ABSTRACT
 

This study documents a sustained pattern of police obstruction across multiple Canadian jurisdictions and agencies between 2021 and 2025. Drawing on police occurrence reports, audio recordings, email correspondence, and decisions from oversight bodies, it shows how law enforcement can be used not to investigate serious, well-documented criminal complaints, but to block investigation through coordinated negligence, false or incomplete reporting, and jurisdictional deflection.  In this context, police discretion—ordinarily justified as a tool for efficient law enforcement—operates instead as an instrument for preventing accountability where the allegations touch state-adjacent, networked, or reputationally sensitive interests.
 

The record supports a finding of institutional foreclosure, not a series of isolated mistakes: each agency redirects the complainant elsewhere, each does so on a pretextual basis (mental-health framing, “civil matter,” “out of jurisdiction”), and each does so in a way that ensures no alternative investigative pathway remains open.  The analysis is grounded in settled Canadian law on police duties, the low threshold for commencing an investigation, and the constitutional role of police in facilitating—not obstructing—access to justice.

Keywords: Institutional Foreclosure, Systemic Police Obstruction, Negligent Investigation, Reasonable Grounds Standard, Jurisdictional Deflection, Civil–Criminal Inversion, Mental-Health Framing, False Police Reporting, Oversight Failure, Multi-Agency Coordination, Access to Justice, Charter s.7 Security of the Person, Vavilov Responsive Reasons, Organized Stalking, AI-Mediated Harassment, Cross-Jurisdictional Cybercrime, Sealed Proceedings, Cost/Fee Fraud, RCMP Professional Standards Admission, Post-Democratic Administration

SYSTEMIC POLICE OBSTRUCTION: A STUDY IN INSTITUTIONAL FORECLOSURE

I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION: POLICE AS GUARDIANS, NOT GATEKEEPERS

A. The Fundamental Duty
 

The Supreme Court of Canada has framed the police duty to investigate in categorical terms.  In R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5, at para. 35, the Court held: “There is no question that police officers have a duty to enforce the law and investigate crimes.  The principle that the police have a duty to enforce the criminal law is well established at common law.”
 

Chief Justice McLachlin restated the point in Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41, at para. 1: “The police must investigate crime.  That is their duty. In the vast majority of cases, they carry out this duty with diligence and care.  Occasionally, however, mistakes are made.  These mistakes may have drastic consequences.”
 

And at para. 44 in Hill: “The effective and responsible investigation of crime is one of the basic duties of the state, which cannot be abdicated... The enforcement of the criminal law is one of the most important aspects of the maintenance of law and order in a free society.  Police officers are the main actors who have been entrusted to fulfill this important function.”
 

This makes the duty more than an internal policy obligation: it is part of the constitutional architecture.  The system presumes that when a citizen brings a plausible criminal complaint, police will investigate.  When, instead, police adopt practices of systematic non-investigation in the face of credible material, they cease acting as guardians of the justice system and become gatekeepers who can, in practice, prevent access to it.
 

B. The Threshold for Investigation: Intentionally Low
 

Canadian law deliberately sets a low bar for starting an investigation. Hill, at para. 58, states: “It is reasonable for a police officer to investigate in the absence of overwhelming evidence — indeed evidence usually becomes overwhelming only by the process of investigation.”
 

The Ontario Court of Appeal in 495793 Ontario Ltd. (Central Auto Parts) v. Barclay, 2016 ONCA 656, at para. 51, emphasized that police are to investigate incidents which might be criminal, make an informed decision about laying charges, and present facts to the Crown.  Critically, the Court held that police are not required to evaluate evidence to a legal standard—that is the role of prosecutors and courts—and not required to exhaust every investigative avenue or interview every witness before forming reasonable grounds (para. 52).
 

That approach aligns with criminal-law doctrine.  In R. v. Loewen, 2010 ABCA 255, at para. 32, the Court held that reasonable grounds require only that it was objectively reasonable to believe an offence was being committed, “not that it was probable or certain”.  The Supreme Court reiterated in R. v. Tim, 2022 SCC 12, at para. 24, that reasonable grounds are about probability, not certainty.
 

Against that legal backdrop, a police service that refuses to investigate despite detailed reports, supporting documentation, corroborating recordings, and cross-jurisdictional linkages is not exercising judgment—it is frustrating the very standard that enables investigation.  Non-investigation at that point is not good-faith prioritization; it is obstruction.
 

C. The Public Interest in Police Diligence
 

In Hill, at para. 36, the Court recognized that negligent investigation harms both the individual and the system: “Recognizing an action for negligent police investigation may assist in responding to failures of the justice system, such as wrongful convictions or institutional racism.”

Cory J. was quoted for the proposition that society “needs protection from both the deliberate and the careless acts of omission and commission” that lead to injustice (para. 37).
 

Although Hill dealt with wrongful convictions, the underlying logic is bidirectional.  Wrongful non-investigation produces an equally corrosive result: it denies victims any possibility of protection or redress, signals to perpetrators that certain conduct is functionally immune, and places the police power on the side of inaction.
 

II. THE DOCUMENTED PATTERN: TWO AGENCIES, ONE RESULT

A. Surrey RCMP: Initial Non-Investigation (2022)
 

On February 10, 2022, Nathan Dempsey attended the Surrey RCMP detachment to report:
 

• organized, multi-actor harassment;

• multiple entries/break-ins with nothing stolen but items moved, devices accessed, and environmental cues left behind;

• cyber-attacks and AI-mediated harassment keyed to private events; and

• linkages to ongoing civil proceedings in British Columbia that were themselves contaminated by fraud.
   

