Translations
Translator: Ruth Grant, Editor: Matt Burden, Senior editor: Mark Mellor Pages 189 to 203
Local Court Enforced Felony Scandal & Obstructed Justice. Federal Employees at SCC Prevented Reconsideration Hearing.
2024: Enforcing Felony, Discarding Justice, & Burying Scandal
The baffling dismissal of the SCC Leave Applications and miscellaneous motions, which had remained derelict and not processed in accordance with SCC Rules 51(1) and 54(4), was repeated six months later through a motion for reconsideration which likewise remained derelict long after it was filed. The Registrar closed the file in the adjacent letter. All told, procedural violations at the BC Supreme Court prevented trial. The BC Appellate court refused to hear the matter, and likewise the SCC. Given the scope and consistency of obstruction involved, the actors, and the substance of the evidentiary record, a governance scandal is clearly evidenced.
Out-Of-Province Courts Helped Facilitate the Cost Scandal Absent Applicable Tests
In the first half of 2024, local adjudicators paved the way for the retainer fee felony to be readily enforced. These judges were privy to Affidavits from CAGE counsel, which claimed that 737.7 billable hours were required to conduct nine (9) short-chambers hearings (A maximum of $4,500 in tariffs under the provincial fee schedule for comparable work). The CAGE CEO's local counsel suggested the half-million dollar execution order was punitive in nature, which likewise contradicted the Affidavits of CAGE counsel in BC. Local adjudicators displayed callous disregard for applicable legal tests, and an admission that enforcement would encumber the pursuit of justice and result in bankruptcy. In an appeal of a motion to stay enforcement, a judge ordered egregious security of costs, irrespective of the applicable legal test in Williams Lake Conservation Co. v. Kimberly-Lloyd Developments Ltd., 2005 NSCA 44, irrespective of the grand-theft felony being committed, and irrespective of data suggesting the security of costs amount would coincide with the workload. I declined to move forward with the Appeal, citing R. v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309 at paragraphs 76-78, and Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391 at paragraphs 91 & 110, as the same pattern of obstruction had continued for almost three years without a reasonable expectation of change, again claiming Certiorari and seeking injunction. My bank accounts were emptied in late June, 2024. See the Zersetzung and Guide pages concerning ongoing criminal mischief.
CAGE Counsel Sought Censorship of the Felony Enforcement Files
Per the redacted email exchange below, CAGE Counsel seeks a confidentiality order over the entirety of enforcement-related filings, including Affidavits which contain public exhibit materials. This follows the same pattern as was demonstrated in the BCSC files. At bottom-right, email correspondence with counsel for the Attorney General is appended. In an alarming development, the AG office attended enforcement hearings as an "interested observer", who had subsequently advised his intent was to chaperone CAGE counsel. The AG was made aware of the overarching scandal, and the felony concerning retainer fees. This evidentiary piece likewise reinforces the governance scandal so palpably demonstrated.
The Court Placed Unjust Precedents From Peers Above Constitutional Tests
The adjacent chambers transcript excerpt is especially germane to the characteristics of the proceedings. This portion demonstrates the effect of unjust concurrence, and the duplication of error. This judge, among all of his counterparts in both BC and out of province, upheld palpable errors of law and fact that were previously held, regardless of the degree and gravity of error. The applicable legal test is Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII), [2019] 4 SCR 653 at paragraphs 19 & 20 concerning a proper standard of review. Absent ongoing review and adherence to case law, review standards would predate Magna Carta. On every applicable issue involving evidence, the standard of review has been pushed aside; not unlike a kangaroo court. The four-page document referenced in the adjacent text concerns a four-page brief I filed which proves that the BC Supreme Court had sealed hundreds of pages of public materials pertaining to the scandal, and whereas the same precedent was repeated over and over again, and in Appellate venues. At times, violations of case law were so severe that the judge had compromised the most basic tenets of human ethics. A concurrence among orders typically evidences correctness. However, when a concurrence replicates grave error, it evidences scandal. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391 at paragraphs 91 & 110 held a stay is required under these conditions.
Weaponized Security of Costs & Out-of-Province Appellate Hearings in 2024
Appellate efforts in the 2024 out-of-province proceedings had replicated the errors of those in 2023, whereas the enforcement of the cost scandal had been pushed forward in earnest, irrespective the applicable tests shown in the Authorities Page. Security of Costs were awarded initially in British Columbia at an exorbitantly high amount, and absent consideration of customary legal tests. Williams Lake Conservation Co. v. Kimberly-Lloyd Developments Ltd., 2005 NSCA 44 promulgated the standard test concerning security (paying an opponents' legal fees preemptively as a condition to Appeal) at paragraph 11;
“Generally, a risk, without more, that the appellant may be unable to afford a costs award is insufficient to establish “special circumstances”. It is usually necessary that there be evidence that, in the past, “the appellant has acted in an insolvent manner toward the respondent” which gives the respondent an objective basis to be concerned about his recovery of prospective appeal costs. The example which most often has appeared and supported an order for security is a past and continuing failure by the appellant to pay a costs award or to satisfy a money judgment: Frost v. Herman, at ¶ 9-10; MacDonnell v. Campbell, 2001 NSCA 123, at ¶ 4-5; Leddicote, at ¶ 15-16; White at ¶ 4-7; Monette v. Jordan (1997), 1997 NSCA 163 (CanLII), 163 N.S.R. (2d) 75, at ¶ 7; Smith v. Heron, at ¶ 15-17; Jessome v. Walsh at ¶ 16-19.”
The same test is underscored with respect to evidentiary thresholds at paragraph 15;
“Kimberly-Lloyd has not shown that WLCC has acted in an insolvent manner towards Kimberly-Lloyd, or toward anyone else, and has not established any other “special circumstance” required for an order for security on appeal. Even if the appeal fails and if costs are awarded, there is no evidence that the amount of costs would be substantially higher than the amount which, in the past, has been ordered against WLCC, and which WLCC has paid.”
