Comity is not a binding principle.  It is defined in the case law in Apotex Inc. v. Allergan Inc., 2012 FCA 308 at paragraphs 43-44;

“Both Apotex and Allergan have the same understanding of the doctrine of comity (Apotex’s memorandum, paras. 57 to 64; Allergan’s memorandum, paras. 45 to 48).  This doctrine is sometimes described as a modified form of stare decisis, i.e. horizontal rather than vertical (House of Sga’nisim v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 BCSC 1394, para. 74).  Stare decisis requires judges to follow binding legal precedents from higher courts.  Although not binding in the same way, the doctrine of comity seeks to prevent the same legal issue from being decided differently by members of the same Court, thereby promoting certainty in the law (Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Health and Welfare), 1995 CanLII 19354 (FC), [1995] F.C.J. No. 1430, 64 C.P.R. (3d) 65, pp. 67 and 68 (T.D.)).  [...]  As a manifestation of the principle of stare decisis, the principle of judicial comity only applies to determinations of law.  It has no application to factual findings.  As was stated by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Delta Acceptance Corporation Ltd. v. Redman, 1966 CanLII 130 (ON CA), [1966] 2 O.R. 37, paragraph 5 at page 785 (C.A.): The only thing in a [j]udge’s decision binding as an authority upon a subsequent [j]udge is the principle upon which the case was decided.”

Likewise in the same case law at paragraphs 45-47;

“In the Federal Court, Mactavish J. in Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 3, acknowledged this limitation as follows (para. 70):  The principle of judicial comity might arise in the context of a ruling on a point of law but I did not consider myself bound by any factual findings made by my fellow judges in the earlier proceedings.  [...]  The assumption that underlies the doctrine of comity is that in theory there can only be one correct answer to a question of law.  As was noted by Jackett P. in Canada Steamship Lines Ltd. v. M.N.R., 1966 CanLII 910 (CA EXC), [1966] Ex. Cr. 972, at page 976, while judges are not bound to apply this doctrine by any strict rule of stare decisis, what is avoided by adhering to this doctrine is the uncertainty which diverging answers create. In the words of Lord Goddard, C.J. in Police Authority for Huddersfield v. Watson, [1947] 1 K.B. 842, at page 848:  I can only say for myself that I think the modern practice, and the modern view of the subject, is that a judge of first instance, though he would always follow the decision of another judge of first instance, unless he is convinced the judgment is wrong, would follow it as a matter of judicial comity.  He certainly is not bound to follow the decision of a judge of equal jurisdiction.  He is only bound to follow the decisions which are binding on him, which, in the case of a judge of first instance, are the decisions of the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords and the Divisional Court.  [...]  In the Federal Court, the above passage has been referred to as authority for the proposition that while the decisions rendered by colleagues are persuasive and should be given considerable weight, a departure is authorized where a judge is convinced that the prior decision is wrong and can advance cogent reasons in support of this view (Dela Fuente v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 992, paras. 29; Stone v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 81, paras. 12)."

The same principle is affirmed in Apotex Inc. v. Pfizer Canada Inc., 2014 FCA 250 at paragraph 115;
 

“In contrast, the doctrine of comity or horizontal stare decisis is not binding.  Mylan cites Allergan for the proposition that a Federal Court judge may only with certain justifications adopt a patent construction at odds with a colleague’s prior construction.  This decision does not go so far.  Rather, this Court highlighted the uncertainty that is created when two judges of the same court reach distinct results on the same question of law without explanation.  It remains that, as shown by Allergan, the only thing that an appellate court can do when this happens is to eliminate the uncertainty by settling the question of law (Allergan at para.53).  There is no legal sanction for a judge’s failure to abide by comity.”

