The Cost Scandal Affidavits [8,258% Above Tariff]

Supplemental to the litigation contents (here), this blog page exhibits true redacted copies of the October 17th, 2023 Affidavits of Emily MacKinnon, lead counsel for the unidentified and federally-sponsored Commercial and Government Entity ("CAGE") referenced on this website.
 

Retainer fees (lawyer costs) in the amount of $376,201.97 were certified in British Columbia in response to nine (9) court hearings under 60 minutes in duration, as shown in the BCSC Court Clerk’s Notes, likewise depicted at this page.  These hearings were of simple complexity and were often handled by articling students.  The bill reflected 737.7 hours of work (like the passenger jet), with the line items depicting seven (7) lawyers and two (2) paralegals assigned to overlapping tasks at outrageous time blocks.  The same pattern had occurred in the BC Court of Appeal.  By contrast, customary tariffs reside in the neighborhood of $500 for a hearing under one hour (ie., NS Rule 77), which reflect industry standards, or, $4,500 for all nine hearings by comparison.  The BC certificates followed the miscarriage of justice shown (here). 

The bill was enforced outside BC in the form of an execution order, without any regard for the circumstances.  None of the aspects of the scandal were corrected through customary recourse nor investigated, despite my best efforts.  Docket entry was denied at the SCC.  The entire file was permanently sealed in all venues, and the courts had in fact published a revised chronology of events.  

The proceedings were further beset by AI-Assisted cyber torture, Influence Ops, and neurotech crime (here & here), in the ambit of UN Resolution A/HRC/57/61, as is detailed in the Testimony.  This page focuses on the destructive retainer fee scandal which exceeds the remainder of my nest egg.

Assurances Were Given.
 

The relationship between the MacKinnon Affidavits and the BCSC Clerk's Notes invites consideration of a third-party project interest alongside the other aspects of the scandal.  The analysis is easy.  A reasonable litigant would not agree to a $400,000 retainer to conduct nine short hearings with modest prep, many of which were expected to be handled by articling students.  A reputable law firm (Canada’s 4th largest) would not propose that retainer.  An unbiased adjudicator would neither certify nor enforce it.  Finally, the various employees and public servants sandwiched between the milestone events could not be expected to violate their mandates and personal ethics in assisting an effort like that under ordinary conditions, whereas in certain capacities, they had.
 

These characteristics, widely disproportionate to the commercial interests of a mid-sized company, and antagonistic to the public’s expectation of an independent judiciary, cannot occur in a vacuum.  They require a shared purpose among participants, and an environment capable of managing risk that the CAGE could not provision as an independent actor.  Prior to any initial steps being taken, the persons and entities involved would have required assurances from a stakeholder capable of offering them.  Coordination and contingency planning would be required to ensure continuity among stakeholders and adjudicators in other venues.  Finally, the benefit of aligning with the scandal would have been understood to eclipse any risks in the ambit of the criminal code.  These are exceptionally high thresholds with a lot of boxes to tick, and they yield an exceptional proportionality gap when measured against the CAGE's private commercial interests alone. 

In other words, none of the persons and entities involved would have agreed to move forward in that capacity unless they were certain that the courts would rule in such a way as to permit the scandal, and that both federal and provincial law enforcement, and regulators, would turn a blind eye.  The scandal could have gone anywhere.  Consider what that means with respect to the scope of a controlled institutional framework.

It is thus reasonable to conclude the existence of a robust third-party project interest, and systemic characteristics in Canada's institutional fabric that widely detract from public expectation.  A bald denial of contextual evidence and a reliance on unfounded jurisdictional excuses, both thematic to the management of the scandal, invite diminishing returns.  The only things that protect perpetrators at present are unconstitutional sealing orders, and a reticence among police and professional colleagues.  A whistleblower will not only address the injustice shown on this website; he/she will address an unconstitutional framework that undermines the standards Citizens have voted for and pay taxes to maintain.

​An Uncontroverted Case Law Mandate.