I paid Security of Costs in out-of-province hearings over the course of 2023, which were properly construed in accordance with standard tariffs. However, during out-of-province hearings in 2024, in an Appeal of a motion to stay the Cost Scandal Execution Order (the SCC reconsideration motion had not yet been rejected at the time), I was ordered to pay three times as much security up-front compared to the 2023 hearings, the latter of which required more work by comparison. The Appellate judge advised no explanation would be provided, despite being privy to the felonious characteristics of the cost scandal, and being privy to an Affidavit from out-of-province CAGE counsel that listed retainer fees. That Affidavit from counsel highlights the felony that had occurred through the CAGE's BC counsel, and likewise had mitigated any reasonable justification of a security of costs requirement three times higher than the near-identical proceedings that had unfolded a few months prior. In other words, the out-of-province court leveraged Security of Costs as a species of obstruction. The test in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII), [2019] 4 SCR 653 at paragraphs 133-134 is applicable;
“It is well established that individuals are entitled to greater procedural protection when the decision in question involves the potential for significant personal impact or harm: Baker, at para. 25. However, this principle also has implications for how a court conducts reasonableness review. Central to the necessity of adequate justification is the perspective of the individual or party over whom authority is being exercised. Where the impact of a decision on an individual’s rights and interests is severe, the reasons provided to that individual must reflect the stakes. The principle of responsive justification means that if a decision has particularly harsh consequences for the affected individual, the decision maker must explain why its decision best reflects the legislature’s intention. This includes decisions with consequences that threaten an individual’s life, liberty, dignity or livelihood.” [...] Moreover, concerns regarding arbitrariness will generally be more acute in cases where the consequences of the decision for the affected party are particularly severe or harsh, and a failure to grapple with such consequences may well be unreasonable. For example, this Court has held that the Immigration Appeal Division should, when exercising its equitable jurisdiction to stay a removal order under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, consider the potential foreign hardship a deported person would face: Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84."
Legal Test: Denied Customary Review, and Held in Contempt for Resisting the Cost Scandal
Pursuant to aforementioned commentary concerning the BC Appellate Court and the Supreme Court of Canada, I was denied a customary review cycle concerning the events of the scandal; including the retainer fee scandal ("the Cost Scandal"). The execution order that arose from the October 17th, 2023 Affidavits sworn by the CAGE lead counsel, to the tune of almost a half-million dollars, was enforced out-of-province in a manner that ignored customary checks and balances concerning the reasonableness criteria as outlined in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII), [2019] 4 SCR 653, the tenets of basic common sense, and my right under section 7 of the Charter concerning a hearing based on the entirety of the contextual background (Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007 SCC 9 at paragraph 29). The cost certification, its execution order and subpoenas, and the orders that had initially occasioned them are subject to the jurisprudence and legislation cited in the Authorities Page. Most especially, Sections 7, 8, 24(1), and 52(1) of the Charter.
In August 2024, concerning the cost scandal, an out-of-province court held me in contempt for refusing to respond to a discovery subpoena in aid of its execution. At the time, all remaining recourse had been exhausted at the Supreme Court of Canada concerning customary review of the serious and palpable scandal detailed herein. Specifically, the matter had been denied entry into the SCC docket, despite it meeting customary thresholds for entry. Yet, the unfounded severe and unconstitutional effects of the scandal remain unaddressed, both inside and outside the courtroom, by way of unnatural concurrence. Should a Citizen accept victimhood under these conditions?
The SCC has urged caution in civil contempt matters that may contain the aforementioned characteristics. The established precedent is cited at paragraph 37 of Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 79 as stated;
"I wish to leave open the possibility that a judge may properly exercise his or her discretion to decline to impose a contempt finding where it would work an injustice in the circumstances of the case."
The species of injustice concerns the effects of a contempt order as measured against the contextual evidence involved and the applicable case law. Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 clearly holds that the judicial framework acts in the service of and is subject to the Constitution. The same occasions a legal defense in refusing to obey unconstitutional judicial orders and mandates, as is detailed in R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, 2001 SCC 24 at paragraph 29; and R. v. Hibbert, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973 at paragraphs 52 & 59. The SCC held in Ruzic at paragraph 29;
“The notion of moral voluntariness was first introduced in Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232, for the purpose of explaining the defense of necessity and classifying it as an excuse. It was borrowed from the American legal theorist George Fletcher’s discussion of excuses in Rethinking Criminal Law (1978). A person acts in a morally involuntary fashion when, faced with perilous circumstances, she is deprived of a realistic choice whether to break the law. By way of illustration in Perka, Dickson J. evoked the situation of a lost alpinist who, on the point of freezing to death, breaks into a remote mountain cabin. The alpinist confronts a painful dilemma: freeze to death or commit a criminal offense. Yet as Dickson J. pointed out at p. 249, the alpinist’s choice to break the law “is no true choice at all; it is remorselessly compelled by normal human instincts”, here of self-preservation. The Court in Perka thus conceptualized the defense of necessity as an excuse. An excuse, Dickson J. maintained, concedes that the act was wrongful, but withholds criminal attribution to the actor because of the dire circumstances surrounding its commission."
Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 applies to the present circumstances of the scandal with respect to peaceful civil disobedience, though the emphasis is vectored toward a defense of necessity as a justification. Wilson J. distinguishes between excuse and justification in Perka at page 268;
“As Dickson J. points out, criminal law theory recognizes a distinction between justification and excuse. In the case of justification the wrongfulness of the alleged offensive act is challenged; in the case of excuse the wrongfulness is acknowledged but a ground for the exercise of judicial compassion for the actor is asserted.”
Dickson J. wrote in Perka at pages 245-246;
“In Morgentaler, supra, I characterized necessity as an “ill-defined and elusive concept”. Despite the apparently growing consensus as to the existence of a defense of necessity that statement is equally true today. This is no doubt in part because, though apparently laying down a single rule as to criminal liability, the “defense” of necessity in fact is capable of embracing two different and distinct notions. As Mr. Justice Macdonald observed succinctly but accurately in the Salvador case, supra, at p. 542: Generally speaking, the defense of necessity covers all cases where non-compliance with law is excused by an emergency or justified by the pursuit of some greater good. [...] The first is a utilitarian principle to the effect that, within certain limits, it is justifiable in an emergency to break the letter of the law if breaking the law will avoid a greater harm than obeying it. The second is a humanitarian principle to the effect that, again within limits, it is excusable in an emergency to break the law if compliance would impose an intolerable burden on the accused.”
Wilson J. characterizes the foregoing in general terms at page 274 in the same matter;
“Returning to the defense of necessity as a justification, it may generally be said that an act is justified on grounds of necessity if the court can say that not only was the act a necessary one but it was rightful rather than wrongful. When grounded on the fundamental principle that a successful defense must characterize an act as one which the accused was within his rights to commit, it becomes immediately apparent that the defense does not depend on the immediacy or “normative involuntariness” of the accused’s act.”
