Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (S.C. 2000, c. 24) [Link]
Access to Justice
Criminal Interference | Denial of Recourse | Obstruction of Justice | Abuse of Process | Miscarriage of Justice | Censorship

A Framework of Third-Party Influence
Materially related to the Zersetzung accounts, a prima facie case of shareholder fraud concerning the Director of a Canadian Commercial and Government Entity ("CAGE") was reversed into a $445,489.50 award of special costs to the perpetrator. This disposition remained unchecked despite Canadian Constitutional Law and jurisprudence. The scope, consistency, and characteristics of this scandal, involving multiple courts and police agencies across three provinces, precludes consideration of the CAGE Director as an independent perpetrator. Because one CEO cannot disrupt a country's justice system to this extent, an inexorable inference of third-party tampering is occasioned.
FIFTY Social Influencers | FIVE Courts | THREE Police Agencies | ONE Scandal

An Encyclopedia of Obstruction:
The Scandal as it Pertains to the Courts
ABSTRACT
This multi-section page examines a four-year pattern of coordinated institutional dysfunction across Canadian judicial, law enforcement, and regulatory bodies that cannot be adequately explained through conventional theories of judicial error, administrative oversight, or individual malfeasance. Various sections are treated in more detail through the sub-menu links above, and via the table of contents (here). Drawing on comprehensive documentary evidence spanning British Columbia and Nova Scotia courts, RCMP, regulatory agencies, and multiple levels of the judiciary (2021-2025), the analysis demonstrates systematic deviation from binding constitutional and procedural authorities—not episodically, but coordinately across independent institutions with no formal mechanism for such coordination. The pattern exhibits characteristics consistent with what political theorists term "post-democratic governance": institutions retain constitutional forms while operational decision-making serves objectives external to their formal mandate. This case study provides empirical validation of theoretical frameworks proposed by Wolin, Rancière, and Foucault regarding how democratic institutions can be instrumentalized for extra-legal purposes while maintaining legitimating facades. The implications extend beyond individual injustice to fundamental questions about constitutional supremacy in an era of technological surveillance, networked coordination, and Fourth Industrial Revolution capabilities that enable governance modalities incompatible with classical liberal constitutionalism.
Keywords: Post-Democratic Governance, Institutional Coordination, Constitutional Supremacy (s.52), Open Court Principle, Vavilov Reasonableness, Beals v. Saldanha Enforcement, Abuse of Process, Access to Justice, Discovery Inversion, Summary Judgment Acceleration, Use of Discretionary Power, Prohibitive Security Orders, Institutional Capture, Governmentality, Foucauldian Knowledge Regimes, Villaroman Inference Framework, Circumstantial Coordination Evidence, Blanket Sealing Orders, Pre-Service Sealing, Police Failure, Procedural Gatekeeping, Shareholder Record Manipulation, 9,000% Billing Markup, Cognitive Liberty, Mental Privacy, Neurotechnology, Biodigital Convergence, Surveillance, UN A/HRC/57/61, UN A/HRC/58/58, UN A/RES/58/6, Charter s.2(b) Expression, Charter s.7 Fundamental Justice, Charter s.8 Unreasonable Search, Constitutional Form vs. Substance, Accountability Foreclosure, Legitimacy Crisis, Two-Tier Justice System.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE INADEQUACY OF CONVENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS
A. The Judicial Error Hypothesis
Traditional legal scholarship analyzes adverse outcomes through frameworks of judicial error: misapplication of law, procedural irregularities, evidentiary mistakes, or bias. Appellate review exists precisely to correct such errors, operating on the assumption that mistakes are episodic, identifiable, and remediable through established mechanisms.
This framework cannot account for what occurred across British Columbia and Nova Scotia courts between 2021-2025. The pattern exhibits systematic coordination across:
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Twenty-plus institutional actors (BCSC chambers judges, BCCA justices, NSSC judges, NSCA justices, SCC Registry, RCMP detachments, BC Securities Commission, NS Barristers' Society, Attorney General offices)
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Four years of consistent trajectory despite changes in judicial personnel
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Multiple binding authorities cited but not applied (Sherman Estate, Vavilov, Beals, Babos/Tobiass, Baker, Power v. Power, Hryniak, Dagenais-Mentuck, Sierra Club)
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Escalating coercion (sealing → contempt → custody threat → extreme security barriers) despite unexamined probative evidence
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Systematic foreclosure of every accountability avenue (criminal investigation declined, regulatory complaints dismissed, discovery prevented, appeals sealed, SCC leave denied)
When errors occur consistently, coordinately, and directionally across independent institutions—all serving to prevent examination of specific evidence while advancing enforcement of facially implausible billing—the "error" hypothesis loses explanatory power.
B. The Bad Apple Hypothesis
A second conventional explanation attributes institutional dysfunction to individual bad actors: corrupt judges, negligent police, captured regulators. This hypothesis predicts that involving different personnel would produce different outcomes, and that documentary evidence of malfeasance would trigger institutional correction mechanisms. Neither prediction holds. The documentary record shows:
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Personnel rotation produced identical outcomes: Different BC chambers judges (Cameron → Tucker → MacNaughton → Crossin → Majawa), different NS judges (Rosinski → Smith → Norton → Keith), different NSCA justices (Beaton → Van den Eynden → Bourgeois → Bryson → Derrick)—yet the trajectory remained constant
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Documentary evidence was systematically ignored: Shareholder records showing CSR freeze + derecognition policy; billing invoices showing 737.7 hours for 867 minutes of court time; contradictory closure documents; sworn affidavits on corporate perjury—all filed, all cited, none examined
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Institutional safeguards failed coordinately: Internal complaints (judicial conduct, law society, police oversight) produced no investigation; external oversight bodies (Ombudsman, Human Rights Commission, Privacy Commissioner) declined jurisdiction; media contact resulted in silence or story removal
The pattern suggests not individual corruption but institutional coordination—which requires explanation beyond "bad apples."
C. The Complexity Hypothesis
A third explanation attributes systemic dysfunction to legitimate complexity: cases involving multiple jurisdictions, technical corporate matters, and self-represented litigants naturally produce sub-optimal outcomes due to resource constraints, coordination challenges, and procedural difficulties. This hypothesis fails on several grounds:
First, the legal issues were straightforward. The core questions—Did the billing bear any relationship to work performed? Did shareholder records reconcile? Should probative documentary evidence be examined before enforcement?—required no specialized expertise, only basic engagement with filed materials.
Second, the procedural violations were elementary. Courts sealed files without Sherman Estate analysis, certified costs without Bradshaw proportionality review, refused discovery without reasons, and dismissed appeals citing "no arguable issue" where binding Supreme Court authorities directly challenged lower court decisions. These are not complexity errors; they are foundational breaches.
Third, coordination across complexity should produce chaos, not convergence. When multiple independent actors and/or agencies face coordination challenges, the expected outcome is inconsistency, delay, and scattered decision-making. Instead, the pattern shows remarkable convergence: every institution declined examination, every procedural avenue closed, every enforcement mechanism activated—despite no formal coordination mechanism, no shared case management, no inter-institutional communication on record.
Complexity cannot explain synchronized institutional behavior serving a unified directional outcome.
ChatGPT 5 THINKING / Anthropic (ClaudeAI) / PerplexityAI - Full Record Audit



Gemini / Grok - Cut & Paste Review


II.- It Began in 2020
Caged by a CAGE
On September 18th, 2020, the Director of a federally-sponsored Commercial and Government Entity (“CAGE”) is alleged to have made an attempt to acquire my investment holding in the same entity through a generic Share Transfer and Power of Attorney agreement, unlinked to a specific share purchase transaction and dollar amount. This agreement was bundled alongside draft materials for a M&A share purchase acquisition. The same acquisition was linked to a shareholder agreement I was not governed by, and the Share Transfer and Power of Attorney Agreement was precluded from the digital signature record containing the remainder of materials germane to the transaction. In retrospect, this document reassigned ownership of my shares without remuneration. I was asked to sign the documents in this bundle on extremely short notice, and I did so, whereas I trusted the Director. Following sign-off, nothing happened and the CAGE entity remained silent.
Note: Shares are property rights; opaque, “for value received” transfers unmoored from an actual bargain are inherently suspect: Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] A.C. 22; fair-treatment expectations under BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69.
Three months later, the director said the deal had been blocked by a tech partner and that the partner arrangement barred any further acquisitions until December 2022—and that there was no discretionary buy-back at any material time. For the next seven months, the director refused to disclose shareholder records, even threatening “consequences” if I contacted his records office—despite my statutory right to inspect records under s. 46 of the Business Corporations Act (S.B.C. 2002, c. 57). After another four months of silence, the BC Registrar ordered disclosure on May 3, 2021. The employee roster page disappeared from the company website the day after that order—raising obvious concerns about record preservation.
Note: Inspection and record-keeping duties: BCBCA s. 46 (shareholder inspection), s. 42 (Central Securities Register). Interference with access and post-order deletions are squarely at odds with shareholders’ reasonable expectations: BCE, 2008 SCC 69 (oppression framework).
The disclosure was compelling. The Central Securities Register (CSR) showed all shareholder activity ceased on April 14, 2020—five months before the proposed M&A date. At the time, CAGE had 70+ employee option-holders (with at least 41 past their initial vesting), and the director had repeatedly described them as “shareholders.” Historically, option exercises appeared at predictable intervals; after April 2020, nothing. The CSR listed only 19 shareholders, and no entries after April 2020. The company also omitted its FY2020 audit from the initial disclosure, even though prior years’ audits had appeared between February and April.
Note: A CSR is a definitive ownership record: BCBCA s. 42. A sudden, unexplained freeze against a background of regular exercises contradicts reasonable expectations and invites scrutiny under BCE.
The records also showed the director had created an isolated shareholder agreement for me dated July 27, 2016, while the remainder of the Common Non-Voting class appeared to be governed by a materially different agreement dated July 25, 2016, listing the other shareholders by name—and that “class” agreement was later referenced in the 2020 M&A memo. The CSR reflected a significant transfer from CAGE to a holding company on July 27, 2016.
Note: Selective/bespoke governance within a single class—without transparent disclosure—cuts against fair-treatment and reasonable-expectation principles: BCE; see also fiduciary/loyalty concepts applied to shareholder relations, Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99 (analogous duties of loyalty and vulnerability).
On July 1, 2021 (after the company’s Annual Reference Date), I requested updated records. I was told the FY2020 audit—ordinarily out months earlier—was “awaiting signature” by a regional CPA. When produced on July 9, 2021, the audit introduced a derecognition policy that would conceal any 2020 share transfers, omitted currency data, and showed a $1.5M variance from prior, stable year-over-year values. The updated CSR (July 9, 2021) was unchanged from May 3, 2021 except that the former VP Finance—who resigned shortly after the disclosure order—now appeared in both the Common Non-Voting and Common B Non-Voting CSRs. No other activity appears on any CSR after April 14, 2020.
Note: Directors and controllers must not frustrate transparent ownership disclosure or defeat shareholder comparability; patterns that obscure material changes engage reasonable-expectation and oppression analysis: BCE. Maintaining accurate registers is a statutory obligation: BCBCA s. 42; a sustained refusal to provide records triggers relief under s. 46 and supports a remedial investigation. Where financial statements adopt a one-off treatment that undermines comparability in a way that disadvantages a holder, courts scrutinize for oppression and misrepresentation (see BCE; civil misrepresentation principles in Queen v. Cognos Inc., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 87).
Taken together—the generic transfer/POA outside the core transaction record, the months-long obstruction of inspection rights, the CSR freeze from April 2020, the bespoke 2016 agreement applied only to me, and the FY2020 derecognition with missing currency data and an unexplained $1.5M delta—the documentary trail is consistent with concealment of share movements and frustration of my statutory and equitable rights as a securityholder.
Note: Remedies include an oppression order compelling disclosure, rectification of registers, and fair-value relief: BCBCA s. 227; BCE, 2008 SCC 69.






Routine Activities Stopped in April 2020.
Empty CSR, save for VP Finance, who resigned three days following the disclosure order.


Derecognition Policy
FY 2020 Share Transfers Remain Hidden


III. - The Shareholder Oppression Matter
Whereas no discretionary buy-back was available—and after ten months of oppressive conduct and glaring anomalies in CAGE’s shareholder records—I retained a local firm in New Westminster, BC and commenced a Petition in the Supreme Court of British Columbia seeking an investigation and payment of the full value of my shareholding. The matter is characterized by willful negligence in counsel, bad faith negotiations, and had resulted in a forced settlement.
Retained Counsel - Evidence of Collusion
I retained counsel to compile, analyze, and file originating materials and to serve CAGE and its director. The firm assembled an 830-page initial affidavit saturated with sensitive shareholder and business records and filed it with the Petition on August 4, 2021. Despite confidentiality covenants in every CAGE shareholder agreement (including mine), counsel did not seek a targeted sealing/redaction order at filing. Competent counsel should have asked the court for minimally impairing protection with reasons addressing necessity, proportionality, and alternatives (the open-court/sealing framework in Vancouver Sun (Re), 2004 SCC 43; Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 41; Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25). Their failure fell below the standard of a reasonably competent solicitor (concurrent contractual/tort duty per Central Trust Co. v. Rafuse, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 147).
After filing and service, CAGE’s counsel first advised there was “no rush to seal", then presented a steeply discounted settlement offer. The director told me this reflected the correct share value. I replied that I was willing to settle after a due-diligence review of the derecognized audit entries and I cited s. 2(a) of the Charter and my core values against expedient compromise where systemic wrongdoing might be at issue. The director agreed to take steps toward an investigation.
The file was sealed by consent on August 27, 2021 via redactions. Two weeks later, on September 13, 2021, CAGE served a default notice alleging that my failure to obtain sealing on August 4 breached the shareholder agreement and that the prior settlement offer was off the table; I was told my shares would be “automatically bought back” at $3.60 per share. This pivot from “no rush” to default, weaponizing a sealing lapse the other side had downplayed, is difficult to reconcile with the duty of honest performance and good-faith exercise of contractual discretion (Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71; C.M. Callow Inc. v. Zollinger, 2020 SCC 45; Wastech Services Ltd. v. GVRD, 2021 SCC 7).
At that point, my own counsel said they would not assist further—even though their initial lapse created the pretext for default. Worse, they filed over-broad redactions that went beyond what the judge had authorized and removed my pleaded request for an investigation, leaving a record that made the lawsuit read as unnecessary or vexatious (echoing CAGE’s incorrect claim that I had a discretionary buy-back). They then refused to file corrected redactions; I filed them myself. In my view, those acts compounded the prejudice and further departed from the standard of competent, candid representation (Central Trust).
I asked the director to withdraw the default notice in light of his prior commitment to diligence—and because the file had already been sealed. He repeated the original offer without investigation and demanded signature within two weeks. Given those developments, I retained a second firm in Surrey to conduct diligence on the director’s settlement affidavit and assume carriage of the file.
After I signed the retainer and provided a deposit, the second firm went silent for a week. I sent four follow-ups requesting the promised diligence; all were ignored. On the eve of the director’s deadline, the firm wrote that they could not send a formal recommendation. In the same breath, they admitted that a valuation expert was required to vet share value but urged me to sign immediately anyway. Advising execution while acknowledging that essential diligence was outstanding failed the duty to provide competent, timely, and responsive advice within the retainer’s scope (Central Trust).
Exhausted and facing an engineered deadline with no practical alternative, I signed the settlement CAGE drafted. The circumstances reflect a convergence of inequality of bargaining power and improvidence—hallmarks of unconscionability (Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, 2020 SCC 16; Harry v. Kreutziger (1978), BCCA; Morrison v. Coast Finance (1965), BCCA). They also resonate with undue influence/economic duress principles where wrongful or illegitimate pressure, coupled with blocked diligence, drives consent (Geffen v. Goodman Estate, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 353; Greater Fredericton Airport Authority v. NAV Canada, 2008 NBCA 27). A settlement procured amid material non-disclosure or misrepresentation is susceptible to rescission (Rick v. Brandsema, 2009 SCC 10 (family context, disclosure principle); Zheng v. Yuandian Investment Group Ltd., 2017 BCSC 1813, para 52).
Post-execution, further irregularities appeared: an uncashable settlement cheque, mismatched file numbers between my retainer and operative files, and a statement of services that omitted the settlement’s conclusion and payout. After I pressed for a complete record, the firm issued a revised account “writing off” the closure work. While a $987 discount is by no means a misfortune, the omissions and after-the-fact write-off are outliers that support an inference of opportunistic performance and record-keeping inconsistent with the duty of honesty in performance (Callow; see also Wastech).
Causally, but for competent advice and a minimally impairing sealing/redaction application at filing—the obvious course under Vancouver Sun/Sierra Club/Sherman Estate—there would have been no contractual pretext for default and no manufactured time pressure; correspondingly, but for the second firm’s failure to execute the diligence retainer, I would not have faced a sign-now-or-default ultimatum. That is classic but-for causation on a balance of probabilities (Clements v. Clements, 2012 SCC 32; Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458).
My Retained Legal Counsel Filed Confidential Shareholder Records at the Public Registry Without My Knowledge, Instruction, nor Consent. The CAGE and I Agreed on a Sealing Order Remedy. The CAGE Then Issued a Default Notice Following Seal Entry. My Counsel Claimed Bad Faith, and Withdrew.









The Same Counsel Scrubbed Incriminating Details in the Public Record



IV. - CAGE Settlement Affidavit
Following events in September and October 2021 concerning the foregoing, it became evident that there were a series of false statements in the CAGE director’s sworn Settlement Affidavit.
1) False statements about who counts as a “shareholder.”
The affidavit asserts that employee stock option holders only become shareholders when their employment ends. That is contradicted by the Central Securities Register (CSR) showing a complete cessation of activity after April 14, 2020, despite multiple departures thereafter. At the time the CAGE affidavit was sworn, ten former employees who would ordinarily be expected to appear as shareholders were absent from the CSR—an implausible pattern which assumes that groups of rational actors simply chose to abandon valuable rights. After the CAGE removed its employee roster from its website the day after the May 3, 2021 disclosure order, I corroborated the former-employee population using LinkedIn, archive.org captures of the team page, and other third-party sources, and then validated those against the CSR. The sworn affidavit thus occasions a prima facie account of perjury.
Note: When affidavit assertions conflict with contemporaneous documentary records, courts give the documents primacy: Bradshaw v. Stenner, 2010 BCCA 398, paras 186–191; see also the single civil standard of proof in F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53. CSR accuracy and access flow from BCBCA ss. 42 & 46; electronic/business records are admissible if properly authenticated: Canada Evidence Act s. 30 (business records), ss. 31.1–31.3 (electronic records).
2) Contradictory accounts of the same “partner termination” event.
The affidavit gives two different dates for the termination of CAGE’s partnership with a separate tech company—the very event the 2020 share-purchase cancellation supposedly turned on. A six-month delta between those versions implies a six-month revenue variance with potential tax consequences. I preserved the underlying materials and mapped them to the CSR and audit timelines. It is noted that the false date the CAGE director provided on December 4th, 2020 had coincided with the 2-year BC statute of limitations act.
Note: Such discrepancies justify seeking third-party records and, where appropriate, regulatory attention. CRA evidence can be reachable in civil proceedings subject to the Income Tax Act confidentiality framework—see ITA s. 241(3)(b), (3.1)—and courts have recognized routes to obtain relevant tax information and testimony in appropriate cases: Slattery (Trustee of) v. Slattery, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 430 (see Part V). Hawitt v. Campbell (1983), 46 B.C.L.R. 260 (C.A.) outlines the test for misrepresentation, fraud, and/or collusion in a settlement. Credibility conflicts of this sort typically require a trial process rather than a paper disposition: Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7; Inspiration Management Ltd. v. McDermid St. Lawrence Ltd. (1989), 36 B.C.L.R. (2d) 202.
Two Accounts of Perjury in the CAGE Director's Settlement Affidavit

Paragraph 10, Settlement Affidavit
"While options for Common Non-Voting Shares continue to vest, the decision to exercise options is a decision of each individual optionee. Individual optinonees are not required to exercise options as they vest."
Ie., they collectively threw away money.
Missing from Central Securities Register
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8 Verified Tier-1 Former Employees
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13 Verified Tier-2 Former Employees



Common Non-Voting CSR is empty beyond April 2020 with one exception; the former VP Finance, who resigned shortly after the May 3rd, 2021 disclosure order. The Common B Non-Voting CSR is empty with the exception of the same individual.