The "Spruce Mills" benchmark test for Comity is repeated in Chief Mountain v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2011 BCSC 1394 At paragraphs 74 & 76;

“Judges of this Court generally do not depart from decisions of their fellow judges.  This practice promotes certainty and consistency in the law.  It is not, however, an invariable requirement.  It is a practice rather than a rule because certainty and consistency are not the only desirable characteristics in the law – it should also be open to change.  The principle is sometimes described as the principle of comity, or “horizontal stare decisis”, to distinguish it from the rule of “vertical” stare decisis which requires judges to follow binding precedents from higher courts.  [...]  In British Columbia, Hansard Spruce Mills is the classic expression of the principle of comity.  Mr. Justice Wilson (as he then was) wrote that, as a general rule, he would follow decisions of his fellow judges.  The exceptions to that rule would be limited (at para. 4-5):  Therefore, to epitomize what I have already written in the Cairney case, I say this: I will only go against a judgment of another Judge of this Court if:
 

1. Subsequent decisions have affected the validity of the impugned judgment;

2. It is demonstrated that some binding authority in case law, or some relevant statute was not considered;

3. The judgment was unconsidered, a nisi prius judgment given in circumstances familiar to all trial Judges, where the exigencies of the trial require an immediate decision without opportunity to fully consult authority.
    

If none of these situations exist I think a trial Judge should follow the decisions of his brother Judges."
 

The Spruce Mills test criteria for exceptions to Judicial Comity was expanded in the same case law at paragraph 81;

“In Musqueam First Nation v. British Columbia, 2010 BCSC 1259, Mr. Justice Nathan Smith considered the comity principle, and observed at para. 28 that possibly Mr. Justice Wilson did not include the reference to “patently wrong” in the Hansard Spruce Mills list of exceptional circumstances because a “palpable” error will often be the result of one or more of the other factors listed in Hansard Spruce Mills.  I agree with that observation.”
 

Finally, the test detailed in Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare), 1995 CanLII 19354 is succinct at page 67(g);
 

“The principle of judicial comity has been expressed as follows: The generally accepted view is that this court is bound to follow a previous decision of the court unless it can be shown that the previous decision was manifestly wrong, or should no longer be followed: for example, (1) the decision failed to consider legislation or binding authorities which would have produced a different result, or (2) the decision, if followed, would result in a severe injustice.”
 

Failing to Exercise Discretion When Faced With a Comity Argument is an Error of Law.

A judge cannot simply rubber-stamp an order made by his/her peer in an earlier hearing without considering the facts and applicable legal tests.  When they fail to exercise discretion in that capacity, they commit an error of law (Colburne v. Frank, 1995 NSCA 110 at paragraph 9; R. v. Tayo Tompouba, 2024 SCC 16 at paragraph 73; A.M.G. v. C.J.K., 2024 NSCA 62 at paragraph 90).  Per Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653 at paragraph 20;

"Nonetheless, this Court has in the past revisited precedents that were determined to be unsound in principle, that had proven to be unworkable and unnecessarily complex to apply, or that had attracted significant and valid judicial, academic and other criticism: Craig, at paras. 28-30; Henry, at paras. 45-47; Fraser, at para. 135 (per Rothstein J., concurring in the result); Bernard, at pp. 858-59.  Although adhering to the established jurisprudence will generally promote certainty and predictability, in some instances doing so will create or perpetuate uncertainty in the law: Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development v. Ranville, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 518, at p. 528; Bernard, at p. 858; R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740, at p. 778.  In such circumstances, “following the prior decision because of stare decisis would be contrary to the underlying value behind that doctrine, namely, clarity and certainty in the law”: Bernard, at p. 858. These considerations apply here."

When a concurrence of judges make the wrong order, as is the case here, it is indicative of a systemic problem that must be addressed, and the public interest weighs in favor of investigation and discovery.  All of this contributes to the overarching thesis brought forth in the case law at the top of the page concerning bias and partiality in proceedings, and whereas, the entirety of proceedings are without force or effect under Canada’s supreme rule; the Constitution.  

The chain of reasoning must be discernible, as is likewise captured in another reiteration of the Vavilov standard of reasonableness as is shown In Magee (Re) (Ont CA, 2020) at paragraph 19;
 

“A reasonable decision is one that, having regard to the reasoning process and the outcome of the decision, properly reflects an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, 441 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at paras. 102-104. In addition, a reasonable decision must be justified in relation to the constellation of law and facts that are relevant to the decision. For instance, the governing statutory scheme and the evidentiary matrix can constrain how and what an administrative decision-maker can lawfully decide. Further, “[w]here the impact of the decision on an individual’s rights and interests is severe, the reasons provided to that individual must reflect the stakes”: Vavilov, at para. 133. The principle of responsive justification means that especially in such high-stakes cases, the decision maker must meaningfully explain why its decision best reflects the legislature’s intention.”