Wilson, J. articulates the characteristics of the legal defense in Perka at page 279;
“Where the defense of necessity is invoked as a justification the issue is simply whether the accused was right in pursuing the course of behavior giving rise to the charge. Thus, where the act otherwise constitutes a criminal offense (i.e. it embodies both mens rea and the actus reus) the accused must show that he operated under a conflicting legal duty which made his seemingly wrongful act right. But such justification must be premised on a right or duty recognized by law. This excludes conduct attempted to be justified on the ground of an ethical duty internal to the conscience of the accused as well as conduct sought to be justified on the basis of a perceived maximization of social utility resulting from it. Rather, the conduct must stem from the accused’s duty to satisfy his legal obligations and to respect the principle of the universality of rights.”
In keeping with Wilson J.’s comments in Perka, the conflicting legal duty concerns the Constitution as it pertains to this scandal. Namely section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, being the same section of the Charter as it pertains to the cost felony and disposition of proceedings, and section 24(1) as it pertains to the characteristics of the scandal generally speaking, in the mode of criminal harassment and privacy crimes. It is likewise a matter of conscience in my case, under section 2242 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church ("CCC"). The Catechism maintains;
“The citizen is obliged in conscience not to follow the directives of civil authorities when they are contrary to the demands of the moral order, to the fundamental rights of persons or the teachings of the Gospel. Refusing obedience to civil authorities, when their demands are contrary to those of an upright conscience, finds its justification in the distinction between serving God and serving the political community. "Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's." "We must obey God rather than men": When citizens are under the oppression of a public authority which oversteps its competence, they should still not refuse to give or to do what is objectively demanded of them by the common good; but it is legitimate for them to defend their own rights and those of their fellow citizens against the abuse of this authority within the limits of the natural law and the Law of the Gospel.”
Likewise at CCC section 1903;
“Authority is exercised legitimately only when it seeks the common good of the group concerned and if it employs morally licit means to attain it. If rulers were to enact unjust laws or take measures contrary to the moral order, such arrangements would not be binding in conscience. In such a case, "authority breaks down completely and results in shameful abuse."
Regarding a Citizen's right to live in accordance with deeply-held beliefs pursuant to Section 2(a), former Deputy Attorney General and Minister of Justice Frank Iacobucci wrote in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, 2004 SCC 47 at paragraph 41;
“In R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., 1986 CanLII 12 (SCC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at p. 759, Dickson C.J. stated that the purpose of s. 2(a) is to ensure that society does not interfere with profoundly personal beliefs that govern one’s perception of oneself, humankind, nature, and, in some cases, a higher or different order of being. These beliefs, in turn, govern one’s conduct and practices. [Emphasis added.]”
In summary, on the heels of unaddressed criminal mischief and miscarriage of justice in the BC proceedings, this scandal involves felony facilitated through legitimate authorities in BC, which was likewise enforced out-of-province, and precluded from review at the SCC. A defense of justification applies on the basis of the evidence, applicable legal tests, and the constitutional guardrail concerning these events as is outlined in the milestones. Per page 259 in Perka;
“Where the accused places before the Court sufficient evidence to raise the issue, the onus is on the Crown to meet it beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The defense is accentuated insofar as customary avenues of recourse have been removed, and a trial of the common issues had been prevented from occurring. This legal defense is exceptionally crucial in an era characterized by the creeping influence of ideological interest in our institutions, as detailed further below in this page, and in detail at the Q/A Part II page. Obviously, compliance with victimhood under the conditions detailed on this website is unconstitutional, unreasonable, and impermissible, if not appalling.
Prior to addressing the text of the written decision pictured below, preliminary observations must be made. The first concerns the evidence in the file and its contextual background. No treatment was given concerning the characteristics of the scandal, which the judge was privy to. Reasonable persons are able to discern that a serious scandal had taken place concerning the use of legitimate authorities to protect wrongdoing and facilitate crime. Likewise, records indicate that the victim was denied customary review and correction, so as to be forced to live with the scandal’s crippling effects, and face indefinite detention should the victim resist. This contempt order below joins a concurrence of rulings made over the past two years which had construed a false contextual narrative in favor of the CAGE, in the wake of the April 1st, 2022 discovery order inviting CRA testimony. Stakeholders in the public service played along. Incriminating evidence was sealed and its existence denied. Applicable legal tests were ignored. Procedural violations were perpetuated. A concurrence of orders acknowledging the foregoing as valid were accepted at face value. To cite the CAGE lead counsel in a twitter post, "Nothing says 'I re-spect you' like a concurrence". Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007 SCC 9 details a Citizen’s Charter right to fair proceedings at paragraph 29;
“This basic principle has a number of facets. It comprises the right to a hearing. It requires that the hearing be before an independent and impartial magistrate. It demands a decision by the magistrate on the facts and the law. And it entails the right to know the case put against one, and the right to answer that case. Precisely how these requirements are met will vary with the context. But for s. 7 to be satisfied, each of them must be met in substance.”
The text of the written decision below maintains a narrative which was consistent throughout the scandal since June 2022; likewise precluding reference to the incriminating components of the scandal, and positioning the CAGE as the rightful beneficiary of its effects. Beginning at paragraph 8(b) in the decision below, the judge had asserted my submissions concerning the substance and character of the scandal were idiosyncratic. On June 27th, 2024, in anticipation that the same oft-cited assertion, I filed a sixty (60) page brief containing two (2) pages of summary, sixteen (16) pages of evidentiary milestones with Affidavit page references, and forty-eight (48) pages of applicable case law citations, rules, and legislation. There are one hundred and ten (110) jurisprudence citations in that document, all of which are mated to the evidence and events in the scandal, as they had related to the motion before the judge. A number of these tests are cited in the Authorities Page [here]. By means of the same, it can by no means be held that my understanding and/or treatment of the matters at stake are characteristic of idiosyncrasy.
Answering Weaponized Courts with Evidence & Case Law
Turning to subsections (c) and (d) at paragraph 8, one must begin by citing the legal test at Bradshaw Construction Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 54 B.C.L.R. (2d) 309 (S.C.), paragraph 44, whereas, "Special costs are fees a reasonable client would pay a reasonably competent solicitor to do the work described in the bill." This implicates the CAGE insofar as reasonable litigators would not agree to a scope of work involving 737.7 billable hours to achieve nine short-chambers hearings (the one hearing in S-229680 alone was billed at 156 hours). There were no compensatory awards involved. It implicates the CAGE law firm in providing the same scope of work, as well as perjury in an Affidavit stating the hours were required. Finally, it does implicate adjudicators in certifying these scandalous fees into order without scrutiny, notwithstanding the miscarriage of justice which had occasioned the certification hearing to begin with. The applicable caselaw, beyond the test in Bradshaw, concerns the aforementioned precedent in Charkaoui , and the standards of review set forth in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 SCR 653. Whereas it was not the task of the motion judge to correct the scandal in the BC courts, it was within his power to exercise discretion and order investigative provisions.