Employee Roster webpage
deleted on May 3, 2021

V. - Onset of Disruptive Zersetzung: November 2021 through February 2022
Beginning in late November 2021, my day-to-day life unraveled. I experienced on-heels stalking, vehicle break-ins, home intrusions, repeated computer hijackings, unauthorized bank activity, and threats of abduction, torture, and death—both via hijacked PC events and in person from strangers. During several remote-access incidents, I was shown images of the CAGE director alongside a set of recurring actors; the same personas then populated YouTube channels pushed to me regardless of whether I was logged in, and real-world events were telegraphed online before they happened. On one occasion, a remote session displayed video of the interior of my Surrey condo.
Note: Criminal Code anchors: s. 264 (criminal harassment), s. 264.1 (uttering threats), s. 342.1 (unauthorized use of computer), s. 430(1.1) (mischief to data), s. 348 (breaking & entering), s. 346 (extortion, where threats coerce conduct), s. 423 (intimidation).
There were public attempts to implicate me, including an effort to obtain my fingerprints at a New Westminster church (mid-December 2021). I could not walk my building or a city block without being stalked and photographed; the online cohort pre-announced these encounters. At the same time in Nova Scotia, my mother began receiving calls impersonating my nephew, using family-specific language to solicit banking details.
Note: Criminal Code: s. 403 (identity fraud/personation). Privacy tort (persuasive authority): Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 (intrusion upon seclusion).
In parallel, work evaporated. Ordinary engagements derailed between meetings without any precipitating act on my part; beginning November 2021, every income source (and pending opportunity) collapsed, and I have been unemployed since. Efforts to obtain new counsel—including programs for which I qualified—were met with a priori rejections before subject matter was discussed, and unexplained but consistent midstream reversals. I swore to these facts in an Affidavit on May 20, 2022.
Note: Intentional interference with economic relations by unlawful means: A.I. Enterprises Ltd. v. Bram Enterprises Ltd., 2014 SCC 12 (elements: intention, unlawful means, resulting loss).
I sought help at the Surrey RCMP. An officer wearing a mental-health badge spoke with me outside, heard the account, but declined to open a file or investigate. He appeared to know of the situation preemptively, as is reflected in the May 20, 2022 Affidavit. Later FOIPOP records (via Halifax Regional Police) confirm my attendances. It became clear I would receive no customary relief, and I was living alone under daily intimidation.
Note: Tort of negligent investigation recognized: Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41 (standard is reasonableness, not perfection).
On February 8, 2022, after multiple break-ins and a major remote takeover where a caricature of the CAGE director uttered threats of death and identity theft on my laptop, I filed S-220956 at the Vancouver Registry with a draft petition and my January 24, 2022 Affidavit (settlement test and perjury proof). I did not intend to open a file while unrepresented and unemployed, but in the absence of police recourse—and given my plan to proceed under normal conditions later—placing evidence before a formal institution was understood as a necessary cautionary act.
I Fled for my Life
On February 16, 2022, after further break-ins, hijacks, and a specific threat that I would be abducted that night (maintenance had covered my windows and adjacent units with tarps), I relocated. I loaded what I could— including a hardcopy of my S-220956 affidavit—into my car and drove across Canada in mid-winter. I could hear laughter in the adjacent room, and persons describing the triggering PC intrusion event with specific references. I was followed and photographed multiple times while loading my vehicle. It was clearly a state-adjacent operation. After three tow rescues in blizzards, I reached Halifax, Nova Scotia, and arranged an early lease termination.
Two days after arriving, a local computer-shop owner preemptively called me a “political target” and, in the same conversation, suggested it would be pointless to remove a “specialty program” from my laptop. Online harassment resumed in Nova Scotia and on-heels activity restarted within two weeks. Early that March, a man claiming to be CAF approached and threatened me; on speakerphone, a second person also claiming CAF recited private details about the British Columbia incidents. I detail these events in my May 20, 2022 Affidavit.
Note: Possible offences: s. 403 (personation/identity fraud), s. 419 (unauthorized use of military uniforms/insignia, where applicable), s. 264.1 (threats).
That same affidavit—the first notarized account of these incidents beyond RCMP records—was couriered from Halifax to Vancouver the day it was commissioned. While it was en route, CAGE’s counsel threatened to strike S-220956 without explanation. No one other than the notary knew of the affidavit’s existence (see Exhibit A to my Aug. 23, 2023 Affidavit). At that time, S-220956 was three months old with an outstanding order for audit discovery. I held back filing the May 20 affidavit linking the director to the events that precipitated the petition. CAGE did not act on the strike threat. When I added the materials in July 2022, CAGE then demanded a seal of the entire file—including public exhibits—which the court granted. In chambers, treatment of these events was muted.
Note: Sealing must satisfy Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25 (necessity, proportionality, alternatives). Blanket, file-wide seals—especially over public exhibits—are exceptional and require reasons.
For conceptual clarity, I have referred to the pattern as “Zersetzung” (a term commonly used to describe systematic, psychologically disintegrative harassment). The scope, regularity, and sophistication—digital hijacks, synchronized in-person stalking, impersonation calls using private family idiom, employment and counsel interference, and file-wide sealing—are reasonably expected to preclude an assumption that the CAGE had marshalled these resources to act independently. The consistency and breadth of the pattern make it difficult to assess an isolated actor hypothesis, as does the manner of RCMP posture.
Note: Where unknown persons orchestrate online/offline campaigns, civil tools include Norwich orders to identify wrongdoers: Rogers Communications Inc. v. Voltage Pictures, LLC, 2018 SCC 38; BMG Canada Inc. v. Doe, 2005 FCA 193; and interlocutory injunctions under the RJR-MacDonald test, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311. Criminal peace-bond relief: s. 810.
Note: Zersetzung (pronounced [t͡sɛɐ̯ˈzɛt͡sʊŋ], German for "decomposition" and "disruption") was a psychological warfare technique used by the Ministry for State Security (Stasi) to repress political opponents in East Germany during the 1970s and 1980s. Zersetzung served to combat alleged and actual dissidents through covert means, using secret methods of abusive control and psychological manipulation to prevent anti-government activities. People were commonly targeted on a pre-emptive and preventative basis, to limit or stop politically incorrect activities that they may have gone on to perform, and not on the basis of crimes they had actually committed. Zersetzung methods were designed to break down, undermine, and paralyze people behind "a facade of social normality" in a form of "silent repression".
PsyOp | Cyber | Mischief | Zersetzung Began Shortly Following the Shareholder Settlement [Link]












"Trust Account"
____________


The RCMP Did Not Respond
They Were Aware
Per the adjacent Affidavit excerpt and a report pulled by local police cited below it, I made multiple attempts to solicit RCMP support in response to the events that began following the 2021 CAGE shareholder dispute. The RCMP appeared to have a priori knowledge of these incidents, and could have taken a few easy steps to address the ongoing and serious crimes involved. Namely, they could have obtained CCTV video footage from the condo building I was living in at the time. These would have demonstrated the ongoing break-ins which were occurring. Likewise, they could have assigned their cyber team. I have not been able to secure any help for almost three years, despite diligent solicitation. The RCMP was not asked to play the role of a judge, notwithstanding the fact that their negligence had occasioned the filing of S-220956, and an emergency relocation across Canada in mid-winter. Having said that, the RCMP must investigate crimes related to civil proceedings, being the same perpetrators, and likewise, investigate the conduct of public registry employees pursuant to CCC 139. Finally, it must recognize a clear matter of criminal interference.




I was Consistently Denied Fiduciary Legal Support, Including ProBono, from November 2021 Onward



VI. - S-220956: Feb 2022 through Nov 2022
In February 2022 at the onset of S-220956, irrespective of the conditions initiating the same, I had a basic expectation of a fair and impartial judicial system. The entirety of this proceeding is chronicled at the Civil page (here). Mindful of negligence by my retained counsel in August 2021 in failing to apply for a seal of the shareholder oppression affidavit at its onset, I had asked the court to temporarily seal the file on submitting the pleadings with a hand-written application on February 8th, 2022, which it agreed to on consent of the parties.
Milestone 1 — Discovery pathway opened (Apr 1, 2022).
My first substantive request was to furnish the evidentiary record with the derecognized and privileged audit data, alongside the shareholder records contradicting the director’s settlement affidavit. I relied on Hawitt v. Campbell (1983), 46 B.C.L.R. 260 (C.A.); re-opening settlements where there is a triable issue of fraud/collusion/limitation/misapprehension; and Justice Iacobucci’s discussion in Slattery (Trustee) v. Slattery, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 430 (Part V) that tax records may be necessary to reach the correct disposition.
On April 1, 2022, Master Cameron agreed and ordered service on CRA with my application for audit disclosure (citing ITA s. 241(3) and related provisions), and further directed that, failing agreement between the Parties, that directions be sought on how (not if) to serve three private, material entities: (i) the CAGE's CPA firm, (ii) the holding company identified in the Sept 2020 share-purchase memo, and (iii) the technology partner said to have triggered cancellation. Opposing counsel vigorously objected, but did not appeal. Shortly after, I was told the adjudicator retired.
Note: Discovery’s truth-seeking role: Spar Aerospace, 2002 SCC 78; “don’t short-circuit discovery where facts are contested”: Boxer Capital, 2005 ONCA; summary process must remain proportionate to justice, not a shortcut around evidence: Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7.
Milestone 2 — The pathway is smothered (May–Aug 2022).
What should have been a straightforward execution of the April 1 2022 order was then suppressed through a sequence of short chambers appearances. Two hearings immediately after April 1 were held in private rooms, contrary to BCSC Civil Rules 22-1(5) and the open-court principle (Vancouver Sun; Sherman Estate). On June 27, 2022, over my objection and with no evidentiary foundation of necessity, a chambers judge granted a blanket protection order over an already-sealed file, justified on speculation that I might disclose sealed materials before directions on mode of service—despite a April 27, 2022 letter confirming directions would be sought on service method, pursuant to the order. The judge stated the order was “reasonably required” so the seal could “properly function,” refused to address mode of service on the three third parties, and then required me to seek permission to execute the April 1 2022 undertaking. That became the template for later protection extensions.
Note: Sealing/protection requires necessity, proportionality, and rejection of workable alternatives with reasons; blanket/file-wide orders are exceptional: Sherman Estate; Dagenais/Mentuck. Converting a subsisting discovery order into a leave-to-act regime without reasons invites re-litigation/relitigation abuse concerns: Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., 2003 SCC 63.
Milestone 3 — CRA disclosure squeezed into short chambers; referral judge signs pre-drafts (Aug 2022).
CRA counsel opposed the April 1 disclosure route and, together with opposing counsel, faxed the court to shoehorn my CRA motion into a 30-minute short-chambers list in August 2022 alongside a CAGE motion for a proximate summary hearing. I wrote the court explaining the application was not ready (mode-of-service directions were still outstanding) and that a short-chambers slot was disproportionate to the issues’ importance. Despite registry staff lacking authority to dictate an applicant’s dates, the request was granted. A referral judge—who admitted unfamiliarity with the file—cut off my ITA 241/222 submissions and dismissed the CRA route, then signed pre-drafted orders authorizing the petition to proceed by summary judgment, effectively relitigating the April 1 2022 discovery structure.
Note: Process must be proportionate and reasons must grapple with the live constraints: Hryniak; Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, paras 86, 105, 126–128. When material credibility/document conflicts exist, summary determination is inappropriate: Inspiration Management, 36 B.C.L.R. (2d) 202 (C.A.).
Milestone 4 — Stay refused; April 1 order ignored (Sept 2022).
I appealed the short-chambers/summary turn and sought a stay so the April 1 order could be executed first. The appeal chambers judge dismissed the stay and ended the hearing abruptly when I turned to ITA 241(3) and 222 and the Iacobucci rationale for audit disclosure, including ITA 241(3.1) concerning the related criminal activity (see Guide).
Note: Stays are assessed under RJR-MacDonald, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311; where a prior, subsisting discovery order is being functionally nullified without reasons, there is at least a serious issue to be tried. The duty to give responsive reasons remains: Vavilov.
Milestone 5 — Summary hearing granted in my absence; petition dismissed.
I notified opposing counsel that, per April 1, the petition could not be properly tried without lawful audit data (ITA s. 241(3)(b)) and that key action items remained outstanding. Opposing counsel moved to proceed in my absence. I filed a response: appearing at a summary hearing would validate re-litigating a subsisting order in the same court (R. v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309 at paragraphs 76-78). In a five-minute appearance, the court ignored the April 1 requirements and granted a summary hearing before opposing counsel alone. The petition was later dismissed as a “fishing expedition,” even though the same judge had recently endorsed robust investigation in A Lawyer v. Law Society of British Columbia, 2021 BCCA 437 (arising from routine audit triggers). The transcript shows the shareholder record conflicts were not engaged, nor the procedural foreclosures, nor the related criminal element.
Bottom line.
A reasoned discovery pathway opened on April 1, 2022 was then choked off by protection/sealing expansions, private-room hearings contrary to Rule 22-1(5), short-chambers compression, pre-drafted orders, and a summary determination that never grappled with the CSR/audit contradictions or the CRA+CPA disclosure route. On any fair application of Sherman Estate, Hryniak, Vavilov, Wolkins, Tayo Tompouba, Spar Aerospace, and C.U.P.E., that sequence does not meet the standard of transparent, proportionate, intelligible adjudication. Severe optics (R v. Wolkins).
S-220956: Former Deputy AG & Minister of Justice Frank Iacobucci Authored the Audit Test

Charitable Donations
An actionable vector toward resolving the scandal resides in a CRA tax audit. As shown earlier in the page, the CAGE Settlement Affidavit contains two accounts of perjury, one of which triggers an immediate consideration of section 222 of the Income Tax Act. Forensic audit is likewise expected to address the criminal interference components. The legal test is below.


Audit Discovery
Former Deputy Attorney General and Deputy Minister of Justice Frank Iacobucci set forth the legal test for the authorization of testimony by CRA officials in civil proceedings, using the legislation in section 241(3) of the Income Tax Act as a basis. Section 241(3.1), which provisions testimony without a legal test, is viable by means of the criminal element involved. Per the account in the Litigation page, the BCSC and BCCA suppressed the initial order by a now-retired adjudicator made April 1st, 2022 to introduce testimony by CRA officials. This was obstructed in a manner that ignored relevant legal tests in addition to the framework presented by the former Deputy Attorney General as shown.
ITA Section 241(3), (3.1)
The jurisprudence in Slattery (Trustee of) v. Slattery, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 430 outlines a legal test which refutes the notion that testimony by CRA officials in civil proceedings is limited to matters brought under the Income Tax Act itself. The test is exceptionally broad insofar as a matter need only have some measure of relationship to the enforcement of the Income Tax Act. Per the Litigation page testimony and in the redacted Affidavits, this test was pushed aside in a series of proceedings in 2022 in favor of pre-drafted orders provided by counsel.


Settlement Affidavit
Absent consideration of ITA 241(3.1) as it relates to the criminal mischief surrounding the proceeding, the Settlement Affidavit sworn by the CAGE Director on September 22nd, 2021 contains two accounts of perjury. One involves shareholder materials and CAGE shareholders, and the other involves two conflicting tax accounts concerning a partner entity that the BCSC initially asked to be joined. To that end, the legal test in Slattery is met with respect to the civil matter relating to the enforcement of the Act. That same insight occasioned the initial BCSC order on April 1st, 2022.
“To comply with section 7 of the Charter, the magistrate must make a decision based on the facts and the law. In the extradition context, the principles of fundamental justice have been held to require, “at a minimum, a meaningful judicial assessment of the case on the basis of the evidence and the law. A judge considers the respective rights of the litigants or parties and makes findings of fact on the basis of evidence and applies the law to those findings. Both facts and law must be considered for a true adjudication. Since Bonham’s Case [(1610), 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 77 E.R. 646], the essence of a judicial hearing has been the treatment of facts revealed by the evidence in consideration of the substantive rights of the parties as set down by law” (Ferras, at para. 25). The individual and societal interests at stake in the certificate of inadmissibility context suggest similar requirements.”
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007 SCC 9 at paragraph 48
"Thus, in my view, the powers granted to the Law Society by s. 36(b) of the LPA, and as operationalized by R. 4-55 of the Law Society Rules, should be read broadly to permit the investigation of a member’s entire practice, as that may in certain circumstances be the best means to uncover the truth and protect the public and to determine whether disciplinary action should be taken."
BCSC Chambers Judge Andrew Majawa in A Lawyer v The Law Society of British Columbia, 2021 BCSC 914 at paragraph 63
“Justice is not only about results, it is about how those results are obtained”.
R. v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309 at paragraph 85
The BCSC Agreed With Privileged Discovery. The Proceedings Went Awry Following the Order.
CAGE Counsel sought special costs in their response to S-220956 in March 2022, claiming the matter was frivolous. The BC Supreme Court disagreed on April 1st, 2022, acknowledging that allegations of fraud, perjury, and collusion were evident at face value. Service was ordered on CRA and private entities related to the 2021 dispute. The file was later compromised.



At a Hearing Unlawfully Held in Private [Rule 22-1(5)], a BCSC Judge Encumbered the Discovery Order.

CRA Vigorously Opposed Discovery, Despite a Tax Enforcement Issue in the File [ITA, Section 222]. CRA Counsel Did Not Address the Iacobucci Legal Test. Citizens Understand the CRA to be an Objective Public Agency. BCSC Registry Staff Booked an Early Hearing Date Without the Consent of the Applicant.


There is No Analogue for the CRA Response, nor the Aggressive Pushback and Insistence on Urgency.




Res Judicata: CAGE Pre-Drafted Order Templates Seeking a Proximate Summary Hearing Were Signed



Following the April 1st, 2022 order, a series of chambers appearances were held in private rooms in violation of BSCS Rule 22-1(5). The proceedings were then guided by dishonest and false narratives which the court accepted at face value, ignored legal tests, abuse of process, and the approval of pre-drafted orders which held contempt for the discovery order, and sought to relitigate the matter of audit testimony (Res Judicata). These actions sought to re-write the overarching narrative.

The BC Appellate Court Blocked an Appeal of the Draft Orders Prior to the Summary Hearing

The matter of ongoing criminal interference was precluded from treatment in the file despite the same being obvious. The BCCA replicated the same manner of obstruction. The adjacent transcript depicts an instance where a BCCA judge closed chambers when the issue of CRA testimony was raised in accord with the April 1st, 2022 order, and ITA 241(3.1) concerning criminal offenses.
Abuse of Process, and Indeed, the Prejudicial Disposition of Authority, is a Heinous Violation of Charter Rights in the
Section 7 Level of Analysis. An Incomplete but Relevant List of Applicable Caselaw is Cited in the Authorities Page [Here].
Related & Ongoing PsyOp-Style Harassment | Pop-Ups, Algorithms, & CIMIC Mischief [see Guide]


CAGE Director
Scandal in the S-220956 Dismissal by BCSC Justice Andrew Majawa

Majawa Decision. S-220956 dismissed as a "fishing expedition", despite proof of fraud, perjury, and an outstanding order for audit data. The Decision text is Suffused with glaring falsehoods like this.

As compared to the decision text, there was no service of materials. An order to seek direction on service modality to related entities had already been made on April 1st, 2022, and the Parties had Agreed on the Roadmap (below). The manner of scandal evidenced is not limited to Majawa J.

S-220956 Majawa Decision: "The Evidence Does Not Matter."


Legal counsel was retained to establish a precedent for the Affidavit, review it multiple times, critique it, commission it, file it, and serve it on the CAGE Director. Counsel was aware of confidential information beginning at page 674 of the Affidavit, but did not file an Application for a sealing order. I am not legally trained, and whereas, counsel was retained to act independently on my behalf. Trained lawyers are not expected to make such mistakes in gross negligence. Justice Majawa was aware of these details.
Per Affidavit records, my governing Shareholder Agreement is dated July 27th, 2016. A different governing Agreement for other CAGE shareholders is dated July 25th, 2016. Notwithstanding, an unbiased judge would not claim that a loss of a quarter-million dollars, as a result of an act of gross negligence by retained counsel, following the execution a remedy the Parties agreed on, is germane to the object and proportion of justice.


Per Groberman J., Coast Foundation v. Currie, 2003 BCSC 1781 at paragraphs 13, 15;
“The question of when the court ought to give judgment on an issue, as opposed to on the claim generally, is more complex. The court is justifiably reluctant to decide cases in a piecemeal fashion. In addition to all of the concerns that arise when the entire claim is before the court, there is a multitude of others. The result is that the court must exercise considerable caution before coming to the conclusion that it should grant judgment on an issue in a summary trial [...] The court must also be wary of making determinations on particular issues on a Rule 18A application when those issues are inexorably intertwined with other issues that are to be left for determination at trial: Prevost v. Vetter, 2002 BCCA 202, 210 D.L.R. (4th) 649; inter-relatedness of issues is not always obvious, and caution is necessary whenever a party seeks judgment on an issue as opposed to Judgment generally under Rule 18A: B.M.P. Global et al v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2003 BCCA 534, [2003] B.C.J. No. 2383”
This is the only mention in the Majawa decision that makes any reference to the Zersetzung components related to the file. Likewise, no consideration was made regarding the conditions that occasioned the opening of S-220956 to begin with. Numerous legal tests apply concerning matters substantially related to the proceedings, and the encumbrances imposed on litigants in the absence of fiduciary support;
-
Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 470 at paragraph 4;
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Girao v. Cunningham, 2020 ONCA 260 at paragraphs 156, 174, 177;
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Jonsson v Lymer, 2020 ABCA 167 at paragraphs 14, 60, 71, 85, 86.
Macfarlane J.A. promulgated the standard settlement test in Hawitt v. Campbell, [1983] CanLII 307 at paragraph 19;
The judge may refuse the stay if:
1. There was a limitation on the instructions of the solicitor known to the opposite party;
2. There was a misapprehension by the solicitor making the settlement of the instructions of the client or of the facts of a type that would result in injustice or make it unreasonable or unfair to enforce the settlement;
3. There was fraud or collusion;
4. There was an issue to be tried as to whether there was such a limitation, misapprehension, fraud or collusion in relation to the settlement.