The case law concerning costs is clear.  Per Bradshaw Construction Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 54 B.C.L.R. (2d) 309 (S.C.) at paragraph 44;
"Special costs are fees a reasonable client would pay a reasonably competent solicitor to do the work described in the bill.". 

Likewise per Gichuru v. Smith, 2014 BCCA 414 at paragraph 155;
“When assessing special costs, summarily or otherwise, a judge must only allow those fees that are objectively reasonable in the circumstances”. 

Other tests align, and include but are not limited to Grewal v. Sandhu, 2012 BCCA 26 at paragraph 106; Smithies Holdings Inc. v. RCV Holdings Ltd., 2017 BCCA 177 at para. 56; Nuttall v. Krekovic, 2018 BCCA 341 at paragraphs 26 & 29; and Tanious v. The Empire Life Insurance Company, 2019 BCCA 329 at paragraphs 49 & 53, inter alia. 

By way of further analogy, Northmont Resort Properties Ltd. v. Golberg, 2018 BCSC 151 had determined special costs in an amount of $333,000 for three hundred and seventy (370) actions, being $900 per action, at paragraph 50.  I was billed $376,201.97 for just nine (9) thirty-minute hearings (very short actions), and was denied customary recourse.  That's an average of $41,217.53 per action in my case, which paragraph 10 in the MacKinnon Affidavits state were reasonably required, and were billed to the CAGE.  The one twenty-minute hearing in S-229680 was billed at $78,385.36, which exceeds current data concerning Canada's average annual salary of $59,020 at the time of this update (source here). 

Having exhausted my recourse in August 2024, I was jailed for thirty days for opposing it (here), whereas the court refused to recognize Wilson J.'s valid legal defense promulgated in Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232, or acknowledge any of these facts for that matter.  At the time of this July 6th, 2025 update, I was advised by a judge that I may face subsequent incarceration again in the near future.  The contents at the "jailed" page likewise contain redacted health records.

A scandal such as this is expected to be corrected with aplomb, including at the SCC level.  Per R. v. C.P., 2021 SCC 19 at paragraph 137;
“There is no basis to believe that a serious argument pointing to a miscarriage of justice would not meet the public interest standard for leave to appeal to the Court [...] The Supreme Court would and does exercise its leave requirement in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”

​​
It is again noted that these costs arrived on the heels of a miscarriage of justice, which is explored at the Litigation page and the Civil page in a loosely chronological fashion, as supported by redacted exhibits, preceded by the shareholder scandal shown (here).  The entirety of the scandal must be addressed, as to explore the cost component alone would signal acceptance of the miscarriage of justice that led to it.  The RCMP has not yet agreed to investigate this scandal in any of its related parts, be it the related criminal interference, or the collusive effects cited here, despite an obvious appearance of scandal, and the latter being actionable under Part IV of the Criminal Code.

R. v. Tayo Tompouba, 2024 SCC 16 at paragraph 72;
"..miscarriages of justice under s. 686(1)(a)(iii) Cr. C. are a residual category of errors that exists to ensure that a conviction [translation] “can be quashed where a trial was unfair, regardless of whether the error was procedural or substantive in nature” (Vauclair, Desjardins and Lachance, at No. 51.250; see also Khan, at paras. 18 and 27).  The question to be decided in this regard is whether the irregularity was so severe that it rendered the trial unfair or created the appearance of unfairness (Khan, at para. 69, per Lebel J., concurring; see also Fanjoy, at pp. 238‑40; Davey, at paras. 50‑51; Kahsai, at paras. 67‑69)."

R. v Wolkins, 2005 NSCA 2 at paragraph 89;
“A miscarriage of justice may be found where anything happens in the course of a trial, including the appearance of unfairness, which is so serious that it shakes public confidence in the administration of justice: R. v. Cameron (1991), 1991 CanLII 7182 (ON CA), 64 C.C.C. (3d) 96 (Ont. C.A.) at 102; leave to appeal ref’d [1991] 3 S.C.R. x.”