Subsections (e) through (h) in the decision repeat the unfounded technical encumbrances imposed by the BC courts cited earlier in this page. It is essential to note that in each of the written decisions made by the courts involved since June 2022, all of which are under unconstitutional sealing orders, no contextual treatment is provided. The decisions state previous unfounded
orders at face value, presenting the same edicts as constitutionally valid given their substance and character. Whereas the evidence is sealed and whereas most public servants expect courts to function in accord with their object, this is disingenuous and misleading. The evidentiary context of these milestones must be understood, most especially by the public if the court were to incarcerate a Citizen for opposing them. Per R. v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309 at paragraph 85, “Justice is not only about results, it is about how those results are obtained”.
At paragraph (10) in the written decision above, the judge asserts an a priori and unfounded ad-hominem characterization similar to his comment at paragraph (8)(b). In response, I underscore the sixty (60) page brief filed June 27th, 2024 concerning the evidentiary milestones in the case, and the one hundred and ten (110) case law citations which coincide. In doing so, I respond to outright slander with relevant facts and law.
At paragraph (11) in the written decision above, the judge asserts that incarceration is the only remaining appropriate recourse. The appropriate response aligns with my preceding comments concerning the legal test in Chakouri, Supra. A file was put before the court concerning fraud, collusion, and perjury on the part of the CAGE. The file is further suffused with related criminal mischief and obstruction of justice by agencies in the public service. None of this had been addressed at any time, and likewise, I had been denied customary review through appellate courts and regulators. The file had likewise been precluded from the SCC docket. Finally, the judge relies on unfounded technical encumbrances which were imposed following my innocuous attempts to attract whistleblowers, in the absence of customary recourse (R. v. Ruzic, Supra, at paragraph 29).
"As Peter Cory points out, at pp. 101 and 103: If the State commits significant errors in the course of the investigation and prosecution, it should accept the responsibility for the sad consequences. Society needs protection from both the deliberate and the careless acts of omission and commission which lead to wrongful conviction and prison."
Hill v. Hamilton‑Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129, 2007 SCC 41 at paragraph 37
Legal Tests Concerning the Estoppel of Systemic Abuse
"Enough is Enough"
Access to fair, independent, and just courts that will adjudicate matters on the basis of fact and law is a Citizen’s right under the Constitution, as denoted at section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007 SCC 9 at paragraphs 22, 23, 27, and 48). The SCC established criteria for a stay of proceedings in R. v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309, in circumstances where courts overstep their competency, and where ongoing participation in compromised proceedings would signal validation of the abuse. Per Moldaver J. at paragraphs 76 through 78 in Babos;
[76] “A stay may be justified for an abuse of process under the residual category when the state’s conduct “contravenes fundamental notions of justice and thus undermines the integrity of the judicial process” (R. v. O’Connor, 1995 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, at para. 73). A stay may be justified, in exceptional circumstances, when the conduct “is so egregious that the mere fact of going forward [with the trial] in the light of it [would] be offensive” (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, 1997 CanLII 322 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391, at para. 91).
[77] “There are two public interests at play: “the affront to fair play and decency” and “the effective prosecution of criminal cases”. Where the affront is “disproportionate”, the administration of justice is “best served by staying the proceedings” (R. v. Conway, 1989 CanLII 66 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659, at p. 1667).”
[78] “In other words, when the conduct is so profoundly and demonstrably inconsistent with the public perception of what a fair justice system requires, proceeding with a trial means condoning unforgivable conduct.”
The foregoing precedent in Babos accurately reflects the characteristics of the proceedings in the scandal and related engagements with court employees who had facilitated the obstruction of procedural guardrails. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391 reflects the precedent in Babos and further considers a question concerning systemic prevalence and longevity. In other words, can a Party beset by obstruction of justice and misconduct reasonably expect their situation to change? If not, what should they do? Per paragraphs 91 and 110 in Tobiass;
[91] “The first criterion is critically important. It reflects the fact that a stay of proceedings is a prospective remedy. A stay of proceedings does not redress a wrong that has already been done. It aims to prevent the perpetuation of a wrong that, if left alone, will continue to trouble the parties and the community as a whole in the future. See O’Connor, at para. 82. For this reason, the first criterion must be satisfied even in cases involving conduct that falls into the residual category. See O’Connor, at para. 75. The mere fact that the state has treated an individual shabbily in the past is not enough to warrant a stay of proceedings. For a stay of proceedings to be appropriate in a case falling into the residual category, it must appear that the state misconduct is likely to continue in the future or that the carrying forward of the prosecution will offend society’s sense of justice. Ordinarily, the latter condition will not be met unless the former is as well ‑‑ society will not take umbrage at the carrying forward of a prosecution unless it is likely that some form of misconduct will continue. There may be exceptional cases in which the past misconduct is so egregious that the mere fact of going forward in the light of it will be offensive.”
[110] "An ongoing affront to judicial independence may be such that any further proceedings in the case would lack the appearance that justice would be done. In such a case the societal interest would not be served by a decision on the merits that is tainted by an appearance of injustice. The interest in preserving judicial independence will trump any interest in continuing the proceedings. Even in the absence of an ongoing appearance of injustice, the very severity of the interference with judicial independence could weigh so heavily against any societal interest in continuing the proceedings that the balancing process would not be engaged."
In keeping with the foregoing, in matters where there is little expectation that a judge would authorize a stay, the onus is on the Citizen to act unilaterally in defense of his/her rights under the Constitution (Charter, sections 7, 24(1), and 52(1) among others that may apply). The alternative is to accept victimhood (R. v. Ruzic, Supra, at paragraph 29) and validate unconstitutional overreach. The Constitution is Canada’s supreme law (Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), Supra, at paragraph 27). The foregoing precedents are expressly germane to the characteristics of the scandal as it pertains to the proceedings. The common issues were not tried once. Rampant procedural violations and onerously biased rulings had suffocated any opportunity to pursue relief. Standards concerning a voluntary estoppel in circumstances of prejudicial treatment are likewise customary outside of courtrooms.