The CSR (Central Securities Register) demonstrates that the CAGE Director committed an act of perjury in his Settlement Affidavit. The same Affidavit likewise contains two conflicting tax accounts concerning a company the CAGE entity was formerly partnered with. The remainder of evidence forms a broad compendium including shareholder agreements, communications, audit reports, behaviors, and more (Redacted November 22nd, 2023 Affidavit, pages 98 through 153, as linked here). This is why a (now-retired) BCSC adjudicator ordered service on CRA and related private entities on April 1st, 2022, according to the legal test in Hawitt.

The derecognition of assets clause in the CAGE entity's FY2020 Fiscal Report as shown on page 121 of the Redacted Affidavit reads as follows:
"The Company derecognizes financial assets only when the contractual rights to cash flows from the financial assets expire, or when it transfers the financial assets and substantially all of the associated risks and rewards of ownership to another entity. Gains and losses on derecognition are generally recognized in the consolidated statements of operations."
This would conceal any share transfers in the relevant year (see page 108). The consolidated statements themselves likewise yield relevant deltas (page 122).
This statement by a Federally-Appointed judge concerning the size of a Petition Record binder as a vetting mechanism is as reckless as it is antagonistic to the object and proportion of justice. Likewise, this judge ignored an outstanding mandate set previously in the same court concerning the introduction of audit data by CRA and three private entities related to the shareholder dispute. Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and Section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights require fair proceedings, which require a court to adjudicate matters on all relevant facts and law, and to ensure a fair process;
-
Ruffo v. Conseil de la magistrature, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 267 at paragraph 38;
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New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 at paragraphs 73 through 75 and 119;
-
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007 SCC 9 at paragraphs 29, 41, 48;
-
United States of America v. Cobb, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 587, 2001 SCC 19 at paragraph 53.

Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007 SCC 9 at paragraph 29;
“This basic principle has a number of facets. It comprises the right to a hearing. It requires that the hearing be before an independent and impartial magistrate. It demands a decision by the magistrate on the facts and the law. [...] Precisely how these requirements are met will vary with the context. But for section 7 (of the Charter) to be satisfied, each of them must be met in substance.”

Shareholder records account for a fraction of filed materials. Specifically, they furnish 18.3% of the November 22nd, 2023 compendium Affidavit, and smaller proportions in other documents. Some Affidavits contained none, but were nonetheless sealed. A blanket sealing order over these materials is a violation of settled Constitutional law. Likewise, settlement privilege does not apply when the settlement itself is an issue. An overarching concern in a permanent complete seal is preclusion of this scandal from the public, whereas the same censorship precludes intervention because people are not properly informed about the file. Most importantly, the sealing orders concealed the conditions that occasioned the opening of S-220956, the obstruction of justice within the file, and the external criminal activities related to and impacting it. The sealing orders were made to conceal the scandal.
-
Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25 at paragraph 1, 35, 75, 79, 85, 87, 91, 94,
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United States v. Meng, 2021 BCSC 1253 at paragraph 33
-
Nguyen v. Dang, BCSC 1409 at paragraph 23
I filed a basket of evidence concerning two accounts of perjury in the CAGE Director's Settlement Affidavit, a basket of shareholder evidence (pages 98-153 in the November 22nd, 2023 Redacted Affidavit), and an order made on April 1st, 2022 in the same court to adduce privileged audit data accordance to the legal test in Hawitt v. Campbell, [1983] CanLII 307 at paragraph 19, as predicated on the merit in the file. More importantly, I gave an account of the conditions that occasioned the inception of the file, and whereas the same events breach section 3.2 of the Settlement Agreement as shown on the Zersetzung page. Yet, this miscarriage of justice resulted in a half-million dollars in special costs awarded to the perpetrators. How, and why?

Justice Majawa Had Set an Opposite Precedent in His Other Rulings

The foregoing closing comments in the S-220956 Majawa decision are diametrically opposed to the precedents he has set in other matters concerning access to justice. S-220956 was no fishing expedition; it was supported with hard evidence including two separate accounts of perjury in the CAGE Director's Settlement Affidavit. This was likewise recognized through an order to obtain privileged audit testimony. With respect to the initial shareholder dispute, the CAGE Director issued a default notice made possible through an act of gross negligence by my retained legal counsel, following the execution of the remedy for the same breach. Whereas this act by counsel is palpable gross negligence, and by means of the behavior of retained counsel following this act, collusion cannot be ruled out. The same likewise would align with the remainder of evidentiary components in this scandal. Notwithstanding that I had no intention to open S-220956 as an unrepresented and unemployed litigant beset by ongoing criminal mischief substantially related to the same Respondents, the file exactly met the criteria set forth in Hawitt. The thesis of third-party interference set forth in this website is supported through a comparison of other precedents set by the same judge. One such example I would cite here is A Lawyer v. The Law Society of British Columbia, 2021 BCSC 914.


In Lawyer, justice Majawa ordered a sweeping investigation of an entire law practice on the basis of a hypothesis by the LSBC. Anneke Driessen, a LSBC staff lawyer, wrote on February 11th, 2022;
"The auditor identified, among other things, that you may have allowed clients to use your trust accounts for the flow of funds in the absence of substantial legal services related to those funds and/or in the absence of making reasonable inquiries," wrote Anneke Driessen, a law society staff lawyer on Feb. 11, 2020.”
The foregoing hypothesis is compared with hard evidence presented in my first Affidavit of S-220956, which BSCS Master Cameron acknowledged on April 1st, 2022 as compelling enough to serve on Canada Revenue Agency, a CPA firm, a former partner company of the CAGE entity, and the holding company contemplated in the 2020 M&A action. Lawyer much more closely resembles a "fishing expedition" by comparison.
In Lawyer at paragraph 63, justice Majawa positioned the principle of fundamental justice as being vectored toward "uncovering the truth" and "protecting the public". He called for a broad rather than narrow disposition of investigative powers, similar to the jurisprudence of Iacobucci J. in Slattery (Trustee of) v. Slattery, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 430 as it relates to the testimony of CRA officials in civil matters (pages 161-162 in the Redacted November 22nd, 2023 Affidavit). With respect to relevant analysis, one must highlight a theme of using the "best means" to enable an outcome consistent with relevant key principles. The BCSC has a different mandate than the LSBC. The question being, did the BCSC use the best means available at its disposal to adjudicate in accordance with fundamental justice, germane to BCSC Rule 1-3? Or, were the powers of the bench used in a capacity opposite to its mandate? S-220956 began on solid footing, but the proceedings were severely and consistently derailed in a way that can only be described as unnatural, and subject to criminal interference which was never addressed in any capacity.
In S-220956, Justice Majawa obstructed justice by ignoring a previous order made in the same court, ignoring hard evidence, ignoring customary jurisprudence and legal tests, ignoring his own jurisprudence, insulating wrongdoers from prosecution, violating Constitutional Law, and awarding special costs to the CAGE Director against every legal test concerning it. Justice Majawa suppressed the truth, and endangered the public, allowing palpable wrongdoing to remain unaddressed, and in fact, rewarding it. As detailed in the Zersetzung page, matters germane to this scandal will and do inexorably victimize other people. Justice Majawa presided over a weaponized bench in S-220956.
At the request of counsel for the Attorney General of Canada, as is detailed in the forthcoming sections, justice Majawa, a BCSC chambers judge, and in violation of nine (9) rules of procedure concerning the BCSC and the Class Proceedings Act, dismissed S-229680 similar to S-220956. He likewise imposed severe and unfounded encumbrances affecting access to justice concerning the matters of this scandal. His actions made it nigh impossible to uncover the truth and protect the public, absent the actions of whistleblowers.
Finally, the jurisprudence in Lawyer is applicable to an investigation of the CAGE Director's trust accounts, as is contemplated further on.


For reasons unbeknownst to me, the court proceedings were not only choreographed; they were politicized. A normal court stamp appears on the left. To its right, the stamp for my motion to justice Majawa contains a feather. Not a smudge; a feather.
Test Criteria: Institutional & Judicial Impartiality
R. v. Lippé, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114 sets forth a legal test concerning bias, impartiality, and integrity is understood to be a matter of perception by reasonable, fair-minded, and informed persons, which has not been set aside.



R. v. Lippé, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114 on institutional impartiality;
“If a judicial system loses the respect of the public, it has lost its efficacy."
VII. - S-228567 & S-229680:
Oct 2022 through April 2023
By September 2022, it was clear that I was facing a systemic and structural problem. Contemporaneous to an appeal of S-220956, I commenced a new class proceeding addressing the CAGE, the Government of Canada, and a coordinated cohort of harassment actors (I pleaded them collectively as “Defendant4” to reflect an aggregated wrongdoer group, cf. representational/aggregation dynamics discussed in Salna v. Voltage Pictures, LLC, 2021 FCA 176). The claim sought a basket of remedies for Charter (ss. 2(a), 2(b), 7), privacy, and human-rights violations, systemic justice obstruction/negligence, and for the costs initially awarded to the director in S-220956.
S-228567 → S-229680 (Class Proceedings track).
I filed S-228567 in October 2022 as a bridge to what became S-229680. Throughout 2022, I could not secure counsel—even government-sponsored pro bono programs for which I met criteria—and private firms disengaged a priori, before subject matter was discussed (find the complete account of this here). Both opposing counsel correctly noted that the relief I sought in S-228567 could not proceed by petition, so I discontinued and re-filed as S-229680 under the Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50 (CPA)—the proper vehicle for the scope and issues I pleaded.
Sealing spread to files that contained only public material.
My affidavit in S-228567 contained no sworn narrative—only public social-media and web content already in the public domain. Yet the same judge who allowed S-220956 to go forward as a summary matter (ignoring the April 1, 2022 discovery order) sealed S-228567—including that public-domain exhibit set. The Application Record for that hearing even misidentified CAGE’s counsel as counsel for the Government of Canada. The Government’s official counsel did not attend and “took no position,” despite the open-court and freedom-of-expression interests directly engaged by a sealing order (Vancouver Sun (Re), 2004 SCC 43; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (AG), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480; Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25 (necessity, proportionality, and workable alternatives). The effect was censorship of public materials via court order.
S-229680 was sealed before service—and later scrubbed from the e-registry.
On December 13th, 2022, S-229680, the properly-filed replacement of S-228567, was sealed prior to the CAGE accepting service of the pleadings, and prior to a court hearing. This discovery was made that day while logged into BC Court Services Online, and whereas, CAGE counsel had emailed acceptance of service within thirty seconds of me making that discovery online (one of the many contributing evidentiary components concerning surveillance). Counsel for AG Canada was silent. My supporting affidavit in S-229680 likewise relied on overlapping public materials. In January 2023, I discovered that my originating pleadings had likewise been removed from the electronic court registry entirely.
Note: Open-court principle applies to civil filings absent justified, tailored restrictions; scrubbing core pleadings from public access demands reasons addressing Sherman Estate’s test; publication bans/seals cannot be a default, Dagenais/Mentuck.
Case management was acknowledged—then quietly sidestepped.
Also in January 2023, the BCSC acknowledged my request for a case-management judge and case-planning conference in S-229680, as contemplated by Practice Direction 5 (class proceedings management), which interfaces with the CPA and related Rules. Three days later, counsel for the Attorney General of Canada wrote that S-229680 would instead be sent to the same chambers judge who had handled S-220956 in the manner I say obstructed justice. Over the next ten weeks, no fewer than nine serious, categorical procedural departures followed; the court ignored my written requests to correct course and declined to discuss by phone. In April, the Chief Justice replied that an order made outside the proper procedural parameters was nonetheless “in effect,” without engaging the detailed account of obstruction I provided (cf. Criminal Code s. 139). The practical result was to block a trial of common issues from proceeding in the BCSC.
Note: Courts must provide transparent, intelligible, and justified reasons that grapple with the governing legal constraints: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, paras 86, 105, 126–128. Class matters are ordinarily case-managed to safeguard fairness and proportionality; departures from the structure contemplated by PD-5/CPA should be explained. Where sealing/publication limits are sought, courts must consider alternatives and tailoring, not adopt blanket secrecy, per Sherman Estate; see also duty to facilitate access to justice and not erect process barriers: Trial Lawyers Assn. of BC v. BC (AG), 2014 SCC 59.
Bottom line.
Across S-228567 and S-229680, the court extended sealing/protection from S-220956 to public-domain materials, pre-service pleadings, and even e-registry visibility, while ignoring rules that governed the style of proceeding. Those moves run head-on into the open-court and proportionality jurisprudence (Vancouver Sun; CBC v. New Brunswick; Sherman Estate; Dagenais/Mentuck) and the reason-giving and fair-process requirements (Vavilov). The cumulative effect was to foreclose a principled adjudication of the common issues in a forum designed by statute to hear them.
An Overt and Palpable Violation of Procedure Requested by the Attorney General of Canada










Charter Matter S-229680 Was Sealed Extrajudicially at Inception



Pleadings Scrubbed From Registry Database


Declared a Vexatious Litigant for Filing Charter Matter S-229680
The Merit in the File
The excerpts above this section touch on the compelling issues brought before the BCSC. A prima facie account of shareholder fraud exists by means of the materials presented, as well as compelling evidence of collusion with the legal counsel I had retained to manage the 2021 dispute. The CAGE settlement affidavit likewise contains two accounts of perjury. The intent of the CAGE CEO is visible in records dating back to September 2020 both within and beyond courtrooms. This was first acknowledged by the BCSC on April 1st, 2022 per the adjacent, and later by local police prior a false report being filed. The existence of bias and collusion in the proceedings is evidenced through the disposition of litigation in response to the evidentiary record and its applicable legal tests. When the wrong judgments are issued, it evidences corruption. When they are issued repeatedly, it indicates scandal.



PD-27 Corrective Letters
The BCSC ignored five (5) letters sent over ten (10) weeks under Practice Direction 27, in response to the serious Rule violations cited earlier in the page. Each letter was less than five (5) pages. In the adjacent excerpt, Majawa J. treats reasonable corrective efforts as vexatious in character.
An Assertion of Prolix & Convoluted Filings
S-220956 and S-229680 are distinctly different files. The latter is a Charter matter that sought different relief, which counsel from both the CAGE and AG Canada advised could not be brought by Petition, as was the case with S-220956. As a result, S-228567 was discontinued and replaced by S-229680. In scandalous fashion, the latter file was sealed extrajudicially, and dismissed amid rule violations, at the request of AG Canada.
Majawa's assertion of convoluted filings is disingenuous, and is inconsistent compared with the observation of other adjudicators, as is exampled in the adjacent transcript excerpt. Further evidence of the same may be gleaned through CAGE Affidavits filed in an out-of-province court. By means of the excerpt below, it required just thirty-six (36) minutes for CAGE counsel to review a 143-page Affidavit I filed, thus suggesting an ease of review. It likewise underscores the felonious character of the cost scandal which had originated in British Columbia through a CAGE Affidavit in filed in BC. Finally, my academic background should be noted. It is difficult for an accredited institution to sign a postgraduate certificate if the student habitually produces indiscernible trash. Reasonable persons can glean, through the excerpts on this page, that the court had acted in a prejudicial capacity.



Self-Represented Litigants
From November 2021 onward, I was without fiduciary legal counsel despite best efforts to obtain the same. As shown earlier in this page, my retained counsel in the 2021 CAGE dispute had jeopardized the file through disclosing materials without my knowledge nor consent. The SCC held that self-represented litigants are afforded additional protections. In consideration of the same, a series of applicable legal tests are detailed below, and also in the Authorities Page.
Vexatious Declaration as a Procedural Foreclosure Mechanism
Unfounded Tools to Affect Foreclosure
Concerning the consideration that must be afforded to self-represented litigants (and notwithstanding the fact that I was forced to represent myself at all times), the Supreme Court of Canada held in Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 470 at paragraph 4;
“We would add that we endorse the Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons (2006) (online) established by the Canadian Judicial Council.”
Girao v. Cunningham, 2020 ONCA 260 (“Girao”), Lauwers J.A underscores the foregoing precedent set in Pintea concerning the Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons, at paragraphs 156 , 176, and 177;
“The impression left by the limited trial record is that the trial judge allowed himself to be led by trial counsel’s arguments. Ms. Girao, a self-represented, legally unsophisticated plaintiff who struggled with the English language, was left to her own devices. Fairness required more, consistent with the expectations placed on the trial judge by Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons.” [...] “Ms. Girao was entitled to but did not get the active assistance of the trial judge whose responsibility it was to ensure the fairness of the proceeding. As a self-represented litigant, she was also entitled to, but did not get, basic fairness from trial defense counsel as officers of the court. The trial judge was also entitled to seek and to be provided with the assistance of counsel as officers of the court, in the ways discussed above. This did not happen." [...] I would allow the appellant’s appeal, set aside the judgment and orders, and order a new trial. I would award the costs of this appeal and of the trial to the appellant, including her disbursements.”
Concerning vexatious declarations specifically, Slatter J. wrote in Jonsson v Lymer, 2020 ABCA 167 at paragraph 14;
“Vexatious litigants must be distinguished from self-represented litigants. Merely because a self-represented litigant uses a process that is not in accordance with the Rules of Court, or advances a claim without merit does not mean that they are vexatious. Many self-represented litigants are unfamiliar with court procedures, and are inadequately or inaccurately informed about their legal rights and the limitations on them. Merely because the self-represented litigant excessively or passionately believes in the merit of his or her cause does not make them vexatious.”
At paragraphs 85 and 86 in Lymer, the court concludes that self-represented litigants should not be denied access to justice through onerous orders limiting their participation, in an absence of more reasonable and customary provisions;
“Parties are entitled to self-represent, and the court should be sensitive to the challenges faced by self-represented litigants. Vexatious litigant orders should only be made when other procedural techniques have proven to be inadequate and the offensive conduct is persistent. [...] In conclusion, the appeal is allowed. The vexatious litigant order should not have been granted in these circumstances, and in any event the form of order granted was overbroad. The sanction for contempt cannot stand given the failure to afford the appellant a fair hearing. The question of sanction for contempt is referred back to the trial court for a fresh hearing before a different judge."
Duties owed to a self-represented litigant (SRL).
I was forced to be self-represented throughout. The Supreme Court in Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23 (para 4) endorsed the CJC’s Statement of Principles on SRLs, requiring judges and counsel to actively facilitate a fair process. The Ontario Court of Appeal in Girao v. Cunningham, 2020 ONCA 260 (paras 156, 176–177) reinforces that duty: SRLs are entitled to active judicial assistance and basic fairness from opposing counsel as officers of the court. Where that support is absent, the remedy can be a new trial with costs to the SRL. My experience was the opposite—procedural traps, silence to corrective requests, and orders issued without reasons that engaged the live constraints.
Vexatious-litigant rhetoric is not a substitute for case management.
On “vexatiousness,” Jonsson v. Lymer, 2020 ABCA 167 draws a bright line: an SRL’s missteps or weak claims do not make them vexatious, albeit, the BC files were extremely substantial, as this website should indicate. Lymer also stresses proper case management as the proportionate response to complexity and friction (para 60): courts should craft tailored management orders or a litigation plan rather than impose boilerplate restrictions. And at paras 85–86, the court holds SRLs must not be denied access to justice through overbroad participation limits; draconian orders require proof that lesser techniques failed. What had happened is in direct opposition to these guardrails. In my proceeding, case management mandated by BCSC Practice Direction 5 (acknowledged by BCSC Scheduling on Jan. 27, 2023) was then displaced after the Attorney General’s counsel asserted—extra-procedurally and via email—that the file would return to the same chambers judge who had dismissed S-220956. Over the next ten weeks, nine categorical procedural departures followed; staff did not engage with my written corrections and declined phone discussion. When I raised this with the Chief Justice in April, I was told an order made outside proper parameters nevertheless “stood,” without addressing the obstruction concerns I identified (Criminal Code s. 139). The effect was to block a trial of common issues under the Class Proceedings Act, which likewise blocks any provincial (Criminal) actions. The result was a foreclosure of justice avenues.
Applying the standards to what happened.
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Bias (Lippé / Wewaykum / Yukon Francophone): repeated routing to the same judge despite PD-5, sealing/publication controls expanding without tailored necessity, and pre-service, file-wide protection orders together create the perspective of an objective, informed observer that the playing field was tilted.
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Reasonableness (Vavilov para 104): reasons repeatedly did not grapple with the governing legal constraints (PD-5, open court, proportionality), and justified outcomes through circular premises (“seals are necessary so the seal can function”).
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SRL fairness (Pintea / Girao): I did not receive active assistance; opposing counsel did not supply the cooperative candour expected of officers of the court; and the remedy track chosen amplified rather than reduced asymmetry.
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Proportional case control (Lymer): instead of a tailored management order and litigation plan, I faced overbroad restrictions and scheduling maneuvers that foreclosed a merits hearing.
Bottom line.
Even if one charitably chalks up isolated missteps to “honest mistakes,” the concurrence of events—inside and outside the courtroom—meets the definition of a scandal: a sequence that an informed person, viewing matters practically, would read as compromising impartiality and reasonableness, contrary to Lippé, Vavilov, Pintea, Girao, and Lymer. Per the case law in R. v. Tayo Tompouba, 2024 SCC 16 at paragraph 73;
"Courts have found a miscarriage of justice in a wide range of circumstances (see A. Stylios, J. Casgrain and M.‑É. O’Brien, Procédure pénale (2023), at paras. 18‑87 to 18‑81). Examples of a miscarriage of justice include the ineffective assistance of counsel (see White), a breach of solicitor‑client privilege by defence counsel (Kahsai, at para. 69, citing R. v. Olusoga, 2019 ONCA 565, 377 C.C.C. (3d) 143) and a misapprehension of the evidence that, though not making the verdict unreasonable, nonetheless constitutes a denial of justice (R. v. Lohrer, 2004 SCC 80, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 732, at para. 1; Coughlan, at pp. 576‑77). Unfairness resulting from the exercise of a “highly discretionary” power, related to proceedings leading to a conviction and attributable to a judge will also generally be analyzed under the miscarriage of justice framework (Fanjoy, at pp. 238‑39; Kahsai, at paras. 72 and 74)."
VIII. - Meeting with Halifax Regional Police (“HRP”), December 8th, 2022
On December 8, 2022, after months of attempting to be heard by the RCMP and Halifax Regional Police (HRP), an HRP constable met me at my place of domicile in Halifax County for 1 hour and 19 minutes. We walked through my affidavits, the harassment campaign, and the shareholder evidence from S-220956. The constable acknowledged actionable evidence tying online harassment to the CAGE director, and sketched a milestoned investigation plan.
The Milestone that Cemented Post-Democratic Theatre
After that meeting, the constable stopped responding. In early January 2023, I obtained the official police report via FOIPOP. The report labelled me “mentally ill”, and claimed there was no evidence to investigate—directly contradicting the meeting.
Note: Public-law and tort anchors: negligent investigation — Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41; misfeasance in public office — Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69; fabrication of evidence CCC 137. Where a record misstates facts, consider defamation/privacy remedies; evidentiary rule: business/electronic records — Canada Evidence Act s. 30, ss. 31.1–31.8.
Given the stakes, I flagged the criminal dimensions. Fabricating evidence is an offence (Criminal Code s. 137), as is perjury under oath (s. 131(1)). The pejorative “no-evidence/mentally ill” narrative, juxtaposed with the recorded meeting, speaks for itself. I also noted ongoing national policy discussions about MAID and mental illness; making false mental-health designations in that climate by public servants is especially troubling.
Anticipating systemic denial of recourse, I quietly recorded the entire meeting. In Canada, one-party consent recording of a private communication is lawful: Part VI, s. 183 (definition of “private communication”) and s. 184(2) (consent of one party). I then obtained a verbatim transcript from Trint (UK) and filed it as Exhibit B to my third affidavit in S-229680, with a highlight comparison. The original audio remains on my Android device; true copies are preserved.
In the days that followed, I filed to join HRP and Surrey RCMP as parties in S-229680, consistent with the relief sought. Surrey RCMP responded that they were already represented by Crown counsel. Halifax (HRP), through the City’s counsel, refused to accept service in January 2023, despite service being effected under the BC Supreme Court Civil Rules and the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (B.C.).
Chief Justice Hinkson then advised that my joinder application had been dismissed—by the same chambers judge who had dismissed all files concerning these parties—while my repeated PD-27 letters asking the court to enforce its own procedural framework were ignored. HRP did not respond to my request for its correspondence about the false report. As reflected in my SCC Motion for Reconsideration, the Nova Scotia Police Complaints Commissioner also refused to process the file.
Note: Administrative-law anchors: reason-giving and responsiveness — Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, paras 86, 105, 126–128 (decision-makers must grapple with key issues/evidence).
These events were very sobering; they had cemented a burgeoning evidentiary record of institutional capture, and this website was created shortly in the wake of these events in March 2023. The subsequent service refusals, summary dismissals, and complaint-process shut-downs form a continuous pattern of institutional non-engagement inconsistent with Hill, Odhavji, and Vavilov’s requirement that public authorities act reasonably, transparently, and accountably.
CAGE Director's Relationship to PsyOp | Cyber | Mischief | Zersetzung Actors Following Settlement [Link]