"He's Not Worth The Cost" | Constitutional Guardrails Against Justifying State-Sponsored Abuse
Since the scandal began to unfold in earnest, I have been denied customary recourse by law enforcement and regulative agencies, denied an opportunity to retain fiduciary legal counsel despite best efforts, and have been denied customary recourse following a serious scandal concerning the proceedings. Furthermore, no whistleblowers nor advocates had emerged. In considering this, I recall a starting admission given during a lengthy oral reasons reading by a BC Appellate Judge, who denied a reasonable 4-day deadline extension to Appeal S-229680 following its unfounded dismissal amid the violation of nine (9) rules of procedure. The judge in this case had stated that a trial of the common issues in S-229680 "might cause social unrest". There may be some truth to those comments, given the gravity of the issues involved. Having said that, the judge had asserted the balance of justice rested on my victimhood, and, the benefit of criminal offenders. We must explore the relevant case law.
In the matter of Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 (CanLII), [2007] 1 SCR 350, the SCC has maintained that national security, political, and/or state-sponsored third-party interests cannot be used to excuse procedures that do not conform to fundamental justice at the section 7 stage of (Charter) analysis. Delivered by the Chief Justice, the SCC in Charkaoui wrote at paragraphs 22, 23, and 27;
“The question at the s. 7 stage is whether the principles of fundamental justice relevant to the case have been observed in substance, having regard to the context and the seriousness of the violation. The issue is whether the process is fundamentally unfair to the affected person. If so, the deprivation of life, liberty or security of the person simply does not conform to the requirements of s. 7. The inquiry then shifts to s. 1 of the Charter, at which point the government has an opportunity to establish that the flawed process is nevertheless justified having regard, notably, to the public interest.” [...] “It follows that while administrative constraints associated with the context of national security may inform the analysis on whether a particular process is fundamentally unfair, security concerns cannot be used to excuse procedures that do not conform to fundamental justice at the s. 7 stage of the analysis. If the context makes it impossible to adhere to the principles of fundamental justice in their usual form, adequate substitutes may be found. But the principles must be respected to pass the hurdle of s. 7. That is the bottom line.” [...] “The procedures required to conform to the principles of fundamental justice must reflect the exigencies of the security context. Yet they cannot be permitted to erode the essence of s. 7. The principles of fundamental justice cannot be reduced to the point where they cease to provide the protection of due process that lies at the heart of s. 7 of the Charter. The protection may not be as complete as in a case where national security constraints do not operate. But to satisfy s. 7, meaningful and substantial protection there must be.”
As is apparent earlier in this page and in the Q/A Page, no public admission was made by any entity in the public service concerning the section 7 violations germane to the overarching scandal. As is detailed above and in the Guide page, local police had acknowledged them in a recorded 79-minute meeting on December 8th, 2022, whereas the same police agency had filed a false report thereafter, which I had obtained via Freedom of Information Request. The BC court denied the existence of the audio recording and unedited transcript which was reduced to paper, and filed alongside the FOIPOP report in an Affidavit. Despite numerous filings detailing the related criminal element and sophisticated mischief concerning invasive technologies, and likewise, the small army of online harassment agents detailed in the Zersetzung and Guide pages, the courts had refused to treat the subject, let alone allow for a hearing to be scheduled (see the Rule violations at the BCSC, the preclusion of trial at the BCCA, and the denial of entry into the SCC earlier in this page). The court files are sealed. It is expected that a concerted effort will be made to ensure the same materials remain undisclosed. The section immediately following, and the Jailed Page, further contemplate an effort in censorship.
Incarcerated Without Access to Counsel
In August 2024, I was arrested by two Sheriffs and was taken to a Correctional Facility (jail) in handcuffs. I was told the arrest had to do with “social media content the CAGE wanted removed”, and that the sentence “would be shortened if the content were removed”. I have no social media accounts, and as a result, no social media posts. I can only assume it referred to this website, which describes the scandal above in a way that redacts personal identities, as they did not clarify. I later found out the arrest had instead pertained to my failure to respond to a discovery subpoena, as part of the CAGE collection efforts. As such, it had appeared that the arresting Sheriffs were misled. A representative from the provincial Duty Counsel agency also referenced online content and insisted it be removed; a matter which was not before any court at any time. Incidentally, she advised that people are rarely, if ever, arrested in civil matters.
Upon imprisonment, I was assaulted within forty minutes by inmates who swarmed into my cell. I had not previously seen those inmates before. I was overpowered, pinned to the floor, repeatedly beaten, and then spat on before being instructed to keep my cell door locked. I have no sensation in my left thigh muscle at the time of this update, even several weeks following the event.
On my second day of incarceration, inmates in the detention block retained my food tray, whereas I was forced to go without food and drink tap water. One inmate tossed a cup of urine under my cell door, which coated much of the floor. The same inmate would bang on my door and chant, “Cell 8, hang yourself”. An attentive guard, with the support of a Captain, was able to relocate me to a different detention block on the morning of the third day.
While detained, I was unable to obtain legal counsel; a Right under section 10(b) of the Constitution Act, 1982. I had previously disclosed issues concerning collusion in legal counsel in BC, and my ability to obtain help thereafter. The provincial Duty Counsel agency advised they were not in position to provide a lawyer because the arrest involved a civil matter, yet, the Act is predicated on a loss of liberty, irrespective of the style of proceeding. Following my release, I had contacted the Duty Counsel rep and had asked that the matter be escalated for internal review. I was unable to identify any other agencies in the Province that provide Duty Counsel in response to the requirements of the Act. The agency did not respond to any outreach.
The incarceration order reflects the subpoena and does not mention online content (the latter had not been brought before any court). It is noteworthy to mention that the judge assumed I could respond to a subpoena for physical attendance and discovery while in jail, in response to the felony scandal. A complete account of my initial jail sentence including exhibits is furnished on the Jailed page (here).
Donor Eggs, Criminal Family Members, & Complementary Peripheral Interests
No Family or Network on Earth is Above the Law.
Get the DNA Records, Pull the Tax Records, Run the Audits, and Fire the Judges Before Incarcerating Me.
Mary Eliza Partrick, pictured below, and likewise a prominent actor involved in the online criminal element of the scandal, is evidenced to be the biological mother of my estranged Nephew (to her right), as a known egg donor. Christine, pictured below left, is Mary’s mother, likewise bearing resemblance. Further detail is found in the Family Affidavit, which includes a report by a US-based investigator, and an expanded background concerning the fertility clinic and relevant developments over the past decade. A material relationship between these actors and the CAGE was first cited in my Affidavit sworn May 20th, 2022, and again in Affidavits sworn in 2023. The Partricks come from old money and influence suffused with esoteric (occult) beliefs, which my estranged relatives likewise maintain. The complementary peripheral interest concerns an estate.
"Presents"
Overt Expressions Concerning the CAGE Remain Under Sealing Orders
CAGE Director
At Stake
A Question of Stakeholder Governance
This Scandal concerns the use of legitimate public authorities and resources to service private interests and to facilitate criminal objectives. It evidences the existence of a stakeholder framework that can shape the conduct of Canadian institutions from time to time, with relative ease. Whereas both the overarching and peripheral interests involved are cited above in this page, the links below expand further on the same.
Fourth Industrial Revolution
Sophisticated Criminal Interference
Post-
Democratic
Institutions
Preclusion of Legal Support
Estranged Criminal Relations
False Police Reports & Obstruction
The Events Raise The Following Public Concerns
A) The characteristics of this scandal preclude ad-hoc corruption. How deeply rooted is Canada's stakeholder influence apparatus?
B) Who or what gave assurances to the CAGE entity, its law firms, and the adjudicators in three courts, and stakeholders in various police and regulatory agencies concerning the facilitation and enforcement of the retainer fee felony?
C) What are the overarching project interests on the part of the assuring stakeholders?
D) What are the beliefs, values, and goals of the influencing framework involved?
E) If the same framework is capable of leveraging legitimate institutions to commit felonies and preclude further recourse for the victim, what else can the public expect? How many others are beset by similar crimes (ie., Sheridan et al., 2020)?
F) Bearing in mind the scope and gravity of palpable errors in judgments and their impacts, and whereas the same errors have consistently been replicated and/or denied review, is there a cognitive liberty component impacting members of the judiciary? The Covid mRNA Vaccines do contain nanotech (links here), and not just the Pfizer and Moderna versions. Do they connect persons to the internet? The errors in fact and law are glaring enough to prompt the question, as are the mandates concerning them. The scandal otherwise concerns cognitive liberty (see analysis in the BCI Page, and the Testimony).
G) What stake do public service employee stakeholders have in sacrificing basic morals, ethics, and their Constitutional mandates to help facilitate the destructive ends of bad actors?
H) Despite the severity of impact and the palpable nature of the evidence and errors involved, there have been no whistleblowers nor advocates as yet. The provincial Attorney General's office had further positioned itself as an "interested observer" in support of the CAGE entity. What factors would occasion the AG office to support the crimes detailed herein?
I) Are public servants ethical actors and moral Citizens if they “stay in their lane” (ie., use their job description as an excuse for reticence)?
J) Should Canadian Citizens remain victims when state and/or state-sponsored agencies fall short of their mandates?
K) Can police rightly refuse to investigate compromised legal proceedings that are denied customary review?
L) If nothing is done to address this scandal and those like it, how can other unknown victims be helped?
The Appropriate Standard of Review
An archived study by Yale law [here] found that over one million bribes are paid into the US judicial system per year, with a comparable amount paid in Canada (approximately 200,000). Those metrics should be sufficient to terrify any right-minded person. While corruption will always manifest in some form or another, the layers of customary recourse in Canada’s institutional framework are expected to catch serious errors and fix them, thus mitigating miscarriages of justice before they are permitted to destroy the lives of their victims.
A concurrence among the decisions of adjudicators and the actions of stakeholders in the public service is most often an indicator of truth and reliability. However, when a concurrence in palpable error in fact and law is evidenced, it is clearly indicative of scandal.
With respect to the scope and characteristics of this scandal and its impacts, involving five courts, three police agencies, in three provinces, over the course of a three-year period, reasonable persons cannot rely on an inference of ad-hoc or isolated corruption. The same is accentuated when considering the related criminal interference involved, and the conduct of non-adjudicative staffers at various agencies. When a basket of public agencies act in violation of their constitutional mandates in support of a criminal objective, and for a prolonged period, we must consider systemic issues at play.
We must instead consider a more comprehensive question of stakeholder influence and governance, and its ability to effectively shape the conduct of adjudicative and other agencies in the public service from time to time, with alarming ease and consistency. Likewise, we must discern why and how the same stakeholder framework has received the support and blessing (the “buy-in”) of those called into the public service as adjudicators, officers of the peace, and employees of various designations. Namely, what interest or benefit could move provincial and federal employees in the public service to sacrifice basic ethics and risk the penalties associated with the violation of their constitutional mandates, especially if they understood the damage their actions (or lack thereof) would cause victims?
Finally, we must discern the project interests at stake. Whereas frameworks never exist for the sake of a single project or person, we must discover the overarching interests of the framework itself, which may provide visibility into forces that can shape our lives, irrespective of the law of the land. That is how significant this is, as based on the characteristics of the event chronology. It cannot be reduced less than that.
According to the astute observations of academics such as Michel Foucault, inferences that concern borderless networks of stakeholder influence are more reasonable in our day than competing assumptions rooted in a normalcy bias. This is due to a widespread and rapid shift in beliefs and values which occurred over the past century, initially forecasted by Frederich Nietzsche alongside other astute critics of his time. By means of the information age, the parameters of ideas and shared objectives have supplanted the traditional emphasis placed on geographical borders. Concurrently, contemporary postmodern assumptions reject a transcendental basis in law, as rooted in our Creator, as is first promulgated in the Charter (Ruffo v. Conseil de la magistrature, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 267 at paragraph 37), thus migrating the object of justice toward subjective filters. The UN and WEF documents cited in my Testimony page openly communicate this preferential option, calling for a “new social contract” that leverages the innovations of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, as a replacement for the socio-political tapestry most Canadians were raised in. According to political philosopher and academic Klaus-Gerd Giesen, as quoted on the landing page, this movement is underpinned by powerful private sector commercial interests. The Testimony, 4IR Portal, and QA Part II pages explore these beliefs and modalities in further detail, with relevant citations. By means of the events detailed on this website, one is able to contemplate a normative framework of stakeholder influence well beyond the realm of reasonable inference. Likewise, the events occasion no viable alternatives.
Postmodern Assumptions Decouple the Object (the purpose) of Law from its Transcendental Roots. An Inexorable Result is an Institutional Apparatus that is Reconfigured to Facilitate Ideological Interests and Those of its Proponents.
It's About Beliefs.
The founding principles of the Constitution are diametrically opposed to postmodern assumptions. The prevailing assumptions will inform the political will, and likewise, will shape the character and utility of the institutional fabric.
Multistakeholder Frameworks See Traditional Distinctions Between Private & Public Sectors as the Relic of a Bygone Era. Driven by Advances in Technology and Communications, the Remaining Material Distinctions Concern Differences in Belief.
"One should try to locate power at the extreme of its exercise, where it is always less legal in character."