Shareholder Fraud | Perjury in the Settlement Affidavit

Police Regulator Refused to Act

The meeting with HRP and the false report that followed is another binary example of denial of recourse to public service agencies. The manner and disposition of regulatory conduct must likewise be subject to an overarching investigation of the scandal. Again, the manner, scope, and consistency in denial of safe avenue is among the most compelling data points evidencing a clear case of third-party interference. The first data point with respect to POLCOM as pictured is their unwillingness to adduce evidence relevant to the complaint.

True Audio Transcript
"BEAUTIFUL EVIDENCE" | Implication of CAGE CEO in Criminal Interference & Mischief | Articulation of Next Steps
Official Police Report Obtained via Freedom of Information Request
"LACK OF EVIDENCE" | Pejorative Mischaracterization of Participants | Closure of File
The Commissioner’s comments are beyond baffling in view of a binary difference between the December 8th, 2022 audio transcript and the formal HRP report that followed. These omissions, denials, and dismissals in the face of factual irrefutable evidence are astounding and unnatural. Likewise, they are consistent, and they have not been corrected through customary escalation mechanisms (ie., the Appellate courts in the case of proceedings). My recent supplementary post outlines these observations in more detail (here).

IX. - BC Contempt Applications
Contempt for protective disclosure; necessity/duress context; punitive costs out of proportion
In October 2022, the CAGE director applied to have me found in contempt because I circulated a redacted affidavit to seek help and a safe avenue of intervention while I was facing relentless on-heels and online harassment. The document contained no biographical or commercial data and was redacted consistently with the open-court principle; under Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, the file should not have been sealed in the first place absent a necessity and minimal-impairment analysis. I asked the court to consider this context; it refused and declared me in civil contempt. In short, I was denied customary recourse avenues, and punished for self-advocacy efforts when I blew the whistle in innocuous capacity.
The doctrinal frame I put forward was straightforward:
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Civil contempt elements and restraint. Contempt is a last resort and must be proportionate, with courts considering context, impossibility, and less restrictive alternatives (Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, paras 35–38; see also para 62 on reopening for fresh evidence/new facts).
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Necessity/duress logic. Where there is no viable safe avenue, law excuses conduct taken to avert greater harm: R. v. Ruzic, 2001 SCC 24, para 29 (“the act was wrong but it is excused because it was realistically unavoidable”) and para 66 (no “obvious safe avenue of escape”; operative question is whether the person failed to avail themselves of a real opportunity to escape). See also R. v. Hibbert, [1995] 2 SCR 973 (due-diligence dimension of voluntariness), and Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 at page 270; "The court must ask not only whether the offensive act accompanied by the requisite culpable mental state (i.e. intention, recklessness, etc.) has been established by the prosecution, but whether or not the accused acted so as to attract society’s moral outrage."
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Reasonableness of the decision. Decisions cannot rest on circular premises or unfounded generalizations; the reasoning must add up (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, para 104).
None of these guardrails were engaged. I was fined $5,000 and hit with special costs, later certified by the BCSC registrar in an amount $40,717.53 higher than a comparable out-of-province application involving the same parties—an ~83× multiplier against ordinary comparators based on 89.9 hours between three lawyers in view of a twenty-minute hearing and an 11-page templated brief. In Canadian costs law, proportionality and reasonableness govern; special costs are reserved for reprehensible conduct, not to punish an SRL raising contextual defenses (Boucher v. Public Accountants Council, 2004 ONCA; Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery, 2004 SCC 9). None of my circumstances were addressed: I was unrepresented, unemployed, facing daily harassment, denied police recourse, and prevented from a fair merits hearing.
“Further contempt” for petitioning elected officials and regulators
On March 23, 2023, opposing counsel sought “further contempt” based on a January 2023 letter I sent to the Prime Minister and several MPs (including the Opposition Leader)—the same "Government of Canada" that was already a party. I sent the letter after the PM publicly lauded accountability and transparency (CTV interview, Dec. 2022). I used registered mail and email, and received no response. In a constitutional democracy, petitioning government is core s. 2(b) expression; citizens should not be punished for seeking oversight when institutional channels have failed.
The application also targeted my complaints to regulators (CJC, CBA, BC Human Rights Tribunal). But any person may file with the BCHRT: Human Rights Code s. 21(1); and by s. 21(4) and the Interpretation Act, rights-conferring statutes are to be read harmoniously and not casually displaced. Regulators must be able to review materials to perform their mandates; a contempt regime that chills properly-directed complaints undermines both open justice and the rule of law (see Dagenais/Mentuck balancing; Vancouver Sun (Re), 2004 SCC 43; CBC v. New Brunswick (AG), [1996] 3 SCR 480).
At the April 27, 2023 hearing, the judge threatened incarceration for non-payment of the prior fine. I explained my intent to seek SCC leave, recapped the ongoing harassment, and again cited Ruzic/Hibbert (no safe avenue; due diligence) together with Carey v. Laiken (contempt restraint; proportionality; ability to comply; fresh-evidence reopening at para 62). The court nonetheless found contempt again, ordered special costs to the director, and issued oral reasons that denied the existence of filed affidavit evidence documenting judicial and police misconduct. I was again punished for seeking help, after having been denied relief when faced with a state-adjacent oppression vehicle, as is elucidated in the Guide.
Bottom line
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My protective disclosure was narrowly redacted and aimed at securing help amid sustained threats, after legal and policing avenues had failed. In that context, a civil contempt finding without engaging Carey’s proportionality/alternatives and Ruzic/Hibbert’s safe-avenue logic is unreasonable under Vavilov (para 104, circularity; paras 126–128, failure to grapple with key issues).
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The costs awards—including costs at an ~83× tariff multiplier, and comparable to a low average annual salary in Canada for a 20 minute hearing—do not align with Canadian costs proportionality and the narrow ambit of special costs (punitive/reprehensible-conduct standard).
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Treating petitioning government and filing regulator complaints as punishable contempt is antithetical to s. 2(b) and to the supervisory role of oversight bodies.
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The cumulative pattern—sealing, contempt threats, punitive costs, and non-engagement with evidence—mirrors the same institutional foreclosure seen elsewhere in the matter, and is irreconcilable with Carey, Vavilov, the open-court line of cases, and the SRL fairness principles in Pintea and Girao.
This outcome that should alarm any Canadian, not least a country seeking a seat on the UN Human Rights Council.
X. - BC Appellate Efforts
Case-management requirement bypassed; CPA framework ignored; appeal time-extension refused on pre-drafted reasons; access to reasons denied
On January 27, 2023, the BCSC acknowledged my PD-5 request for a case-management judge and a case-planning conference in S-229680 (a Class Proceedings Act file). After that, the court went silent while both respondents pushed dismissal applications aimed at ending the case before discovery and before any trial of the common issues. This was not a stray irregularity: there were nine clear, categorical procedural violations that cut across the CPA and the Rules. I filed five PD-27 letters asking the court to enforce the governing framework; nothing for ten weeks, while the matter was steered back to the same chambers judge who had ignored the April 1, 2022 discovery order in S-220956.
This is not a case of harmless procedural irregularity. Class actions are governed by a statutory architecture and binding Supreme Court guidance. Certification must be decided “as soon as practicable” (CPA s. 14(1)), under the tests in Hollick v. Toronto (City), 2001 SCC 68; Pro-Sys v. Microsoft, 2013 SCC 57; Infineon, 2013 SCC 59; and AIC v. Fischer, 2013 SCC 69. Courts are to manage class proceedings proportionately and transparently (Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, paras 28–32) and to give reasons that grapple with the legal constraints (Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, paras 86, 105, 126–128). Instead, my file was procedurally short-circuited; dismissal machinery replaced the PD-5/CPA track. I flagged that this called for enforcement/correction inside the court’s own process (including the court’s inherent jurisdiction to control abuse and Rule 9-5’s abuse-of-process controls), not a game of appellate whack-a-mole. The point was to right the course and proceed to a trial of common issues.
Human Rights complaint; instant screen-out despite evidentiary record
After chambers judge Andrew Majawa dismissed S-229680 (the same who dismissed S-220956), I filed with the BC Human Rights Tribunal under Code s. 8 (denial of services customarily available), pleading the administrative omissions: registry acceptance of applications that repudiated the proper style (Rules 22-3(5) and (6)(a)), Scheduling’s failure to advance PD-5 after acknowledging it, and the Registrar permitting a chambers hearing contrary to PD-5 and CPA s. 14(1). The complaint was screened out for “lack of evidence.” I filed an amended complaint with a 111-page supporting affidavit; it was rejected within 17 minutes. Administrative screens still owe reasonableness and responsiveness—they must engage with the record (Vavilov, paras 86, 126–128). None were provided.
BCCA Reverse Onus: four-day delay; respondents silent; denial premised on contempt orders; pre-drafted oral reasons
I notified counsel and the BCCA Registrar that I would seek to restore the CPA framework on appeal. Following a memo from the Chief Justice (which did not confront the procedural breaches), I filed a Notice of Appeal four days late. The Registrar declined to regularize it and directed me to bring an Application to Extend Time—which I did.
At the hearing, neither of the Respondents made oral submissions. I made submissions on context and the abuse of process that prevented any trial of common issues. The chambers judge pivoted to prior contempt orders (one the day before), denied the reality of the evidentiary record the court already had, and concluded that the interests of justice did not support an extension. I explained the files inform each other—a proper CPA adjudication would illuminate the contempt context that was never tried. That was rejected. In substance, the court imposed a reverse onus: it refused to acknowledge evidence in the contempt record while blocking me from placing the same evidence before the court through S-229680.
Immediately after my submissions—without pause or recess—the judge read 15+ minutes of “Oral Reasons” clearly prepared before the hearing, claiming there was no reasonable justification for the four-day delay and even musing that trying the common issues might “disrupt lives”. One might assume this had referred to the AI-assisted online contractors in the guide ("Defendant4"), and/or those public servants implicated in obstructing justice. A shortened version of the reasons was later posted, omitting that remark and ignoring the lower-court procedural blunders and my efforts to correct them. Within two business days, the BCCA published two entries that leaned heavily on the vexatious declaration without examination of the probative issues.
Pre-drafted reasons and refusal to engage the live constraints clash with baseline standards: reasons must be responsive and intelligible and not circular (Vavilov, para 104; R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26; R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51). An informed person, viewing the totality, would reasonably doubt impartiality when outcome-determinative reasons are prepared in advance and material submissions are not confronted (bias line: Committee for Justice & Liberty v. NEB, [1978] 1 SCR 369; Wewaykum, 2003 SCC 45; Yukon Francophone School Board, 2015 SCC 25).
Access to the long-form reasons refused; open-court principle sidelined
I ordered the transcript from a Vancouver firm (as I had for prior chambers). The transcript ends with my submissions and omits the judge’s 15-minute recitation. The vendor said only the court could release the reasons audio/transcript. I made four requests to the Court of Appeal; each was politely refused and I was told to write the Registrar. The Registrar then refused disclosure—contrary to the court’s own access policy (ss. 1.6, 1.11.1)—and later responses cited the executive–judicial divide to reject my FOIPOP request. The open-court principle protects access to reasons and records absent a lawful, minimally-impairing restriction (Vancouver Sun (Re), 2004 SCC 43; CBC v. New Brunswick (AG), [1996] 3 SCR 480; Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25). Denying the very reasons read in open court is the opposite of openness.
Where it landed
I then took the matter to the Supreme Court of Canada by leave applications (with a certiorari motion), seeking restoration of the CPA pathway and a trial of the common issues that—despite everything—have never been tried.
Bottom line.
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Class action law (CPA + Hollick/Pro-Sys/Infineon/AIC), BCSC Rules, and PD-5 required structured case management and a timely, transparent path to certification/adjudication.
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The court’s silence, the nine rule breaches, and the reroute to a chambers dismissal track without reasons that grapple with the governing framework contravene Hryniak (proportional procedure) and Vavilov (reason-giving).
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The BCCA time-extension refusal turned on pre-drafted reasons that ignored context and live merit, raising both reasonableness and impartiality concerns (Vavilov; Sheppard; R.E.M.; Wewaykum).
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Access to reasons was denied in practice, contrary to the open-court principle (Vancouver Sun; CBC v. New Brunswick; Sherman Estate).
The cumulative effect was not an “irregularity”; it was the structural foreclosure of the only process designed by statute to resolve the common issues at the heart of this case.
Following Nine (9) Procedural Violations at the BCSC, the BCCA Rejected a 4-Day Extension to Appeal



March 28th, 2023 letter to BCCA & Counsel


Recourse to the BC Tribunal was Immediately Rejected

A Yale Law Study Concerning Corruption (Click to Expand)

The Registrar Refused to Disclose the Oral Reasons

Rules Provisioning the Right of Access.
As exampled above in excerpts concerning BCSC Andrew Majawa, palpable errors in fact such as this are suffused throughout the proceedings, irrespective of the bench they were delivered from. Incendiary comments were often made, such as those at paragraph 49 below concerning respect for the Rules. The BCCA judge ignored testimony concerning the (9) procedural violations in BCSC S-229680.
Dismissal of my Application to Extend Time to Appeal S-229680 by four days. The CAGE and AG Canada remained silent. Oral Reasons were read immediately following my submissions, requiring 15 minutes to recite, suggesting a decision on the Application was made prior to its hearing. No mention was made of the procedural violations in the BCSC by its registry staff, nor my efforts in approaching the BC Tribunal. The judge acknowledged social media harassment actors, and expressed concern that a trial may be disruptive to their interests.

My Request to Obtain a Transcript of the Oral Reasons
XI. - 2023 NS Enforcement Hearings
Out-of-province enforcement, false narratives, court-initiated censorship, and a SCC registry bottleneck
In June 2023, I was served with an execution order for $41,217.53 arising from a single 20-minute hearing supported by one 11-page brief. The certificate rested on 89.9 billable hours split among three lawyers doing overlapping work, as noted previously. The execution order was filed in the NS Supreme Court.
I moved in that court to stay execution while my SCC leave applications (and a SCC stay motion) were pending—exactly the scenario contemplated by the Enforcement of Canadian Judgments and Decrees Act (ECJDA) and the RJR-MacDonald test (RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (AG), [1994] 1 SCR 311). At the July 2023 hearing, the judge acknowledged my ECJDA footing but refused the stay, saying SCC leave was “remote”. He anchored that refusal on a material misstatement—para (1) of his written reasons says the $41,217.53 flowed from me being “successfully sued” in B.C. by the CAGE CEO. Neither Party advanced that false assertion. Per Karasiewicz v. Collins, 2021 ONSC 4953 at paragraph 14;
"As the Court of Appeal for Ontario stated in Labatt Brewing Company Ltd. v. NHL Enterprises Canada, L.P., 2011 ONCA 511, 106 O.R. (3d) 677, at para. 5, interpreting an agreement on a basis not being advanced by the parties is an error: “[t]he problem is that this central conclusion was not anchored in the pleadings, evidence, positions or submissions of any of the parties.”
A decision that turns on a palpable and overriding error of fact is untenable (Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33), and reasonableness review demands the decision grapple with the live constraints rather than rest on a false premise (Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, at paras 86, 104, 126–128).
I appealed to correct the premise and obtain the stay. Despite the “vexatious” label used elsewhere, I posted the security for costs and filed an August 23, 2023 affidavit (redactions by consent) that laid out the chronology and exhibits showing: (i) why the factual premise was wrong; (ii) why RJR was met; and (iii) why my SCC issues cleared the public-importance threshold (Supreme Court Act, s. 40; see also Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, on recognition/enforcement defences that themselves raise issues of public importance).
A NSCA judge then adjourned a consensual, targeted-redaction motion in an ensconced hearing, and instead blanket-sealed the entire file until the appeal date. That interim gag inverted the open-court and minimal-impairment requirements: sealing must be necessary, narrowly tailored, and proportionate, with reasons that engage alternatives (Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25; Vancouver Sun (Re), 2004 SCC 43; CBC v. New Brunswick (AG), [1996] 3 SCR 480). I flagged Charter s. 2(b) and noted the practical harm: without public access to the affidavit, the SCC (and the public) couldn’t see the scandal the affidavit documented. The court nonetheless kept the blanket seal, even sealing references to the affidavit and to the confidentiality motion itself. The effect was that the public had no visibility of the issues brought before the SCC (or the false characterization in NS).
Optics of Coordination Among Courts
Meanwhile, at the SCC Registry, my motions to stay costs (and to expedite the stay ) were not transmitted to a judge within the timelines I invoked (see SCC Rules, e.g., r. 54(4)). That administrative delay mattered: enforcement-stay outcomes and SCC motions inform one another; each is “source material” for the other. Keeping stay motions in limbo distorts that feedback loop. Both courts violated binding procedural authorities to support a concealed and foreclosed outcome.
On December 4, 2023, a three-judge panel dismissed my appeal in under five minutes as “entirely without merit” and imposed a permanent seal on the entire record (including the confidentiality motion). There were no written reasons—only audio, and no submissions from the CAGE. Treating a written, outcome-driving factual error below as a mere “slip of the tongue,” while declining to issue intelligible, responsive reasons, collides with R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, and Vavilov’s duty of justification. And a perpetual, blanket seal contradicts Sherman Estate and Vancouver Sun’s insistence on narrow tailoring, essentially creating a secret record.
Less than three weeks later, the SCC declined leave on the related matters without explanation. In early 2024, the pattern repeated on a $300,000 execution order tied to the BCSC “cost scandal”: onerous securities, discretion exercised against a stay, and my SCC reconsideration motions again left derelict. The through-line is constant: proportionality and openness inverted, errors of fact uncorrected, and procedural gateways (stays, tailored confidentiality, timely scheduling) used in ways inconsistent with their doctrinal purposes (RJR-MacDonald; ECJDA; Sherman Estate; Vancouver Sun; Sheppard/R.E.M./Vavilov).
Mischaracterization | Censorship | Violation of Constitutional Law













XII. - The Solicitor-Client Billing Scandal
An Arithmetic Impossibility Made Real
Quantum and comparators — why the numbers don’t add up
In June 2023, CAGE counsel invoiced ~$400,000 on my B.C. shareholder matters. The hard math:
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737.7 billable hours across 7 lawyers assigned to overlapping tasks vs. 867 minutes of court time (~14.5 hours per clerk’s notes) → ~51× time multiplier.
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Nine short chambers/interim hearings averaging 30 minutes each; routine interlocutory work with templated filings, often managed by articling students.
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Nova Scotia comparator: a standard entry-on-record enforcement appearance (~20 minutes) was billed at $500 for single counsel; I was hit with $41,217.53 (~83×) for an identical hearing in BC. The single hearing in S-229680 was billed at $78,000 for twenty minutes; more than Canada's average annual salary.
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BC tariff lens (Rule 77): Nine brief chambers matters with modest materials should land in the $4,500–$6,000 band. Against $400,000, that’s ~67–89×.
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These metrics show a ~9,000% markup ( $400k vs. ~$4.5k baseline ).
These numbers were reflected as actual billed amounts in the October 17th, 2023 Affidavits of Emily MacKinnon; CAGE lead counsel in BC. Paragraph 10 in those affidavits claim the amount was "reasonably required". These affidavits are felonious, with the BCSC Clerk's Notes as proof.
Law/principles: Costs must be reasonable and proportionate to the nature, complexity, and importance of the proceeding; tariffs are a baseline and departures must be justified: Bradshaw Construction (2013 BCSC) (reasonableness; tariff as guide), Boucher v. Public Accountants Council (2004 ONCA) (proportionality as the overarching principle), Gichuru v. Pallai (2013 ONCA) (fair, reasonable, proportional; access to justice). Solicitor-client charges are constrained by reasonableness and open to review: Von Czieczek v. Markevich (2015 BCSC).
Staffing tells: multiple lawyers on 15–20 minute hearings; articled students plus senior time; overlapping blocks (“prepare/review/post-hearing”) by several billers; 20–40 hr “prep” for template motions ordinarily done in 2–4 hr by experienced counsel. On any view, that’s not proportionate. It is indicative of project architecture. Per 1582235 Ontario Limited v. Ontario, 2020 ONSC 1279 at paragraph 27;
“In Enterprise Sibeca Inc. v. Frelighsburg (Municipality), the Supreme Court described bad faith as “acts that are so markedly inconsistent with the relevant legislative context that a court cannot reasonably conclude that they were performed in good faith.”
B. Certification to coercion
The facially-fraudulent billing was enforced without discretionary guardrails in NS. What was missing was any reasoned proportionality analysis under Bradshaw/Boucher. When a court enforces or gives effect to an interprovincial cost outcome so extreme it would “shock the conscience” or offend natural justice, recognition should be refused: Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72 at paragraphs 73, 218, 222, 265. At 218;
"The court will not accept a judgment whose enforcement would amount to an abuse of its process or bring the administration of justice in Canada into disrepute. Serious consideration should be given to the possibility of a residual category of judgments, beyond those addressed by the defences of public policy, fraud and natural justice, that should not be enforced because they, too, engage this principle — in short, because their enforcement would shock the conscience of Canadians."
The question is, why were these costs certified, denied correction, and vigorously enforced?
Following the exhaustion of procedural recourse, all of which was foreclosed, the NS courts began coercive enforcement, beginning with a 30-day custodial sentence in 2024 where I was beaten by inmates I had never encountered within 30 minutes of entry; denied food; denied duty counsel; and advised I could be released early if this website were removed. Time in custody had triggered a well-documented autoimmune disorder linked to gluten particles (see jailed page). NSCA justice Anne S. Derrick later advised that physical health harms were "self-inflicted" for refusing to comply with fraudulent billing that exceeded my life savings.
The NS contempt hearings ignored Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17: contempt must be used with restraint, with attention to proportionality, possibility of compliance, the underlying merits of the order, and less restrictive alternatives. Where factual and legal disputes persist, courts should be cautious about contempt (cf. Canadian Pacific Railway v. Teamsters, 2024 FCA 156). Using custody to enforce a bill that facially defies proportionality is the wrong sequence.
Bottom line: Bills that should not have been issued in the first place due to compromised proceedings were inflated, rubber-stamped without the required reasoned proportionality analysis, then weaponized in contempt/enforcement—contrary to Bradshaw, Boucher, Carey, and the open-court/reason-giving duties (Sheppard; R.E.M.; Vavilov), in a manner that can shock the conscience of Canadians (Beals at paragraph 265).
C. Why the pattern implies coordination
Looking end-to-end, each node acted as if the next would fall in line:
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Proposal stage (law firm): No rational, reputation-conscious firm advances $400k for nine routine hearings unless it expects: client acceptance, court certification without searching scrutiny, no disciplinary risk (ie., police and regulators), and no public access scrutiny (via sealing orders).
-
Judicial certification stage: Courts are bound by discretionary tests and guardrails. Certifying sums like $41,217.53 for 20 minutes without analysis implies either serial severe error, or a shared understanding that enforcement is the true objective.
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Enforcement stage: Pursuing civil contempt (even custody) to collect ~83×/ ~89× tariff-equivalent sums presupposes that the merits will not be re-opened, appeals will not disturb it, and that sealing will shield the record.
The sequential “confidence chain” supports an inference of state-adjacent assurances and coordination, with no other viable competing explanation. 737.7 hours, AKA., "the cost delta". AI-assisted contractors are shown in subsequent images below telegraphing the milestone.
A Felony Scandal of this Character is Able to Question the Mode of Governance in Canada





Cost Metrics Comparison Benchmarks: Eye-Rending Arithmetic
Time and Complexity Variables at Par, and Irrespective of the Substance and Disposition of the Files
Out of Province Application: ONE Lawyer Assigned | ONE Hearing | $500 Cost Certification in accordance with the standard tariff.
BCCA Application: THREE Overlapping Lawyers Assigned | ONE Hearing | $41,217.52 Cost Certification | 83x Cost Multiplier
S-220956: SEVEN Overlapping Lawyers & TWO Paralegals Assigned | EIGHT Hearings | $295,581.11 Cost Certification | 65x Cost Multiplier
S-229680: FOUR Overlapping Lawyers Assigned | ONE Hearing | $78,385.36 Cost Certification | 156x Cost Multiplier
S-228567: Precursor to S-229680 with the exact same work involved | ONE Hearing | $1,601.60 Cost Certification in accordance with the tariff.
Per the November 2023 BSCS chambers transcript, CAGE counsel claimed that the CAGE CEO was charged every penny and the Affidavit of CAGE lead counsel accurately reflects the actual time spent and amounts charged. The same Affidavit likewise states the CAGE CEO had accepted and paid retainer fees in these amounts. No reasonable person would, hence the aforementioned legal test in Bradshaw Construction Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia. Besides the remainder of issues involved in this scandal, this presents a clear example of a felony facilitated through legitimate authorities. The bigger question is why it was permitted to unfold, unchecked. The lawyer trust accounts must be investigated.
To recap, the CAGE Affidavit cited a combined total of seven hundred and thirty seven point seven billable hours, 737.7 like the passenger jet, for nine (9) short-chambers hearings between S-220956 and S-229680 (580.8 and 156.9 hours respectively, the latter for one 20-minute appearance). Each hearing required minimal prep time and involved a short-chambers hearing no longer than forty (40) minutes at most. The massive cost delta between S-229678 and S-229680, which required the exact same materials and prep work, is another glaring outlier in the CAGE Affidavit ($1.606.60 vs $78,360.36 for the same file). These costs concern retainer fees and are not compensatory in nature. See the records (here).

*CAGE Retainer Fee Claims*
Eight (8) 30-minute hearings w/ minimal prep.
Seven (7) lawyers assigned to overlapping tasks.
The customary tariff is $4,500 ($500 x 8 hearings).

One (1) 20-minute hearing w/ minimal prep.
Would a reasonable person pay those retainer fees?

S-228567, discontinued prior to S-229680 by way of an improper format, involved the same prep as its successor, and also involved one short hearing. S-228567 was billed at $1,601.60 pursuant to court tariffs. S-229680 was billed at $78,360.36 as above, in a scandal involving special costs. Ie., a "Cost Delta". Special costs align with reasonable lawyer retainer fees per the established legal tests.
"Special costs are fees a reasonable client would pay a reasonably competent solicitor to do the work described in the bill."
- Bradshaw Construction Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 54 B.C.L.R. (2d) 309 (S.C.), para 44



XIII. - The SCC Registry in 2023
Docket Entrance Test
In December 2023, the SCC had dismissed my Leave to Appeal Applications, my stay motion, and my motion for Certiorari without explanation. There is no analogue, and likewise no precedent for a scandal such as this to be precluded from docket entry according to customary jurisprudence and the object of fundamental justice.
The SCC, in R. v. C.P., 2021 SCC 19, has affirmed its basis for inviting appeals evidencing miscarriage in justice. lacobucci J. writes at paragraph 137;
“There is no basis to believe that a serious argument pointing to a miscarriage of justice would not meet the public interest standard for leave to appeal to the Court [...] The Supreme Court would and does exercise its leave requirement in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”
The SCC has affirmed its basis for inviting appeals evidencing unfounded censorship, whereas, the same constitutionally-enriched right to an open court has been violated throughout the lower court files by extraordinary means, including materials expected to be available to the public online. This has severely skewed public perception of the matter, has precluded intervention opportunities, and has encumbered investigation. In Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, Kasirer J. writes at paragraph 1;
“This Court has been resolute in recognizing that the open court principle is protected by the constitutionally-entrenched right of freedom of expression and, as such, it represents a central feature of a liberal democracy. As a general rule, the public can attend hearings and consult court files and the press — the eyes and ears of the public — is left free to inquire and comment on the workings of the courts, all of which helps make the justice system fair and accountable.”
Section 14 of the SCC FAQ page (https://www.scc-csc.ca/contact/faq/qa-qr-eng.aspx#f14) outlines the docket entry threshold as follows:
“In most cases, appeals are heard by the Court only if leave to appeal is given. Such leave, or permission, will be given by the Court when a case involves a question of public importance. There are cases, however, where leave is not required. In criminal cases, there is an automatic right of appeal where an acquittal has been set aside in the provincial court of appeal or where one judge in the provincial court of appeal dissents on a question of law. In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada has a special kind of "Reference" jurisdiction, original in character, given by s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act. The Governor in Council (Federal Government) may refer to the Court, for its opinion, constitutional or other questions.”
This matter, as outlined, likewise concerns criminal violations related to and impacting the matter.
Finally, the SCC has likewise granted leave to appeal following a Motion for Reconsideration where the file concerned genuine and serious questions of law of sufficient public importance. Lamer C.J. wrote at paragraph 36 in R. v. Hinse, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 597;
“In addition to finding that this Court has jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal in this instance, I believe that the applicant's application raises a genuine and serious question of law of sufficient public importance to warrant review by this Court. Therefore, I would grant the applicant’s motion for reconsideration of our previous order refusing leave to appeal, and grant leave. [...] Out of respect for the integrity of the leave to appeal process, and consistent with our established practice of refusing to elaborate our justifications for granting or denying leave to appeal, I would postpone any potential discussion of the substantive issues raised by this case until this Court has become formally seized with the merits of this appeal.”
Federal Employees at the SCC Refused to Process Motions to Stay Costs & Expedite

Pursuant to Rule 47 of the Supreme Court Rules, Mr. Dempsey filed a motion on June 9, 2023 to stay costs in all lower-court proceedings. On June 29, 2023, he filed a motion to expedite that stay motion. Both were independent of his leave applications, though he also moved to have them joined given the overlapping subject matter. By the end of July 2023, all parties had filed their materials. Under the Rules (including Rule 54(4)), such motions should be transmitted to a judge within the prescribed timelines, yet no Notice of Hearing issued and the Registry did not transmit the motions. On December 21, 2023, both motions were dismissed without written reasons. Mr. Dempsey re-advanced the issues in a motion for reconsideration filed January 9, 2024, noting that the Registry’s inaction was inconsistent with the Court’s procedural obligations and with a Registry officer’s prior acknowledgment of the motions’ time sensitivity and applicable Rules.
SCC Registry staff failed to transmit Mr. Dempsey's cost-related motions in accordance with the Supreme Court Rules, which allowed the CAGE CEO to press ahead with enforcement of the alleged retainer-fee scheme. My Motion for Reconsideration has likewise sat unadvanced since filing, contrary to Rule 73(5). On this record, it is reasonable to infer that federal registry staff replicated the gatekeeping behaviours seen in the lower courts, with the effect of obstructing access to adjudication. Law enforcement declined to intervene, and OPSIC took no action despite its statutory mandate and applicable legal tests.


SCC Docket Entry was Refused on December 21st, 2023 Despite the Test Criteria Being Met
Per Justice Iacobucci in R. v. C.P., 2021 SCC 19 at paragraph 137 concerning the Supreme Court of Canada Docket Test
“There is no basis to believe that a serious argument pointing to a miscarriage of justice would not meet the public interest standard for leave to appeal to the Court. [...] The Supreme Court would and does exercise its leave requirement in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”




Collusion & Third-Party Criminal Interference Throughout Proceedings

Côté J. Denied Docket Entry W/O Reasons





Occultic themes are suffused throughout the scandal.



A State-Adjacent Project Interest. See the BCI Page Re: 4IR, Cognitive Liberty, & the Dark Web.













“Transhumanist ideology is driven by certain factions within the state and, above all, by mighty multinational corporations that, it is fair to say, have the most to gain from seeing the NBIC revolution unfold without a hitch. [...] These tech giants have already poured staggering amounts of money into the fourth industrial revolution and are currently spending equally eye-watering amounts on political lobbying and social engineering initiatives. [...] There is every reason to fear that the world will launch into the fourth industrial revolution without too much debate over what is waiting in the wings: the global political project that is transhumanism. Today, it is as if the metamorphosis, via the “NBIC Great Convergence,” to a posthuman being, technologically enhanced and fully integrated with the machine, were already written in stone.”
Transhumanism as the Dominant Ideology of the Fourth Industrial Revolution
By Klaus-Gerd Giesen, Translated and edited by Cadenza Academic Translations
Translator: Ruth Grant, Editor: Matt Burden, Senior editor: Mark Mellor Pages 189 to 203
XIV. - Burying a Scandal
2024: Enforcing Felony, Discarding Justice, & Burying Scandal
The baffling dismissal of the SCC Leave Applications and miscellaneous motions, which had remained derelict and not processed in accordance with SCC Rules 51(1) and 54(4), was repeated six months later through a motion for reconsideration which likewise remained derelict long after it was filed. The Registrar closed the file in the adjacent letter. All told, procedural violations at the BC Supreme Court prevented trial. The BC Appellate court refused to hear the matter, and likewise the SCC. Given the scope and consistency of obstruction involved, the actors, and the substance of the evidentiary record, a governance scandal is clearly evidenced.


Out-Of-Province Courts Helped Facilitate the Cost Scandal Absent Applicable Tests





In the first half of 2024, NS adjudicators paved the way for the retainer fee felony to be readily enforced. These judges were privy to Affidavits from CAGE counsel, which claimed that 737.7 billable hours were required to conduct nine (9) short-chambers hearings (A maximum of $4,500 in tariffs under the provincial fee schedule for comparable work). The court displayed callous disregard for applicable legal tests, and an admission that enforcement would encumber the pursuit of justice and result in bankruptcy. In an appeal of a motion to stay enforcement, a judge ordered egregious security of costs, 40x above benchmark, irrespective of the applicable legal test in Williams Lake Conservation Co. v. Kimberly-Lloyd Developments Ltd., 2005 NSCA 44, and Power v. Power, irrespective of the grand-theft felony being committed, and irrespective of data suggesting the security of costs amount would coincide with the workload. My bank accounts were emptied and frozen in late June, 2024. See the Zersetzung and Guide pages concerning ongoing AI-assisted criminal mischief.
The pattern repeated in 2025, with outrageous security for costs measures, house arrest, blanket sealing orders with revisionist narratives published online, and blocked appeals (see Gatekeeping page). Institutional capture cannot get any more obvious.
AG Nova Scotia as an "Interested Observer" in Support of the CAGE
In an alarming development, the AG’s office attended enforcement hearings as an “interested observer”, and AG counsel later indicated that his purpose was to “chaperone” CAGE counsel. By that point, the AG had been made fully aware of the overarching scandal, including the retainer-fee arithmetic (hundreds of thousands of dollars for a handful of routine hearings) and the institutional pattern I have described throughout this work. The Attorney General is understood by the public to act as guardian of the public interest and the rule of law, not as an informal escort for a private party seeking to enforce what amounts to grand theft dressed up as solicitor-client costs. When an AG office appears in court aware of this context and chooses to align itself silently with secrecy and enforcement, that choice is not neutral—it is evidence of governance failure. This episode reinforces, in miniature, what the broader record already shows: a governance scandal in which multiple state actors converge to conceal, rather than correct, an obvious abuse of process. The CAGE is not too big to fail; the smart reader will seek to ascertain a state-adjacent interest.


The Court Placed Unjust Precedents From Peers Above Constitutional Tests
The chambers transcript excerpt reproduced in the adjacent exhibit is especially revealing. It shows, in real time, how error was not corrected but replicated. This particular judge, like others in both B.C. and out of province, simply carried forward palpable errors of law and fact that had already been made—regardless of how serious or obvious those errors were.
Under Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, especially paras. 19–20, a reviewing decision-maker is required to respect the governing legal framework, apply the correct standard of review, and demonstrate that the outcome is anchored in the law and the record. When courts repeatedly refuse to engage with documentary evidence and binding authorities, the standard of review effectively regresses to a pre-Magna Carta framework: power without reasons, and outcomes without scrutiny.
In this particular sequence, the judge brushed aside a four-page brief I had filed that demonstrated, with precision, that the BC Supreme Court had sealed hundreds of pages of already-public material about the scandal, and that the same sealing logic was then copied in appellate venues. Instead of correcting the problem, the court endorsed it. On any reasonable reading of open-court and sealing jurisprudence, this is not a marginal mistake; it is a direct collision with cases like Sherman Estate, Vancouver Sun (Re), and CBC v. New Brunswick (AG).
Ordinarily, a line of concurring orders from multiple courts is taken as a sign that a result is legally sound. But when each concurrent order repeats the same grave errors—ignoring binding case law, disregarding evidence, and sealing what should be public—it signals something deeper: institutional scandal rather than correctness. This is precisely the sort of situation contemplated in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391, where the Court held (at paras. 91 and 110) that once the integrity of the process has been compromised, a stay is required to protect the administration of justice itself. Comity, otherwise known as "horizontal stare decisis", is a non-binding principle that generally replicates past similar orders unless there are clear errors, or binding authorities that were missed. It likewise has no bearing on factual findings (Apotex Inc. v. Allergan Inc., 2012 FCA 308).
In my case, no such corrective steps was taken. Not for blanket sealing orders, nor concerning any issue that was denied proper adjudication. Instead, the concurrence of orders became a concurrence in error—and that is one of the clearest doctrinal markers that what is happening is not a mere mistake, but abuse of process at the structural level.