Michael Kelly, Michel Foucault (1994). “Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate”, p.35, MIT Press
CAGE Director
______
_____________________________
Governments Hire
Social Influencers
As explored in detail at the Guide Page, and again in the 4IR Portal, the scope, character, and consistency of the criminal element related to the CAGE Entity and its CEO are grossly disproportionate in support of the CAGE interests alone. The CAGE is a collaborative agent in the service of interests which are expected to garner support commensurate to the event chronology. The governing apparatus, in collaboration with private stakeholders, is exploring NBIC technologies through the use of Citizen guinea pigs. It leverages weaponized authorities to facilitate these ends.
Section 2 of the Charter gives all Citizens that freedom.
A Scary Time in Canadian History
"I'm not sure that I would be comfortable thinking that judges should be advancing the law with a social agenda in mind. It seems to me that the social agenda is the agenda for Parliament and if Parliament wants to advance the law in social terms, that's their job."
The Honourable Marshall Rothstein, Former Supreme Court of Canada Justice
The Basis of Law
As was first contemplated by Plato, the basis of law and social contract follows a consensus in metaphysics. In other words, an overarching perspective one might have concerning ontology (ie., the structure of reality, or the universe, if you prefer). Magna Carta, the Charter of John Locke, and Canada's Constitution Act rely on a Judeo-Christian foundation of metaphysics. In other words, the tenets of moral and natural law are issued by God, which likewise inform the characteristics of a social contract governed by law. Canada's highest court reminded us of this at paragraph 37 in Ruffo v. Conseil de la magistrature, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 267;
“Canada was founded upon the supremacy of God and the rule of law.”
Postmodern lawmakers reject the foregoing along with the possibility of absolute truths (which ironically, would be an absolute). Alternatively, they may suggest that frameworks of natural law are non-binding because they can only be grasped in part. Irrefutable inferences such as intelligent design are often rejected. Those under the same assumptions reject Immanuel Kant’s astute observation that reason must make room for faith, without offering an alternative beyond glib inspirations. The primary characteristic of the distinction between Canada's Constitutional foundation and postmodern assumptions is that the latter would assert that metaphysics and the natural law that stems from it can be re-written. At its most basic expression, the postmodern movement is a species of anarchy.
When anarchists hold sway over adjudicative frameworks by means of statute or overwhelming influence, the disposition of law that follows most expressly aligns with the opinions of those in power, for better or for worse. For this very reason, section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights concerns the interpretation of law as measured against the Constitution, to ensure it cannot be weaponized against its object.
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, namely, section 2, protects the rights of all Citizens; not just vocal and/or influential lobbyists. By means of the same, flags and paraphernalia in support of contentious ideological perspectives, whatever they may be, when erected at public institutions and offices, are a concerning indicator of our time. Whereas the Trudeau administration would need to fly hundreds of ideological flags to meet the requirement of section 2, it is fitting to conclude that the Canadian Flag alone is appropriate as affixed to public buildings.
Per Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, 2004 SCC 47 at paragraph 41
“The values that underlie our political and philosophic traditions demand that every individual be free to hold and to manifest whatever beliefs and opinions his or her conscience dictates, provided inter alia only that such manifestations do not injure his or her neighbors or their parallel rights to hold and manifest beliefs and opinions of their own. Similarly, in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at p. 759, Dickson C.J. stated that the purpose of s. 2(a) is to ensure that society does not interfere with profoundly personal beliefs that govern one’s perception of oneself, humankind, nature, and, in some cases, a higher or different order of being. These beliefs, in turn, govern one’s conduct and practices. [Emphasis added.]”
The Impact of Ideological Overreach and Unhinged Demagoguery is Further Explored at Q/A Part II
Ideological Mandates Have Eclipsed Canada's Constitution in the Public Service
The Constitutional Guardrail
Constitution Act, 1982, Preface
"Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law."
Constitution Act, 1982, Section 52(1)
"The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect."
Canadian Bill of Rights, Section 2(e)
Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared, and in particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to (e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and obligations.
“As has been noted above, it is difficult and probably dangerous to attempt to define with narrow precision that element of governmental intervention which will suffice to permit reliance on the Charter by private litigants in private litigation.”
RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 at paragraph 38
“There is no basis to believe that a serious argument pointing to a miscarriage of justice would not meet the public interest standard for leave to appeal to the Court [...] The Supreme Court would and does exercise its leave requirement in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”
Iacobucci J., Former Deputy Attorney General & Minister of Justice in R. v. C.P., 2021 SCC 19 at paragraph 137
“There is no question that police officers have a duty to enforce the law and investigate crimes. The principle that the police have a duty to enforce the criminal law is well established at common law: R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1968] 1 All E.R. 763 (C.A.), per Lord Denning, M.R., at p. 769; Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, [1988] 2 All E.R. 238 (H.L.), per Lord Keith of Kinkel; P. Ceyssens, Legal Aspects of Policing (loose‑leaf ed.), vol. 1, at pp. 2‑22 et seq.”
R. v. Beaudry, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2007 SCC 5 at paragraph 35
"As Peter Cory points out, at pp. 101 and 103: If the State commits significant errors in the course of the investigation and prosecution, it should accept the responsibility for the sad consequences. Society needs protection from both the deliberate and the careless acts of omission and commission which lead to wrongful conviction and prison."
Hill v. Hamilton‑Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129, 2007 SCC 41 at paragraph 37
"This Court has held on a number of occasions that the right to security of the person protects 'both the physical and psychological integrity of the individual': see R. v. Morgentaler, 1988 CanLII 90 (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C_R. 30, at p. 173 (per Wilson J.); Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, 1990 CanLII 105 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C_R. 1123, at p. 1177; Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 1993 CanLII 75 (SCOQ), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at pp. 587-88. Although these cases considered the right to security of the person in a criminal law context, I believe that the protection accorded by this right extends beyond the criminal law [...] Delineating the boundaries protecting the individual's psychological integrity from state interference is an inexact science. Dickson C.J. in Morgentaler, supra, at p. 56, suggested that security of the person would be restricted through 'serious state-imposed psychological stress'."
New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 at paragraphs 58, 59
The Sherman Estate Test
Reliable Test Criteria for Third-Party Interference
The scope, sophistication, and repeat consistency of obstruction in justice detailed in this scandal over the past two years is exceedingly rare to the point of being unnatural. Leveraging the inference test in Sherman Estate, Supra, at paragraphs 97-98 again, one can make accurate inferences based on a Chronology of Events.
In doing so, the following premises are raised;
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Sophisticated and ongoing criminal mischief related to the CAGE CEO respondents are factual, and are evidenced well beyond reasonable doubt to involve CAF social influence and CIMIC contractors;
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The same criminal mischief disrupted day-to-day life to the point where it is no longer liveable through ordinary means. Business and income was likewise disrupted, and new counsel opportunities precluded, resulting in a total income of less than $9,000 CAD in 2022, and no earnings in 2023;
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Affidavits contain prima facie accounts of perjury, shareholder fraud, tax fraud, and collusion implicating the CAGE CEO;
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My retained counsel in S-2***** had committed an act of gross negligence which occasioned a notice of shareholder default, and made palpable redaction errors beyond the scope of a BCSC court order, to conceal evidence implicating the CAGE CEO Respondents, which they subsequently refused to correct;
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Preclusion of recourse to new counsel including ProBono programs;
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Obstruction of justice and palpable errors in judgment in civil proceedings were consistent over an array of adjudicators in two provinces beyond April 1st, 2022, who were privy to prima facie evidence implicating the Respondents, and corresponding jurisprudence on how to respond to such evidence;
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The obstruction of justice and palpable errors at the BCSC were consistently replicated at the Appellate level, and the file was likewise denied docket entry without written reasons in Canada's highest court;
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Obstruction of justice and denial of safe avenue via police agencies remained consistent over the same two-year period and in all institutions and agencies involved, including the publication of false reports, and the dismissal of the same concern by police regulators despite being presented with prima facie evidence of police misconduct and negligence and whereas this is unprecedented;
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Obstruction of justice through the conduct of court staff who refused to enforce their governing rules of procedure and Constitutional law;
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Obstruction of justice through judicial regulators who refused to act.
The following inferences are reasonable if not inexorable in view of the foregoing;
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At face value, and in view of Canadian law, the CAGE CEO Respondent has neither the means nor the resources to shape the conduct of state and state-sponsored agencies, institutions, adjudicators, and contractors to the extent that is demonstrated;
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The same state-sponsored agencies, institutions, adjudicators, and contractors, in choosing to act in violation of any mandates that may govern their conduct, and in violating Constitutional and criminal law, must have believed the value and benefit in supporting the CAGE CEO Respondents outweighed the risks involved;
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Individuals in those agencies would have likewise had to make personal choices regarding whether or not to violate their own ethical principles to obstruct justice, or alternatively, remain silent while their colleagues did;
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Stakeholders in one agency cannot shape the decisions in other agencies, unless all agencies are answerable to the same overarching stakeholder. Furthermore, the Canadian judiciary is understood to be separate from the Executive branch of Government.
The following conclusions are available for consideration by way of the legal test at Sherman Estate, Supra, at paragraphs 97-98, as possible explanations for the scope, sophistication, and consistency of obstruction of justice and criminal mischief involved;
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An extra-governmental framework exists which holds efficacious sway over the conduct of any and all state and state-sponsored agencies and institutions in Canada (ie., a "multi-stakeholder governance" framework as is shown in UN/WEF documents), which is otherwise unknown to the public;
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State interference is at play, whereby agency stakeholders, police, and adjudicators were subject to political pressure by means of threats, bribes, narratives, inspirations, suggestions, ideological arguments, services, and/or any combination of the foregoing;
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State interference is at play, where milestone events were choreographed within a network of willing and intentional supporters;
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Invasive Fourth Industrial Revolution (“4ir”) technologies are at play in influencing the conduct and decisions of persons, per the researched articles and inferences detailed in the 4ir page and https://www.refugeecanada.net/bci;
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Today's public servants, adjudicators, and law enforcement officers are morally bankrupt, heartless, apathetic, and/or cowardly people willing to abide the ruination of innocent Citizens and protect state-sponsored criminals, so long as their own lives are not negatively impacted. This final reference, although onerous, is the only possible explanation if all four of the previous premises are rejected.
Given the issues involved, privileged data and/or whistleblower testimony is required to tip the scales.
The minimum inexorable conclusion that can be drawn is the presence of a robust state interest in the disposition of litigation as outlined, and in the conduct of the agencies involved. This interest must be linked to a purpose significant enough to justify it. A clandestine program involving 4ir applications and live un-consenting test subjects is expected to meet this high threshold, and the same inexorably aligns with my testimony. Over 100 articles concerning scientific research, health publications, academic publications, public sector pronouncements, investment papers, technology briefs, United Nations declarations, World Economic Forum publications, and mainstream media publications cited on this website are likewise referenced alongside humanity's bloodied history, and the probable near-future socioeconomic and sociopolitical conditions that 4ir applications are intended to address. The full articles are available online, and/or are available on request. The gripping Policy Horizons Canada page concerning Biodigital Convergence was recently removed from the Government of Canada website, though its archived page is available on archive.ph (direct link here). What an investigator cannot do is simply ignore this scandal.
Jurisprudence on Interventions
In deciding whether to grant intervener status in a proceeding, the courts will consider whether the applicant has a direct interest in the litigation, and whether the applicant can make a valuable contribution or bring a different perspective to a consideration of the issues that is different from those of the parties. If the potential intervener does not have a direct interest in the litigation, the Court must consider the public law issue before the Court, whether the case has a dimension that legitimately engages the interests of the proposed intervener, whether the applicant can provide a perspective that may be of assistance to the Court, and whether that viewpoint will assist the Court in the resolution of the case or, conversely, likely take the litigation away from those directly affected by it.
R. v. Watson, 2006 BCCA 234, at para 3
At the stage of an application to intervene, it is not necessary for the applicant to set out what its legal arguments will be. There is no specific requirement that the proposed intervener show that it will advance a unique and different legal analysis, particularly when the evidentiary base has not yet been fully established and the parties' precise arguments remain undeveloped.
Schoof, supra at para 201.
In British Columbia, applicants have been permitted to intervene at the trial level in instances where they can assist the Court by contributing to the evidentiary record.
Schoof, supra at para 202.
Ultimately, the question is whether the applicant will contribute something significant that would otherwise be absent from the proceeding, such that they will be of assistance to the Court as interveners.
Schoof, supra at para 203; Suncor Energy Inc. and Unifor, Local 707A, 2014ABQB 555
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Section 7. The guarantees under section 7 typically arise in connection with the administration of justice, which has in turn been defined as “The state’s conduct in the course of enforcing and securing compliance with the law.”
(Gosselin v. Québec (Attorney General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 at paragraph 77; New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 at paragraph 65; Prostitution Reference - Reference re: Criminal Code, section 193,paragraph 195.1(1)(c) (Man. C.A.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123; B. (R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315; Blencoe v. British Columbia7(Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307).
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Justice Depends on Whistleblowers