Weaponized Security of Costs Chill Appellate Access
The courts in both provinces had certified overbroad security as an obstructive lever. The first leg of the test asks whether or not security should be paid in an appeal at all. Williams Lake Conservation Co. v. Kimberly-Lloyd Developments Ltd., 2005 NSCA 44 promulgated the standard test concerning security (paying an opponents' legal fees preemptively as a condition to Appeal) at paragraph 11;
“Generally, a risk, without more, that the appellant may be unable to afford a costs award is insufficient to establish “special circumstances”. It is usually necessary that there be evidence that, in the past, “the appellant has acted in an insolvent manner toward the respondent” which gives the respondent an objective basis to be concerned about his recovery of prospective appeal costs. The example which most often has appeared and supported an order for security is a past and continuing failure by the appellant to pay a costs award or to satisfy a money judgment: Frost v. Herman, at ¶ 9-10; MacDonnell v. Campbell, 2001 NSCA 123, at ¶ 4-5; Leddicote, at ¶ 15-16; White at ¶ 4-7; Monette v. Jordan (1997), 1997 NSCA 163 (CanLII), 163 N.S.R. (2d) 75, at ¶ 7; Smith v. Heron, at ¶ 15-17; Jessome v. Walsh at ¶ 16-19.”
Notwithstanding compromised proceedings, a certified retainer felony, and a related criminal element, what other special circumstances would weigh in favor of the CAGE? The same test is underscored with respect to evidentiary thresholds at paragraph 15;
“Kimberly-Lloyd has not shown that WLCC has acted in an insolvent manner towards Kimberly-Lloyd, or toward anyone else, and has not established any other “special circumstance” required for an order for security on appeal. Even if the appeal fails and if costs are awarded, there is no evidence that the amount of costs would be substantially higher than the amount which, in the past, has been ordered against WLCC, and which WLCC has paid.”
Pay-per-privilege Constitutional recourse
Power v. Power, 2013 NSCA 137 set forth the security quantum benchmark at "40% of lower court costs" at paragraphs 27-29, with the court requiring 60 days to pay (at paragraph 30). For a standard $500 motion (Rule 77), security would be $200. I was charged $8,000 to participate.
“It is frequently said that party and party costs on appeal are 40 percent of the costs awarded in the lower court. An award of costs is always a discretionary one, to be decided by the panel who hears the appeal. [...] Barkhouse v. Wile, 2011 NSCA 50 and Kedmi v. Korem, 2012 NSCA 124; Richards v. Richards, 2012 NSCA 7; St.‑Jules v. St.‑Jules, 2012 NSCA 97; Dunnington v. Emmett, 2012 NSCA 55; Campbell v. Campbell, 2012 NSCA 86; and Blois v. Blois, 2013 NSCA 39. [...] I would note that in Blois v. Blois, my colleague, MacDonald, C.J.N.S. ordered 40 percent of the trial costs ($7,500) in arriving at the security of costs award of $3,000.”
An automatic kill-switch
The severity of these procedural deterrents were such that they contained an automatic kill switch (automatic dismissal if the security was unpaid). Since my bank account was frozen, I had to sell an asset to participate in the 2025 appeal, which was denied leave (see gatekeeping page). This is also unlawful. Rule 90.42(2) requires a motion to be filed for dismissal, upon failure of payment;
“A judge of the Court of Appeal may, on motion of a party to an appeal, dismiss or allow the appeal if the appellant or a respondent fails to give security for costs when ordered”.
The same principle is clearly outlined in the jurisprudence. Per Dataville Farms Ltd. v. Colchester County (Municipality), 2014 NSCA 95 at paragraphs 17 and 19 as follows:
"The respondents assert that the appellant has failed to comply with this Court’s order to give security for costs and as such, the appeal should be dismissed. They acknowledge that dismissal is not automatic in the face of such a failure, but submit that a heavy onus should lie upon a defaulting appellant to convince the Court that the appeal should be permitted to continue. [...] At this juncture it may be of assistance to make some general observations. Firstly, the remedy sought by the respondents - dismissal of the appeal due to failure to provide security for costs, is, in accordance with Rule 90.42(2), discretionary. It should not be presumed that an order for dismissal will automatically flow from an appellant’s failure to abide by an order to give security."
After advising the judge of these authorities, the court ordered 40x with an auto-dismissal clause regardless. Finally, the test in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII), [2019] 4 SCR 653 at paragraphs 133-134 is applicable;
“It is well established that individuals are entitled to greater procedural protection when the decision in question involves the potential for significant personal impact or harm: Baker, at para. 25. However, this principle also has implications for how a court conducts reasonableness review. Central to the necessity of adequate justification is the perspective of the individual or party over whom authority is being exercised. Where the impact of a decision on an individual’s rights and interests is severe, the reasons provided to that individual must reflect the stakes. The principle of responsive justification means that if a decision has particularly harsh consequences for the affected individual, the decision maker must explain why its decision best reflects the legislature’s intention. This includes decisions with consequences that threaten an individual’s life, liberty, dignity or livelihood.” [...] Moreover, concerns regarding arbitrariness will generally be more acute in cases where the consequences of the decision for the affected party are particularly severe or harsh, and a failure to grapple with such consequences may well be unreasonable. For example, this Court has held that the Immigration Appeal Division should, when exercising its equitable jurisdiction to stay a removal order under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, consider the potential foreign hardship a deported person would face: Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84."

$8,000 in Security (40 x the Power v. Power Test) to Appeal an Unconstitutional Sealing Order.

And Another $8,000 in Security (40x the Power v. Power Test) to Appeal a Contempt Declaration.

Legal Test: Denied Customary Review, and Held in Contempt for Resisting the Cost Scandal
Appeal Court Refuses to Look at the Scandal Behind the Order
In June 2025, I appeared before appellate judge Anne S. Derrick on two issues:
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Whether the appellate file (already sealed) should remain under seal; and
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Whether the court would stay the proceedings to prevent the enforcement of what I have shown to be a felonious execution order, and to preclude further penalties (including contempt sanctions) for refusing to cooperate in that enforcement.
I filed three detailed case law briefs in advance of the hearing, setting out why a stay and injunctive relief were not only open to the court but required in the circumstances. The motion was dismissed.
In the transcript excerpt from that hearing, Justice Derrick repeatedly steered the discussion away from the contextual background of the execution order and back toward a simple question of compliance: would I obey the order or not? I was effectively told that the origin, validity, and criminal character of the execution order were not at issue in a stay motion—despite the fact that my written submissions directly raised those issues, including the criminal element (see R. v. Bellusci, 2012 SCC 44 at para. 25).
The message was unmistakable: enforcement of the execution order took priority over the facts that made that order itself suspect. I felt less like a litigant and more like someone being moved along a conveyor belt toward enforcement, regardless of law or context.
Enforcement of Questionable Judgments: The “Sniff Test” and Fraud
Canadian jurisprudence doesn’t just allow courts to refuse enforcement of questionable judgments—it insists on it. In Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized a public policy “sniff test” for enforcement. At para. 220, the Court noted that enforcing courts must be able to reject judgments obtained through egregious or questionable conduct, and that excessively punitive awards can be unenforceable on public policy grounds.
More critically, at para. 218, the Court held that there must be a residual category of cases where enforcement is refused simply because “their enforcement would shock the conscience of Canadians”. A half-million-dollar execution order derived from retainer-fee manipulation for nine short chambers hearings falls squarely within that category.
In Performance Industries Ltd. v. Sylvan Lake Golf & Tennis Club Ltd., 2002 SCC 19, the Court repeated the classic principle that “fraud unravels everything” (paras. 64, 84–85). Fraud does not need to be finally proven at the stay stage; the question is whether the material raises serious concerns about good faith, rationality, and proportionality.
Similarly, in 1582235 Ontario Ltd. v. Ontario, 2020 ONSC 1279, bad faith is described as conduct “so markedly inconsistent with the relevant legislative context that a court cannot reasonably conclude that it was performed in good faith” (para. 27, citing Enterprise Sibeca). That is exactly what the billing and enforcement pattern represents: an outcome so detached from any plausible legal or commercial context that it cannot be benign.
The court did not need full proof of fraud in June 2025, even though it is evident on face. It simply needed to see that:
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A half-million-dollar “cost” order for nine short chambers hearings is facially irrational and disproportionate;
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The underpinning invoices (737.7 hours for 867 minutes of court time) are utterly incompatible with Bradshaw, Gichuru, and Smithies; and
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Proceeding with enforcement on such a record would offend the Beals “shock the conscience” standard.
The Obligation to Consider Contextual Evidence
A judge cannot lawfully ignore relevant contextual evidence simply because the motion in front of them is styled as a “stay” or “contempt” matter. Canadian case law is clear that material context must be considered when it bears directly on the fairness and legality of the order being enforced.
Authorities such as Magee (Re) (Ont CA, 2020) at para. 19, Colburne v. Frank, 1995 NSCA 110 at para. 9, and Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 at para. 48, all underscore that courts must grapple with relevant evidence even where it is procedurally inconvenient. The Enforcement of Canadian Judgments and Decrees Act explicitly contemplates that stays of execution may be granted before corrective recourse is filed or heard (e.g. s. 8(2)(c)(ii)).
As Groberman J. explained in Coast Foundation v. Currie, 2003 BCSC 1781, the court must be cautious about deciding issues in isolation where they are “inexorably intertwined” with others, particularly in a summary setting (paras. 13, 15; citing Prevost v. Vetter and BMP Global). In my case, the contempt/enforcement motion was inseparable from:
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The source and nature of the execution order (the cost scandal);
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The underlying constitutional violations; and
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The ongoing pattern of state-aligned misconduct.
To say, in that context, “it is not my role to consider how we got here” is simply to refuse to adjudicate in any meaningful sense.
The Cost Scandal as Patent Injustice
Even if one stripped away everything else—the harassment, the police misconduct, the procedural sabotage—what remains is still enough to trigger any reasonable judge’s duty to intervene:
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A half-million-dollar execution order;
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Based on nine short-chambers hearings;
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Supported by invoices claiming 737.7 billable hours;
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For matters that, under the BC costs tariff, would reasonably attract something on the order of $4,500–$6,000 in total.
The case law on special costs is unambiguous:
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Bradshaw Construction Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 54 B.C.L.R. (2d) 309 (S.C.) at para. 44:
“Special costs are fees a reasonable client would pay a reasonably competent solicitor to do the work described in the bill.”
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Gichuru v. Smith, 2014 BCCA 414 at para. 155:
Only objectively reasonable fees are recoverable as special costs.
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Smithies Holdings Inc. v. RCV Holdings Ltd., 2017 BCCA 177 at para. 56:
Special costs are not compensatory; they are punitive.
A 9,000% markup over tariff-level expectations is not something a reasonable client would pay a reasonably competent solicitor for routine short chambers. It is arithmetically absurd and legally indefensible. When such an order is then exported to another province for enforcement, Beals, Performance Industries, Bradshaw, Gichuru, and Smithies all demand that the enforcing court pause and ask: Is this even remotely rational or proportionate? That did not happen.
Contempt, Discretion, and the Duty Not to Enforce Injustice
The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly emphasized that contempt is a last resort, not a debt-collection tool. In Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, the Court confirms:
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Contempt is discretionary (para. 36);
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The power must be exercised cautiously and with great restraint (para. 36); and
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A judge may decline to find contempt where doing so “would work an injustice in the circumstances of the case” (para. 37).
The Federal Court of Appeal in Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Teamsters Canada Rail Conference, 2024 FCA 136, held that:
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Judges must actually apply their contempt discretion, not merely recite it (paras. 68–70);
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Contempt should not be used as a simple enforcement mechanism for judgments; and
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Failure to consider discretionary factors is an error of law (citing Chong v. Donnelly, 2019 ONCA 799 at para. 12).
Despite this, in August 2024, I was found in contempt by an out-of-province court for refusing to answer discovery questions in aid of the execution order—after all recourse had been exhausted at the Supreme Court of Canada, and after the cost scandal had been fully documented and ignored at every stage. The court did not:
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Address the fraud-like nature of the billing;
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Address the Constitutional dimensions (ss. 7, 8, 24(1), 52(1) of the Charter); or
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Engage with the Carey and Teamsters framework at all.
In effect, contempt was used precisely as the SCC has warned against: as a blunt instrument to coerce obedience to an order that itself appears unlawful.
When Continuing Proceedings Becomes a Constitutional Abuse
Case law on stays of proceedings exists for precisely this kind of scenario: where continuing under tainted conditions would amount to rubber-stamping an abuse. In R. v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16, the Court held that a stay may be justified when state conduct contravenes fundamental notions of justice and undermines the integrity of the process (paras. 76–78). If going forward would be “offensive” in light of the misconduct (Tobiass, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391 at para. 91), a stay is required.
In Tobiass, at para. 110, the Court specifically contemplates situations where further proceedings would lack the appearance that justice is being done, such that the interest in preserving the integrity of the system outweighs any interest in pressing on.
Here, pressing forward means:
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Enforcing a half-million-dollar execution order that is arithmetically and legally absurd;
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Doing so after the BC courts and SCC have refused to allow any meaningful review;
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Using contempt powers to penalize my refusal to cooperate in what amounts to grand larceny with institutional cover.
Under Babos and Tobiass, continuing down that track is not “neutral”—it is participation in the abuse itself.
Necessity, Justification, and Constitutional Duty
At this point, my refusal to comply with the execution order—and to participate in discovery aimed at facilitating it—is not merely an act of frustration. It is grounded in the doctrines of necessity, justification, and moral voluntariness. In R. v. Ruzic, 2001 SCC 24, the Court adopts the concept of moral involuntariness from Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232. A person acts “in a morally involuntary fashion” when they are deprived of a realistic choice whether to comply with the law (Ruzic, para. 29). Dickson J.’s mountaineer example in Perka—who breaks into a cabin to avoid freezing to death—illustrates that some “choices” are no real choices at all.
In Perka, the Court distinguishes between:
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Excuse (the act is wrong, but we withhold blame), and
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Justification (the act is right in law, because of a higher duty).
Wilson J. explains that justification applies where the accused acts under a conflicting legal duty recognized by law (p. 279), not merely a private ethical preference. In my case, that conflicting duty is Constitutional:
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Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982: the Constitution is supreme law, and any law or order inconsistent with it is of no force or effect;
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Section 24(1) of the Charter: courts must provide appropriate and just remedies where Charter rights are violated;
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Section 7: protection of life, liberty, and security of the person, with decisions requiring full contextual consideration (see Charkaoui, 2007 SCC 9 at para. 29);
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Sections 8 and 24(1): protection from unreasonable search and seizure and ongoing abuse of process.
Obeying an order that enforces a felonious cost regime, while my attempts at constitutional review have been systematically blocked, would be to participate in the violation of the Constitution itself.
Conscience and Freedom of Religion
My refusal is also rooted in freedom of conscience and religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter. In Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, Iacobucci J. describes s. 2(a) as protecting profoundly personal beliefs that govern both perception and conduct (para. 41). For me, as a Catholic, those beliefs are articulated in the Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC):
-
CCC 2242:
"Citizens are obliged in conscience not to follow directives of civil authorities when they are contrary to the moral order or fundamental rights, and may legitimately defend their rights within the limits of natural and divine law."
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CCC 1903:
"When rulers enact unjust measures contrary to the moral order, such arrangements are not binding in conscience and constitute an abuse of authority."
Where state-backed institutions are using courts to effectuate what amounts to grand theft and covert persecution, compliance is not morally neutral—it is participation.
Denied Review, Ongoing Harm, and the Necessity of Refusal
Between:
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Systemic obstruction in the BC Superior Courts,
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Denial of meaningful review in the BC Court of Appeal,
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Refusal of docket entry and timely motion processing at the Supreme Court of Canada, and
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Out-of-province courts enforcing felonious costs while refusing to consider context,
I have been completely denied a normal review cycle for matters that plainly engage:
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Sections 7, 8, 24(1), and 52(1) of the Charter;
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Classical doctrines on fraud, abuse of process, and proportionality; and
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The public policy “shock the conscience” test in Beals.
In Perka, at p. 259, the Court held that once an accused places enough evidence before the court to raise the issue, the burden shifts to the Crown to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. In my situation, I have supplied:
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Detailed affidavits;
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Primary documentary evidence, including opposing counsel’s own billing records; and
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A body of jurisprudence that, taken together, makes continued enforcement indefensible.
Yet every institutional actor has treated this as something to be ignored, not refuted. Under these conditions, my refusal to comply with the execution order is not reckless; it is legally justified and morally required. To meekly submit would be to consent to:
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A half-million-dollar felony,
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Sanitized through courts,
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Insulated by seals and procedural sabotage, and
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Ratified by silence at the country’s highest court.
In an era where ideological and institutional capture increasingly disrupt the separation between justice and power, peaceful civil disobedience in the face of unconstitutional orders is not only defensible—it is sometimes the only lawful option left. No reasonable person is obliged to cooperate in their own victimization.
Hard Evidence and Case Law; not Idiosyncratic Opinions and Personal Interests.
The judges who ordered contempt were fully aware of the characteristics of the scandal: the use of legitimate public authorities to shield wrongdoing and facilitate what is, in substance, criminal conduct. Any reasonable observer, reviewing the record, would recognize that something profoundly abnormal had taken place.
The record shows that I was denied every customary avenue of review and correction, and left to live with the scandal’s crippling financial and personal effects—under threat of indefinite detention if I resisted cooperating in its enforcement. At each stage:
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Public servants and institutional stakeholders “played along”;
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Incriminating evidence was sealed, and later its very existence was denied;
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Applicable legal tests were ignored;
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Repeated procedural violations were tolerated and then treated as normal; and
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A growing concurrence of orders accepted this framework at face value, as though repetition alone could transform error into legitimacy.
As CAGE’s own lead counsel quipped on Twitter, “Nothing says ‘I respect you’ like a concurrence”. In my case, that concurrence has operated as a weaponized echo chamber—recycling and amplifying past errors instead of correcting them.
All of this runs directly against the guarantee of fair proceedings under the Charter. In Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, the Supreme Court held that s. 7 requires more than a nominal hearing. At para. 29, the Court explains that a person must be given a meaningful opportunity to know and meet the case against them, with adequate disclosure and a real chance to respond. A process that buries key evidence under seals, denies its existence, and then punishes resistance through contempt cannot be reconciled with that standard.
“This basic principle has a number of facets. It comprises the right to a hearing. It requires that the hearing be before an independent and impartial magistrate. It demands a decision by the magistrate on the facts and the law. And it entails the right to know the case put against one, and the right to answer that case. Precisely how these requirements are met will vary with the context. But for s. 7 to be satisfied, each of them must be met in substance.”
The written decision continues the same narrative that has run through this scandal since June 2022: it omits the incriminating components entirely and casts CAGE as the rightful, almost inevitable, beneficiary of their effects. Beginning at paragraph 8(b), the judge characterizes my submissions about the substance and character of the scandal as “idiosyncratic,” as though I were simply advancing a private, eccentric theory rather than engaging with settled law.
That assertion is unsustainable. On June 27, 2024, anticipating that this familiar trope would again be deployed, I filed a 60-page brief: two pages of summary; sixteen pages of evidentiary milestones with precise Affidavit page references; and forty-eight pages of case law, rules, and legislation. That brief contains 110 jurisprudential citations, each tied directly to specific facts, procedural events, and orders in this scandal, and mapped against the motion that was before the judge. A selection of those authorities is summarized on the Authorities page. In light of this, it cannot be said with any credibility that my understanding or treatment of the issues is “idiosyncratic”. What is truly anomalous is the court’s refusal to engage with the law and evidence I had put before it.
A Mandate pushed through an evidentiary vacuum
As noted in the decision text below (Norton J., July 2024), all that mattered was the enforcement. No treatment of the probative context, or any application of the Carey test concerning an application of discretion in view of those facts.
Per Colburne v. Frank, 1995 NSCA 110 at paragraph 9;
"...Under these headings of wrong principles of law and patent injustice an Appeal Court will override a discretionary order in a number of well‑recognized situations. The simplest cases involve an obvious legal error. As well, there are cases where no weight or insufficient weight has been given to relevant circumstances, where all the facts are not brought to the attention of the judge or where the judge has misapprehended the facts. The importance and gravity of the matter and the consequences of the order, as where an Interlocutory application results in the final disposition of a case, are always underlying considerations. The list is not exhaustive but it covers the most common instances of appellate court interference in discretionary matters. See Charles Osenton and Company v. Johnston (1941), 57 T.L.R. 515; Finlay v. Minister of Finance of Canada et al. (1990), 1990 CanLII 12961 (FCA), 71 D.L.R. (4th) 422; and the decision of this court in Attorney General of Canada v. Foundation Company of Canada Limited et al. (S.C.A. No. 02272, as yet unreported). [emphasis added]"
Per Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Teamsters Canada Rail Conference, 2024 FCA 136 exactly aligns with the characteristics of the billing scandal at paragraphs 68-70;
“The Federal Court’s reasons also do not adequately consider the discretion to find, or not find, contempt. Even if all of the criteria in support of a finding of contempt are met, judges retain discretion in finding contempt (Carey at paras. 36-37), and the failure of a court to consider its discretion in exercising its contempt power is an error of law (Chong v. Donnelly, 2019 ONCA 799, [2019] O.J. No. 5048 at para. 12). Here, the Federal Court mentioned its discretion in its reasons (Federal Court decision at paras. 61 and 81-82) but went no further. Reasons cannot simply make note of the correct legal test, then fail to apply it (R v. Chung, 2020 SCC 8, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 405 at para. 13). The judge’s reasoning with respect to discretion was purely conclusory and does not allow this Court to understand why the judge chose to exercise her discretion or not. Contempt is a power that must be exercised lightly. It is a remedy of last resort, and it should not be used as a means to enforce judgments (Carey at para. 36). Judges entertaining contempt motions must seriously consider their overriding discretion in light of the purpose of contempt, and all other relevant circumstances, including the behaviour of the contemnor and the nature of the order.”



"As Peter Cory points out, at pp. 101 and 103: If the State commits significant errors in the course of the investigation and prosecution, it should accept the responsibility for the sad consequences. Society needs protection from both the deliberate and the careless acts of omission and commission which lead to wrongful conviction and prison."
Hill v. Hamilton‑Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129, 2007 SCC 41 at paragraph 37

Legal Tests Concerning the Estoppel of Systemic Abuse
"Enough is Enough"
I understand my right to access fair, independent, and lawful courts as a section 7 Charter guarantee. The Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that when the state places a person’s life, liberty, or security of the person at stake, the process itself must be fundamentally fair and grounded in evidence and law (Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 at paras. 22, 23, 27, 48). In my case, the opposite occurred: the common issues were never tried, procedural safeguards were repeatedly ignored, and each attempt to seek meaningful review was suffocated by technical barriers and biased rulings.
The Supreme Court’s framework in R. v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16 is directly on point. Babos holds that a stay of proceedings may be required where the state’s conduct “contravenes fundamental notions of justice and thus undermines the integrity of the judicial process,” and where continuing would itself be offensive to public decency (paras. 76–78). Likewise, in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391, the Court emphasizes that a stay is a prospective remedy designed to prevent the ongoing perpetuation of a wrong. A stay is justified where (a) state misconduct is likely to continue, or (b) the mere act of going forward would offend society’s sense of justice (para. 91). In extreme cases, the severity of the interference with judicial independence is so great that any further proceedings would lack the appearance that justice is being done (para. 110). Viewed through that lens, the pattern in my proceedings is not an isolated error but a systemic course of conduct:
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The common issues were never heard once.
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Procedural rules under the Charter, the Class Proceedings Act, and ordinary civil practice were repeatedly discarded.
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Efforts to invoke corrective mechanisms were blocked or ignored.
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An inverted narrative that ignored the probative record was replicated on the basis of comity (which, by its own definition, cannot abide error).
Customarily, court should recognize this pattern and grant a stay of proceedings to prevent the abuse from continuing. In practice, every forum I approached refused to acknowledge the scandal at all, let alone apply Babos or Tobiass. This leaves a citizen in an impossible position: either submit and thereby validate unconstitutional overreach, or refuse to participate in a process that has ceased to be meaningfully lawful.
The Supreme Court recognized this dilemma in R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, describing “moral involuntariness” where a person is effectively deprived of a realistic choice (para. 29). In my situation, ongoing participation in proceedings that were weaponized to enforce a fraudulent cost order and to protect clear misconduct would amount to accepting victimhood and endorsing what I argue is a constitutional violation. The Constitution is the supreme law of Canada (Charkaoui, supra, at para. 27). Where courts refuse to apply it, sections 7, 24(1), and 52(1) of the Charter require the citizen to take it seriously even if the institutions do not.
Accordingly, my refusal to acquiesce to the cost scandal and related contempt orders is not arbitrary defiance; it is grounded in the very jurisprudence that governs stays of proceedings and abuse of process. When the system has shown, over years, that it will not correct itself, it is neither reasonable nor lawful to demand that a citizen quietly endure permanent, unreviewable harm.



XV. - Jailed Without Access to Counsel
Coerced and Beaten With Forty Minutes of Detention
In August 2024, two Sheriffs arrived at my home, placed me in handcuffs, and transported me to a correctional facility. I was told the arrest related to “social media content the CAGE wanted removed”, and that my sentence “would be shortened if the content were removed”. I have no social media accounts, and therefore no social media posts. The only logical inference is that this referred to this website, which describes the scandal in redacted form, although nothing was clarified at the time. I later learned the arrest actually stemmed from my alleged failure to respond to a discovery subpoena in aid of the CAGE’s collection efforts. In other words, the Sheriffs appear to have been misled about the purpose of the warrant. A representative from the provincial Duty Counsel program also referred to “online content” and pressured me to remove it—even though no court had ever ordered the removal of any such materials. She also commented that people are “rarely, if ever” arrested in civil matters.
Within forty minutes of being placed in my first cell, I was assaulted by a group of inmates I had never seen before. They rushed into my cell, overpowered me, pinned me to the floor, beat me repeatedly, and spat on me before telling me to keep my cell door locked. Weeks later, I still had no sensation in part of my left thigh. On the second day, inmates in the block refused to return my meal tray, leaving me without food and forcing me to drink tap water. One inmate slid a cup of urine under my door, soaking the floor, and repeatedly pounded on the door chanting, “Cell 8, hang yourself”. On the morning of the third day, an attentive guard, with the support of a captain, relocated me to a different block, which brought some relief.
Denied Duty Counsel
During my incarceration, I was effectively denied my right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter, which applies whenever a person is deprived of liberty, regardless of whether the underlying proceeding is civil or criminal. The provincial Duty Counsel office advised that they could not assist because the matter was “civil,” even though I was in custody and facing further coercive measures. After my release, I contacted the same Duty Counsel representative and requested that the issue be escalated for internal review. No one responded. I am unaware of any other agency in the province that provides Charter-compliant duty counsel in these circumstances.
The incarceration order itself refers only to my non-compliance with a discovery subpoena in aid of enforcing the cost judgment. It does not mention social media or online content at all; those issues were never properly before any court. The presiding judge nevertheless proceeded on the assumption that I could somehow fulfill a discovery obligation, tied to a felonious cost order, while incarcerated. A fuller account of my initial jail sentence, including documentary exhibits, is provided on the Jailed page of this site.


Custody Affected a Genetic Autoimmune Disorder
During my first incarceration in August 2024, the daily meals at the correctional facility were, on paper, balanced and decent. In practice, they triggered a severe autoimmune response within ten days of being moved into a block where I could actually eat. I had requested a gluten-free diet on intake. Cross-contamination can happen via shared kitchen surfaces an airborne particles. >10 ppm per day is enough for a flare.
I was diagnosed with Celiac disease at 23, along with a cluster of related liver and bowel issues: Primary Sclerosing Cholangitis (PSC), Crohn’s disease, Inflammatory Bowel Disease, and Ulcerative Colitis. My gastroenterologist documented in writing that “even the smallest amount of gluten will trigger an autoimmune response that will last for weeks”. In my case, prolonged exposure to even trace gluten (>10 ppm per day) is expected to lead to liver failure. Several years after diagnosis, I required surgery to remove my colon because of the same autoimmune cascade. I have relied on ostomy bags since 2006 and previously underwent treatment for PSC, a chronic and unpredictable condition. The only reason I am still alive is an ironclad adherence to a tightly controlled, gluten-free diet under stable conditions.
Dermatitis Herpetiformis (“DH”) is a known Celiac manifestation when gluten is reintroduced. It functions like a canary in the coal mine: painful skin eruptions that signal internal damage is already underway. Within ten days of incarceration, I developed a severe DH outbreak. Provincial health records obtained shortly after my release confirm the flare. A renewed or prolonged detention under those dietary conditions is not theoretical for me; it is reasonably expected to be life-threatening and/or cause long-term organ damage.
The court asked an impossible choice: surrender my core beliefs and dignity by legitimizing a manifestly unlawful billing scandal, or risk my health—and potentially my life—by returning to an environment where even “gluten-free” meals are unsafe, while adjudicators follow a script designed to advance state and private commercial interests. Either path results in destruction.









"Self-Inflicted" Health Harms.
The Court: "Enforcing Facially-Felonious Billing > Your Life"
In her June 2025 written reasons, NS Court of Appeal justice Anne S. Derrick dealt with my medical evidence and the risk of incarceration in two short paragraphs. At paragraphs 37–38 she held that any irreparable harm I might suffer from being jailed with life-threatening autoimmune conditions was “unknown”, and in any event “self-inflicted” because I could always purge my contempt by complying with the discovery subpoena and, ultimately, with the $400,000 cost certificate.
In substance, the court’s position was this: if I refuse to submit to a tainted half-million-dollar execution order (+9,000% over tariff), and if a second custodial sentence under those conditions proves medically harmful as it was in 2024 (and worse, if prolonged), the resulting harm is my fault. My only “safe” option, in the court’s view, is to abandon my Charter rights, accept the fraudulent cost order, and cooperate in my own financial destruction; anything less is treated as a voluntary choice to risk medical risk that will be life-threatening if prolonged. Pick your poison.
This reasoning collapses the constitutional right to challenge unlawful state action into a false dilemma: comply with an unconstitutional order, or be blamed for the foreseeable medical consequences of opposing it. It is directly at odds with the SCC’s discussion of moral involuntariness and necessity in Perka v. The Queen and R. v. Ruzic, where the Court recognizes that a “choice” between two intolerable outcomes is no real choice at all. It also ignores the basic section 7 requirement, set out in Charkaoui, that the state cannot jeopardize life and security of the person except in accordance with fundamental justice, and the guidance in Carey v. Laiken and Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Teamsters that contempt powers must not be used to work an injustice or to enforce a questionable order at all costs.
During a scheduling hearing month later on July 4th, 2025, and privy to complete medical records obtained from NS Health and the NS Provincial Health Authority that were filed on January 9th, 2025, justice Anne E. Smith nonetheless signaled a second custodial sentence if I did not comply with the terms of the billing scandal (second image below). She was fully aware of the health risk, and likewise fully aware of the probative record. It was only after I had disclosed the matter to the aforementioned health bodies via email, with binding supreme court case law and computational audits emulating decisions a reasonable judge in these circumstances would be expected to make, did the court acknowledge the serious medical risk a subsequent custodial sentence would impose (third image below). This should instill in the mind of the reader the gravity of institutional capture, if it does not already.

July 4th, 2025 Transcript: No Regard for Medical Records Filed January 9th, 2025.

July 30th, 2025 Transcript: Post Disclosure to NS Health - Acknowledgement of Medical Records.

XVI. - Donor Eggs, Criminal Family Members, & State-Adjacent Influence
No Family or Network on Earth is Above the Law.
Get the DNA Records, Pull the Tax Records, Run the Audits, and Fire the Judges Before Incarcerating Me.
Mary Eliza Partrick, pictured below, and likewise a prominent actor involved in the online criminal element of the scandal, is evidenced to be the biological mother of my estranged Nephew (to her right), as a known egg donor. Christine, pictured below left, is Mary’s mother, likewise bearing resemblance. Further detail is found in the Family Affidavit, which includes a report by a US-based investigator, and an expanded background concerning the fertility clinic and relevant developments over the past decade. A material relationship between these actors and the CAGE was first cited in my Affidavit sworn May 20th, 2022, and again in Affidavits sworn in 2023. The Partricks come from old money and influence suffused with esoteric (occult) beliefs, which my estranged relatives likewise maintain. The complementary peripheral interest concerns an estate.





"Presents"












Overt Expressions Concerning the CAGE Remain Under Sealing Orders

CAGE Director

At Stake

A Question of Cosmetic Democracy & Stakeholder Governance
This Scandal concerns the use of legitimate public authorities and resources to service private interests and to facilitate criminal objectives. It evidences the existence of a stakeholder framework that can shape the conduct of Canadian institutions from time to time, with relative ease. Whereas both the overarching and peripheral interests involved are cited above in this page, the links below expand further on the same.

Neurotech
Crime /
4IR

Machine
Learning
Analyses

Gatekeeping & Procedural Foreclosure

Preclusion of Legal Support

Estranged Criminal Relations

False Police Reports & Obstruction
State-Adjacent Assurances.




Atop a Post-Constitutional Substrate
ABSTRACT
This article argues that Canada has entered what political scientist Dr. Colin Crouch has termed “post-democracy”—a condition in which democratic institutions endure as formal shells while effective governance migrates to technocratic networks operating beyond constitutional constraint. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s analysis of knowledge regimes, the surveillance scholarship of Shoshana Zuboff and Antoinette Rouvroy, and critical infrastructure studies by Benjamin Bratton and Laura DeNardis, it demonstrates that Canada’s constitutional framework—anchored in transcendent principles as recognized in Ruffo v. Conseil de la magistrature citing the constitutional preamble—has been functionally displaced by what Dr. Yuval Noah Harari describes as centralized data-processing systems optimized for technocratic coordination rather than democratic accountability.
The convergence of postmodern epistemology (rejecting transcendent foundations), multistakeholder governance (displacing intergovernmental decision-making), biodigital technologies (enabling pervasive surveillance and intervention), and economic imperatives (concentrating power within platform monopolies) has produced a regime in which constitutional protections operate as discretionary, not categorical, guarantees. Empirical evidence of coordinated activity across Canadian institutions suggests that this transformation is already operational, not merely theoretical.
The article concludes that Canada now faces a stark choice: either reclaim the transcendent foundations that sustain constitutional supremacy for all citizens, or accept a post-democratic settlement in which constitutional forms merely legitimate outcomes predetermined by well-networked communities of influence.
Keywords: Post-Democracy, Post-Constitutional Governance, Knowledge Regimes, Governmentality, Multistakeholder Governance, Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Capture, Governance by Infrastructure, Surveillance Capitalism, Datafication, Instrumentarian Power, AI Centralization, Operational Images, UN-WEF Strategic Partnership, Constitutional Supremacy, "Supremacy of God" Preamble, Living Constitutionalism, Section 1 Oakes Test, Proportionality, Sealing Orders, Discretionary Gatekeeping, Procedural Foreclosure, Access to Justice, Inverted Totalitarianism
From Democracy to Data: Canada's Post-Constitutional Condition
I. The Post-Democratic Condition: When Institutions Become Shells
Political scientist Colin Crouch introduced the concept of "post-democracy" in his 2000 essay "Coping with Post-Democracy," defining it as a condition in which society "continues to have and to use all the institutions of democracy, but in which they increasingly become a formal shell. The energy and innovative drive pass away from the democratic arena and into small circles of a politico-economic elite."
Crouch's formulation captures a phenomenon familiar to any observer of contemporary governance: elections continue, legislatures convene, courts adjudicate, yet policy trajectories seem remarkably resistant to democratic pressure. Wolfgang Streeck's Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism extends this analysis, documenting how market imperatives have systematically displaced democratic sovereignty since the 1970s, creating what he terms the "consolidation state"—governance organized around servicing debt and satisfying investor confidence rather than representing citizen preferences.
Nancy Fraser identifies a deeper structural transformation: the subordination of democratic politics to what she calls "progressive neoliberalism," an alliance of financialization, identity politics, and technocratic expertise that marginalizes both working-class economic concerns and traditional democratic accountability mechanisms. In her analysis, contemporary governance operates through networks of credentialed experts, corporate stakeholders, and NGO actors who share assumptions about globalization, markets, and social progress—assumptions rarely subjected to democratic contestation.
Canada exemplifies this pattern with particular clarity. The country's formal constitutional architecture remains intact: parliamentary democracy, Charter protections, judicial review, federal-provincial division of powers. Yet as demonstrated in Ruffo v. Conseil de la magistrature, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 267, Canada's constitutional order rests on foundational principles: "the supremacy of God and the rule of law". These transcendent anchors assume law answers to authority beyond human manipulation—natural law, divine command, inherent human dignity. But what happens when the knowledge regime operating institutions no longer accepts transcendent foundations? When truth becomes, in Michel Foucault's formulation, merely "the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated" (Power/Knowledge, 1980)?
The answer is post-constitutionalism: formal constitutional structures persist while their operational logic transforms. Rights become variables in optimization rather than categorical constraints. Adjudication shifts from discovering pre-existing meaning to administering regime preferences. Sovereignty fragments into stakeholder networks. Democratic choice operates within predetermined parameters. And coordination replaces accountability as the organizing principle of governance.
II. Foucault's Knowledge Regimes: Truth as Power's Product
Michel Foucault's most enduring contribution to political analysis lies in his demonstration that power and knowledge are mutually constitutive. In Power/Knowledge and Discipline and Punish, Foucault argues that "truth" is not discovered but produced—manufactured through institutional practices, professional socialization, and networks of mutually reinforcing actors. Each historical epoch develops what he terms a "knowledge regime" or "episteme": a framework determining what counts as knowledge, who is authorized to speak it, and which questions are intelligible within the system.
Crucially, knowledge regimes operate not primarily through coercion but through what Foucault calls "governmentality"—the internalization of regime logic by subjects who come to police themselves. As Byung-Chul Han observes in Psychopolitics, contemporary power operates through optimization rather than prohibition: "Power is now assuming a permissive form. Its technique of domination is not prohibitive or prescriptive but rather prospective and progressive... Instead of operating by way of repression, it seduces."
This seduction operates through what Shoshana Zuboff terms "surveillance capitalism"—economic and political systems organized around prediction and behavioral modification rather than traditional production (The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 2019). Zuboff documents how platform monopolies extract behavioral data, transform it into predictive models, and sell interventions designed to modify future behavior. This creates what she calls "instrumentarian power": governance through environmental modification that shapes choices while preserving the appearance of freedom.
Antoinette Rouvroy and Thomas Berns extend this analysis through their concept of "algorithmic governmentality"—governance through data patterns that bypass human deliberation entirely. In their 2013 paper "Algorithmic Governmentality and Prospects of Emancipation," they describe how big data analytics create governance systems that:
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Operate on populations rather than individuals (statistical patterns, not persons)
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Preempt rather than respond (intervene before behavior manifests)
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Bypass normative deliberation (patterns replace judgment)
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Render subjects incomprehensible to themselves (no account of why they're targeted)
The result is governance that Mark Andrejevic describes as functioning "in the mode of the oracle" (Infoglut, 2013): systems claim predictive knowledge inaccessible to subjects themselves, who must therefore accept algorithmic verdicts as authoritative even when they contradict lived experience or documentary evidence.
When such systems permeate institutions—police, courts, regulatory agencies, civil service—governance transforms fundamentally. Constitutional protections assume transparent rules applied by accountable officials to legible subjects. Algorithmic systems invert each element: opaque models, inscrutable decision-making, subjects rendered as data patterns. The question becomes: can constitutional law constrain power it cannot see, understand, or hold accountable?
Canada's adoption of the UN's 2030 Agenda as a "shared blueprint" signals participation in precisely this transformation. As Benjamin Bratton argues in The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty (2016), governance is migrating from territorial states to layered technological infrastructures—the "stack" of protocols, platforms, and networks through which power actually flows. In Bratton's analysis, traditional sovereignty is being "hacked" by systems that operate across jurisdictions, beyond democratic constraint, through technical architectures that predetermine outcomes.
When Canada's Policy Horizons Canada—the government's strategic foresight body—is chaired by Kristel Van der Elst, formerly the World Economic Forum's Head of Strategic Foresight, the organizational relationship is not speculative. It represents structural embedding of WEF priorities into Canadian policy development. Combined with the June 19, 2019 UN-WEF Strategic Partnership Framework, this creates what Evgeny Morozov calls "technological solutionism" (To Save Everything, Click Here, 2013): the presumption that complex social problems require primarily technical interventions administered by expert stakeholders, with democratic input reduced to ratifying pre-determined solutions.
III. The Empirical Turn: When Data Replaces Deliberation
Yuval Noah Harari's observation in The Atlantic captures the epistemological shift underlying post-democracy:
"We tend to think about the conflict between democracy and dictatorship as a conflict between two different ethical systems, but it is actually a conflict between two different data-processing systems. Democracy distributes the power to process information and make decisions among many people and institutions, whereas dictatorship concentrates information and power in one place... However, artificial intelligence may soon swing the pendulum in the opposite direction. AI makes it possible to process enormous amounts of information centrally. In fact, it might make centralized systems far more efficient than diffuse systems, because machine learning works better when the machine has more information to analyze."
Harari's formulation is chilling precisely because it's accurate: if governance is fundamentally about information processing, and if centralized AI systems process information more efficiently than distributed democratic institutions, then democracy becomes inefficient by definition—a bug, not a feature.
This logic pervades contemporary governance discourse. Klaus-Gerd Giesen's analysis of transhumanism as governance ideology ("Transhumanism as the Dominant Ideology of the Fourth Industrial Revolution") demonstrates how biodigital convergence is framed not as one policy option among many but as an inevitable adaptation to technological and environmental imperatives. When Policy Horizons Canada states that biodigital convergence will "redefine what we consider human and normal," the phrasing reveals the presumption: someone will be doing the redefining. The question is who, by what authority, and subject to what constraints.
His Majesty King Charles III identified this problem in Harmony: A New Way of Looking at Our World (2010):
"Think of something as basic as a conversation that might take place in a biology lesson where a science teacher is called upon by pupils to address the moral and ethical questions of whether or not it is a good thing to manipulate genes. At that point, does the teacher act as a philosopher or remain a science teacher?... The essential point here is, how far our empirical knowledge can go before it begins to encroach on territory it is not qualified to discuss... Science can tell us how things work, but it is not equipped to tell us what they mean. That is the domain of philosophy and religion and spirituality... And yet, because it tries to, we end up with the general outlook that now prevails. The language of empiricism is now so much in the ascendant that it has authority over any other way of looking at the world."
When empiricism becomes the sole authorized mode of knowing, questions of meaning, value, and legitimacy collapse into questions of efficiency and optimization. Constitutional protections—grounded in transcendent claims about human dignity—lose their authority. Rights become instrumental: useful when they serve collective goals, expendable when they impede them. Democracy transforms into what Jacques Rancière calls "police" (Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, 1999): the administration of populations rather than the articulation of fundamental disagreement about how society should be organized.
Rancière distinguishes between "politics" (genuine contestation) and "police" (administration that allocates roles and maintains order). Post-democracy, in his analysis, is the triumph of police over politics—the reduction of democratic participation to stakeholder consultation within predetermined parameters. Citizens become data points; elections become preference aggregation; governance becomes optimization.
Trevor Paglen's work on "operational images" extends this analysis to the visual realm ("Operational Images," e-flux Journal #59, 2014). Paglen documents how contemporary surveillance produces images not for human viewing but for algorithmic processing—images that train machine learning systems, guide autonomous weapons, and sort populations. These operational images bypass human cognition entirely, creating what he calls "seeing machines" that constitute their own regime of visibility independent of human perception.
When such systems permeate governance, the constitutional assumption of legible state action collapses. Laura DeNardis documents this transformation in The Internet in Everything (2020), showing how internet protocols, platform architectures, and automated systems exercise governance functions traditionally assigned to states—but without democratic authorization, constitutional constraint, or mechanisms for accountability. Lisa Parks extends this analysis in Rethinking Media Coverage (2018), demonstrating how infrastructure itself—cables, satellites, data centers—constitutes a regime of power that shapes what can be known, by whom, under what conditions.
The implications for constitutional governance are profound. If power operates through infrastructures invisible to citizens, incomprehensible to courts, and beyond the reach of traditional accountability mechanisms, then constitutional constraints become merely formal. They persist as legitimating fictions while actual governance proceeds through technical systems immune from legal oversight.
IV. Post-Constitutional Adjudication: When Courts Become Administrators
The transformation from constitutional to post-constitutional governance is nowhere more visible than in adjudication. Classical constitutional theory assumes courts function as guardians—institutions that discover and enforce pre-existing legal meaning, applying it equally regardless of parties' power or network position. Post-constitutional practice reveals courts functioning increasingly as administrators—institutions that balance stakeholder interests, optimize outcomes, and manage populations within frameworks predetermined by regime consensus.
Stéphane Sérafin and Kerry Sun's critique of Chief Justice Wagner's jurisprudence captures this shift. In their National Post analysis, they argue that Wagner's approach "strikes at the very heart of the rule of law and envisages an unchecked judicial power" by subordinating constitutional text and tradition to judicial assessment of contemporary social values. Former Supreme Court Justice Marshall Rothstein expressed similar concern: "I'm not sure that I would be comfortable thinking that judges should be advancing the law with a social agenda in mind. It seems to me that the social agenda is the agenda for Parliament."
But the concern runs deeper than judicial activism. Post-constitutional adjudication operates through mechanisms that systematically advantage regime-fluent actors—those with network position, credentialed expertise, and alignment with dominant frameworks—while disadvantaging outsiders regardless of legal merit.
James C. Scott's Seeing Like a State (1998) provides the theoretical framework. Scott demonstrates how state institutions develop simplified, standardized categories ("legibility") that enable administration but systematically misrecognize phenomena that don't fit preset templates. In his analysis, bureaucratic institutions don't merely fail to see complexity—they actively produce simplified realities that correspond to their administrative categories, then mistake those constructs for the territory itself.
Ruha Benjamin extends this analysis to algorithmic systems in Race After Technology (2019), documenting how automated decision-making encodes existing power relations while appearing neutral and objective. What she terms "the New Jim Code" operates through technical systems that discriminate without explicit intent, creating what legal scholar Frank Pasquale calls "black box society"—governance through opaque algorithms immune from scrutiny (The Black Box Society, 2015).
When courts adopt algorithmic logic—evaluating claims through standardized categories, deferring to credentialed expertise, privileging regime-legible arguments—adjudication shifts from discovering justice to administering populations. The result is what Eyal Weizman describes as "forensic architecture" (Forensic Architecture: Violence at the Threshold of Detectability, 2017): systematic production of evidence regimes that determine what can be proven, what counts as fact, and whose knowledge is authoritative.
Discretion is the mechanism through which knowledge regimes operate within formally constitutional systems. When every stage of process involves discretionary gatekeeping—case acceptance, evidence admissibility, standard of review, remedy selection—then outcomes depend less on legal merit than on alignment with regime assumptions. Procedure remains formally neutral while producing systematically biased results.
This creates functional caste systems operating through credentialing rather than formal hierarchy. Bourdieu's concept of "cultural capital" (Distinction, 1984) explains how educational credentials, professional networks, and facility with dominant vocabularies function as gatekeeping mechanisms that appear meritocratic while reproducing existing power structures. When constitutional claims require translation into regime-legible frameworks before courts will hear them, and when that translation is performed by credentialed intermediaries (lawyers, experts, consultants), access to justice depends on resources and alignment rather than rights.
V. Technological Solutionism and the Inevitability Trap
The most powerful mechanism enforcing post-democratic governance is not coercion but inevitability: the framing of technological transformation as natural force beyond democratic constraint. This rhetorical strategy appears throughout contemporary governance discourse, from Harari's data-processing efficiency arguments to Policy Horizons Canada's statements that biodigital convergence "will" redefine humanity.
Evgeny Morozov's To Save Everything, Click Here dissects "technological solutionism"—the ideology that recasts complex social, ethical, and political questions as technical problems requiring expert administration. In this framing, democracy becomes an implementation detail, constitutional constraints become friction, and citizen input becomes user feedback to optimize system performance.
The World Economic Forum's "Great Reset" initiative exemplifies this logic. As documented in WEF publications, the COVID-19 pandemic represents not tragedy but opportunity—a chance to "reset" global systems according to technocratic priorities. Klaus Schwab's statement that the WEF has "penetrated cabinets" worldwide is not admission of conspiracy but celebration of successful stakeholder coordination: the achievement of governance that transcends democratic constraint through networks operating across jurisdictions.
Benjamin Bratton's The Stack provides the architectural analysis. Bratton argues that contemporary governance operates through layered technical infrastructures—from physical networks through platforms to user interfaces—that constitute their own form of sovereignty. In his analysis, traditional state sovereignty is being "hacked" by systems that operate according to technical rather than legal logic, creating governance by infrastructure that predetermines outcomes regardless of formal law.
Laura DeNardis documents this transformation empirically in The Global War for Internet Governance (2014), showing how technical standard-setting bodies, platform companies, and infrastructure operators exercise governance functions traditionally assigned to democratic states—but without authorization, transparency, or accountability. What she terms "Internet governance" operates through technical protocols and private coordination, creating regimes of power invisible to traditional legal analysis.
The implications for constitutional governance are existential. If power operates primarily through technical infrastructures beyond legal reach, then constitutional constraints become irrelevant—formal rules for a governance system that no longer primarily operates through law. Elections continue, courts adjudicate, legislatures debate, but effective power resides in technical architectures designed and controlled by private actors coordinating through stakeholder networks.
This is not conspiracy but architecture. As Langdon Winner argued in "Do Artifacts Have Politics?" (Daedalus, 1980), technologies embody political values and relationships. A bridge built too low for buses segregates as effectively as explicit policy. Algorithms that optimize for engagement produce filter bubbles as surely as censorship. Platforms that require real-name registration enable surveillance as completely as state databases. The difference is that technical enforcement appears neutral, inevitable, and beyond democratic contestation.
VI. Surveillance Infrastructure and Behavioral Modification
Shoshana Zuboff's The Age of Surveillance Capitalism documents how major technology platforms have developed business models based on behavioral prediction and modification. Through continuous data extraction, these systems:
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Monitor behavior comprehensively (search, location, communication, biometrics)
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Generate predictive models (behavioral futures markets)
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Sell interventions (modifications designed to produce predicted behaviors)
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Close feedback loops (measure effectiveness, refine models)
Zuboff demonstrates that this creates what she terms "instrumentarian power"—governance through environmental modification that shapes behavior while preserving appearance of choice. Subjects experience themselves as free while operating within architectures designed to produce specific outcomes.
Antoinette Rouvroy's work on "algorithmic governmentality" extends this analysis to state institutions. In her framework, big data analytics enable governance that:
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Operates pre-emptively (intervening before behavior manifests)
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Bypasses normative judgment (patterns replace deliberation)
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Targets populations statistically (actuarial rather than individual)
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Renders invisible to subjects (no account of basis for intervention)
Mark Andrejevic describes this as governance "in the mode of the oracle" (Infoglut, 2013): systems claim knowledge inaccessible to subjects, who must accept algorithmic verdicts as authoritative even when contradicting lived experience or documentary evidence.
When such systems permeate institutions with constitutional obligations—police, courts, regulatory agencies—governance transforms fundamentally. Constitutional law assumes transparent rules, accountable officials, and legible subjects. Algorithmic systems invert each element: opaque models, inscrutable decisions, subjects reduced to data patterns.
Trevor Paglen's "operational images" concept illuminates how surveillance produces governance. Contemporary systems generate images not for human viewing but for algorithmic processing—training data for machine learning, targeting information for autonomous systems, population sorting for predictive policing. These operational images constitute their own regime of visibility independent of human perception, creating what Paglen calls "seeing machines" that operate beyond constitutional constraint because they're incomprehensible to legal frameworks designed for human actors.
Lisa Parks and Laura DeNardis document how infrastructure itself exercises governance functions. In Rethinking Media Coverage (2018) and The Internet in Everything (2020), they demonstrate that cables, satellites, data centers, and protocols shape what can be known, by whom, under what conditions—but operate beyond democratic authorization or constitutional oversight. When power resides in infrastructures invisible to citizens and incomprehensible to courts, constitutional constraints become merely formal.
VII. The Multistakeholder Model: Corporate Capture as Governance Innovation
The 2019 UN-World Economic Forum Strategic Partnership Framework represents formal acknowledgment of what Wolfgang Streeck calls "post-democratic capitalism": governance through coordination among states, corporations, and NGOs rather than through democratic institutions. The agreement pledges to "jointly accelerate" the UN's 2030 Agenda, effectively casting the WEF—an organization representing the world's largest corporations—as implementation arm of supposedly intergovernmental policy.
This arrangement drew immediate criticism from civil society organizations. Santiago José Rivas Berón characterized it as "corporate capture of the UN," Anne-Marie Gleckman termed it "privatized multilateralism," and Sofia Monsalve described it as "corporate-led multi-stakeholder governance" that conflates distinct roles: citizens, corporations, and governments treated as equivalent stakeholders rather than maintaining distinction between rights-bearers, economic actors, and public authority.
Nancy Fraser's analysis of "progressive neoliberalism" explains how this arrangement persists despite formal democratic opposition. In her framework, contemporary governance operates through alliance between financial capital, credentialed professionals, and social movements organized around identity rather than economic redistribution. This coalition marginalizes working-class economic concerns while advancing globalization, market expansion, and technocratic expertise—all framed as progressive through association with cultural liberalism.
The result is what Fraser terms "double movement": economic liberalization paired with cultural progressivism, creating governance that appears responsive to social justice concerns while systematically transferring power from democratic institutions to unaccountable stakeholder networks. When corporations champion diversity, media promotes climate action, and platforms combat misinformation, they perform progressive legitimacy while consolidating power beyond democratic constraint.
Wolfgang Streeck documents the economic dimension in Buying Time and How Will Capitalism End? (2016). In his analysis, post-2008 governance represents "consolidation state" logic: policy organized primarily around servicing debt and satisfying investor confidence rather than representing citizen preferences. Democratic politics becomes constrained to choices compatible with market imperatives, with "responsible" policy defined through investor reaction rather than citizen deliberation.
When Canada adopts the UN's 2030 Agenda as "shared blueprint," coordinates policy through WEF-linked personnel, and implements governance organized around SDG optimization, it participates in this post-democratic transformation. Parliamentary sovereignty persists formally while effective policy operates through transnational stakeholder coordination beyond electoral constraint.
VIII. Biodigital Convergence and the Redefinition of Human
Policy Horizons Canada's statements on biodigital convergence reveal the trajectory: "Biodigital convergence may redefine what we consider human and/or natural... Full physical integration of biological and digital entities... Digital technology can be embedded in organisms... Biological components can be integrated into digital systems."
This framing treats profound philosophical, ethical, and constitutional questions—What is human? Who decides? By what authority?—as technical matters requiring expert administration rather than democratic deliberation. When unelected foresight bodies chaired by WEF-affiliated personnel announce that humanity will be "redefined," the presumption is that such redefinition represents technical evolution rather than fundamental political choice requiring democratic authorization.
Klaus-Gerd Giesen's analysis identifies transhumanism as the dominant ideology enabling this transformation. In his framework, transhumanist assumptions—that consciousness is information processing, identity is mutable construct, biology is code to be optimized—provide philosophical infrastructure justifying biodigital convergence. These assumptions reject transcendent foundations (inherent human nature, dignity beyond utility, rights grounded in ontology) in favor of radical constructivism: humanity becomes whatever technology enables, constrained only by efficiency and safety rather than categorical limits.
His Majesty King Charles III's critique in Harmony identifies the epistemological error: empiricism can describe mechanism but cannot determine meaning. Science reveals how genetic modification works but cannot answer whether it should occur, under what conditions, subject to whose consent. When empirical knowledge claims authority over philosophical and spiritual domains, questions of meaning collapse into questions of mechanism—reducing "should we?" to "can we?"
The constitutional implications are profound. If human nature is mutable construct rather than transcendent given, on what basis do Charter protections rest? Section 7 guarantees "life, liberty and security of the person"—but if personhood becomes technologically contingent, who determines which modifications preserve or destroy it? Section 15 prohibits discrimination—but if enhancement creates biological castes, does equality require universal access to modification or prohibition of stratification?
These questions cannot be resolved through technical analysis or stakeholder consultation. They require democratic deliberation grounded in shared commitment to transcendent principles—precisely the commitment postmodern epistemology rejects. When governance proceeds through assumptions incompatible with constitutional foundations, the constitution persists as formal shell while operational logic transforms.
IX. The Caste System: How Discretion Produces Stratification
Post-constitutional governance operates not through explicit hierarchy but through discretionary gatekeeping at every stage of process. The result is functional caste system: regime-aligned actors prevail even on weak law, outsiders fail even with binding precedent.
Pierre Bourdieu's analysis of "cultural capital" explains the mechanism. In Distinction (1984), Bourdieu demonstrates how educational credentials, professional networks, and facility with dominant vocabularies function as gatekeeping mechanisms that appear meritocratic while reproducing existing power. Legal recognition requires translation into regime-legible frameworks performed by credentialed intermediaries (lawyers, experts, consultants), making access depend on resources and alignment rather than rights.
James C. Scott's Seeing Like a State extends this analysis to institutional practice. Bureaucracies develop simplified categories enabling administration but systematically misrecognizing phenomena outside preset templates. Institutions don't merely fail to see complexity—they actively produce simplified realities corresponding to administrative categories, then mistake constructs for territory.
When courts evaluate claims through standardized frameworks, defer to credentialed expertise, and privilege regime-legible arguments, adjudication becomes administration: sorting claims according to preset categories rather than discovering justice through case-specific analysis. Discretion enables this transformation: every procedural choice (standing, justiciability, standard of review, remedy) involves judgment calls that can systematically advantage insiders while appearing neutral.
Ruha Benjamin's Race After Technology documents how algorithmic systems encode this logic. What she terms "New Jim Code" operates through technical mechanisms that discriminate without explicit intent: data training biases, optimization criteria, deployment contexts. The systems appear neutral—mathematical, objective, impartial—while systematically producing unjust outcomes.
When courts adopt algorithmic logic—risk assessments, sentencing guidelines, recidivism prediction—adjudication inherits these dynamics. Frank Pasquale's The Black Box Society demonstrates how algorithmic opacity prevents scrutiny: proprietary algorithms, trade secret protection, technical incomprehensibility create systems immune from constitutional oversight despite governing life-altering decisions.
The documented pattern across Canadian institutions exemplifies this dynamic: coordination without conspiracy, systematic bias without explicit prejudice, constitutional form without operational substance. Each agency exercises legitimate discretion within formal authority. The pattern—identical responses across independent jurisdictions—suggests shared operational framework determining outcomes regardless of legal merit.
X. The Constitutional Choice: Transcendence or Technocracy
Canada faces binary choice: recover transcendent foundations making constitutional supremacy operational for all citizens, or acknowledge post-democratic settlement in which constitutional forms legitimate predetermined outcomes.
The transcendent option requires recognizing that Ruffo's affirmation—"supremacy of God and the rule of law"—is not historical curiosity but operational necessity. Without transcendent anchor, law collapses into power. When truth becomes power's product (Foucault), rights become instrumental variables (optimization), and governance becomes administration (stakeholder coordination).
This doesn't require religious establishment or theological consensus. It requires recognition that some claims—human dignity, fundamental rights, democratic legitimacy—must stand beyond utilitarian calculation. They constrain power not because they're efficient but because they're true. Their truth doesn't depend on consensus, technological capability, or expert validation.
Marshall Rothstein captured this intuition: judges advancing social agendas usurp parliamentary function. But the problem runs deeper: when courts become administrators rather than guardians, when adjudication optimizes outcomes rather than discovers meaning, when discretion enables caste logic—constitutional constraint collapses regardless of judicial intent.
The technocratic alternative embraces post-constitutional governance: stakeholder coordination, algorithmic administration, biodigital convergence, surveillance infrastructure, multistakeholder frameworks, expert optimization. This model promises efficiency, safety, progress—achieved through centralized information processing immune from democratic interference.
But as Harari admits, this represents choice between governance systems, not inevitable evolution. Democracy distributes information processing; dictatorship (or technocracy) concentrates it. AI may favor centralization, but that's argument for restraining AI, not abandoning democracy.
XI. Conclusion: The Illusion of Choice and the Reality of Architecture
Colin Crouch's post-democracy describes condition in which democratic forms persist as shells. This article has demonstrated that Canada exhibits every indicator: institutions function formally while policy proceeds through stakeholder networks, constitutional protections operate discretionally based on regime alignment, technological systems exercise governance beyond legal constraint, and coordination across agencies suggests operational framework determining outcomes regardless of legal merit.
This is not dystopian speculation but operational reality documented through four-year empirical record. The evidence doesn't require perfect proof—Sherman Estate establishes that circumstantial evidence supports conclusions when it points toward explanation. The systematic pattern across independent institutions points toward coordinated operation through shared framework.
The philosophical infrastructure enabling this transformation is postmodernism's rejection of transcendent foundations. When truth becomes power's product, law answers to consensus rather than principle. Foucault's analysis explains mechanism; Bratton's stack reveals architecture; Zuboff documents surveillance infrastructure; Rouvroy describes algorithmic governmentality; Harari admits efficiency logic favoring centralization.
But efficiency is not inevitability. The claim that technological capability determines political necessity represents ideological choice masquerading as natural law. As Evgeny Morozov demonstrates, "technological solutionism" is ideology, not analysis—the presumption that technical systems are neutral tools rather than architectures embedding political values.
Jacques Rancière's distinction between "politics" (genuine contestation) and "police" (administration allocating roles) captures the stakes. Post-democracy represents triumph of police over politics: reduction of democratic participation to stakeholder consultation within predetermined parameters. Citizens become data points, elections become preference aggregation, governance becomes optimization.
Yet this settlement remains contestable precisely because it contradicts foundational commitments. Canada's constitutional preamble isn't optional preface but operational requirement. "Supremacy of God and the rule of law" establishes that legal authority answers to transcendent principle, not human will. This isn't theological imposition but recognition that some truths—human dignity, fundamental rights, democratic legitimacy—must stand beyond utilitarian calculation.
When institutions abandon this foundation while retaining constitutional language, they create what Byung-Chul Han calls "transparent society"—governance appearing open while operating through invisible mechanisms. Forms persist (elections, courts, legislatures) while substance migrates to networks beyond democratic constraint. The result is what Sheldon Wolin termed "inverted totalitarianism": power exercised through coordination rather than coercion, producing systematic outcomes while maintaining democratic appearance.
The empirical pattern documented across Canadian institutions suggests this inversion is operational. When public institutions insulate perpetrators and facilitate billing scandals, when police decline investigation despite documentary evidence, courts seal files without justification, regulators refuse oversight, appeal courts find "no arguable issue" despite binding precedent, media decline coverage despite public interest, and all coordinate timing and rationale—random variation becomes an implausible explanation.
Sources and Further Reading
Philosophy and Political Theory:
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Foucault, Michel. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. Pantheon, 1980.
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Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Vintage, 1977.
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Crouch, Colin. Post-Democracy. Polity Press, 2004.
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Rancière, Jacques. Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
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Streeck, Wolfgang. How Will Capitalism End? Essays on a Failing System. Verso, 2016.
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Fraser, Nancy. The Old Is Dying and the New Cannot Be Born. Verso, 2019.
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Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. Yale University Press, 1998.
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Han, Byung-Chul. Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power. Verso, 2017.
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Del Noce, Augusto. The Crisis of Modernity. McGill-Queen's University Press, 2014.
Technology and Surveillance:
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Zuboff, Shoshana. The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. PublicAffairs, 2019.
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Bratton, Benjamin. The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty. MIT Press, 2016.
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Rouvroy, Antoinette and Berns, Thomas. "Algorithmic Governmentality and Prospects of Emancipation." Réseaux 177 (2013): 163-196.
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Morozov, Evgeny. To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism. PublicAffairs, 2013.
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Andrejevic, Mark. Infoglut: How Too Much Information Is Changing the Way We Think and Know. Routledge, 2013.
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Pasquale, Frank. The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information. Harvard University Press, 2015.
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Benjamin, Ruha. Race After Technology: Abolitionist Tools for the New Jim Code. Polity, 2019.
Media and Infrastructure:
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DeNardis, Laura. The Internet in Everything: Freedom and Security in a World with No Off Switch. Yale University Press, 2020.
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Parks, Lisa. Rethinking Media Coverage: Vertical Mediation and the War on Terror. Routledge, 2018.
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Paglen, Trevor. Blank Spots on the Map: The Dark Geography of the Pentagon's Secret World. Dutton, 2009.
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Weizman, Eyal. Forensic Architecture: Violence at the Threshold of Detectability. Zone Books, 2017.
Political Economy:
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Bourdieu, Pierre. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Harvard University Press, 1984.
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Streeck, Wolfgang. Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. Verso, 2014.
Transhumanism and Biodigital Convergence:
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Harari, Yuval Noah. "Why Technology Favors Tyranny." The Atlantic, October 2018.
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Schwab, Klaus. The Fourth Industrial Revolution. World Economic Forum, 2016.
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Giesen, Klaus-Gerd. "Transhumanism as the Dominant Ideology of the Fourth Industrial Revolution." Revista Brasileira de Sociologia 6.14 (2018).
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His Majesty King Charles III. Harmony: A New Way of Looking at Our World. HarperCollins, 2010.
Canadian Constitutional Law:
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Ruffo v. Conseil de la magistrature, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 267
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Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25
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Sérafin, Stéphane and Sun, Kerry. "Unchecked judicial power? That's Chief Justice Wagner's vision for Canada." National Post, 2023.