Constable Richard Van Leersum recorded the matter in GO# 1301 2022-20564 but reduced the report to a complaint about device tracking “possibly related” to a civil matter.  He did not:
 

• obtain CCTV from a building known to have extensive coverage;

• seize or examine compromised devices;

• follow up on organized-harassment indicators; or

• initiate any coordinated file.
   

He concluded, “no grounds,” and at the same time inserted a mental-health note (“no apparent mental health component noted”)—a formulation that both raises and defers the issue, making it easy to resurrect later. A non-investigation was thus recorded as a completed police response.
 

B. S/Sgt. Ray Monsef: Jurisdictional Deflection (2023)
 

In January 2023, after further harassment, Dempsey supplied Surrey RCMP with a fuller documentary record.  Staff Sergeant Ray Monsef documented the matter in GO# 1301 2023-13421 but reframed it as Dempsey “expecting” the RCMP to apply to BCSC to unseal a file—something Dempsey had not asked them to do.  The real request was investigation of criminal conduct: break-ins, cyber-intrusions, AI-assisted stalking, and a clearly fraudulent $445,489.50 billing scenario (solicitor-client billing at +9,000% customary fees vs. the court Clerk's Notes).
 

Monsef did not open an investigation.  Instead, he:
 

1. mischaracterized the complaint as civil / court-related;

2. tried to reach Dempsey by phone, then framed Dempsey’s preference for email (for auditability) as non-cooperation; and

3. referred the matter to Halifax Regional Police to “assess his mental health.”
    

Monsef also noted that CCTV that could have been obtained in 2022 was now overwritten—without acknowledging that this loss was caused by the original Surrey non-investigation. The deflection to Halifax served to export the problem and to hard-bake a wellness lens into the file.
 

C. Halifax Regional Police: False Reporting vs. Recorded Reality (2022)
 

After relocating to Nova Scotia in 2022, Dempsey contacted Halifax Regional Police (HRP).
 

September 6, 2022 (Cst. MacLaughlin): HRP recorded the interaction as a well-being check and closed it.  That move—reframing a crime report as a wellness call—is the core foreclosure technique.
 

December 8, 2022 (Cst. Brian Pothier): This is the key interaction because it was audio-recorded by Dempsey.  HRP’s FOIPOP / occurrence entry (GO #22-149739) says Dempsey “advised nothing had actually occurred” and that he “was happy with” the outcome.  The audio shows the opposite:
 

• Pothier said: “you’ve got beautiful evidence.”

• He acknowledged cross-jurisdictional continuity (“what happened in B.C. definitely attributed to what happens here”).

• He identified an actor (“we know Michael’s role in all this”).

• He outlined investigative steps: “send me the PDF,” “I should do as full a report as I can,” “I should liaise with my cybercrime section.”
   

In other words, in real time the officer recognized reasonable grounds and promised an investigation; the official record later erased the evidence and closed the file.  That is not mere sloppiness; it is record-level falsification that makes future officers believe there was nothing to investigate.

An escalation to POLCOM Commissioner Patrick Curran resulted in a summary dismissal prior to touching the record, who had likewise refused to accept a copy of the original audio recording of the December 8, 2022 meeting.
 

D. Halifax Regional Police: Reinforcement of the Narrative (2024)
 

On October 10, 2024 (GO# HP 2024-139324), HRP dispatch recorded Dempsey as “rambling on” about cyber-attacks and “telepathy controlling him”.  In reality, Dempsey called to give a previous case number and to request a different officer.  The dispatch entry was pejorative at intake, before any evidence review.
 

Cst. Robert MacMullin then filed a report stating Dempsey “does not have evidence to support his belief,” even though Dempsey once again provided high-resolution AI-harassment materials, familial-link evidence, and cross-jurisdictional documentation—material HRP had already acknowledged in 2022.  None of this made its way into his report, which focused on civil proceedings that presumably functioned normally.
 

Inspector Ron Legere’s Form 11 (March 10, 2025) then folded the whole matter back into a mental-health / vexatiousness narrative, citing Dempsey’s litigation history instead of the evidentiary record.
 

E. Nova Scotia POLCOM: Validation of Obstruction (2025)
 

Dempsey appealed to the Nova Scotia Police Complaints Commissioner (POLCOM).  On July 22, 2025, Commissioner Bill MacDonald upheld HRP’s position, largely by repeating the same flawed jurisdictional line (“HRP… does not have jurisdiction to investigate criminal matters that occurred in other provinces”) and by declining to engage the fact that many of the reported offences occurred in Nova Scotia or had effects there (ongoing harassment, cyber-intrusions, family-adjacent targeting).
 

The Commissioner’s conclusory “no merit” finding, without grappling with jurisdictional case law (e.g. R. v. Stucky, 2009 ONCA 151; SCC authority on transmission / reception location), illustrates how oversight can act as a terminal point for foreclosure.
 

F. CRCC: Federal-Level Dismissal (2025)
 

Dempsey also complained to the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP (CRCC).  On January 3, 2025 (File 2024-4615), the CRCC dismissed his concerns as “implausible,” pointing to the fact that intrusions occurred with nothing stolen, or that vehicle mirrors were repeatedly adjusted.  But that is precisely what Sheridan et al. (2020) documented: organized stalking often uses subtle, deniable, environmental manipulations rather than overt property damage.
 

The CRCC further said it could not find “messages which suggested an impending home invasion” in his 114-page submission—despite Dempsey having furnished AI-generated, time-stamped content matching case milestones and harassment themes.  The omission of that category of evidence is, on administrative-law principles (see Cepeda-Gutierrez), itself reviewable.
 

Most importantly, the CRCC told him there was no further appeal under the RCMP Act.  That completed the foreclosure loop: refusal → oversight validation → no recourse.
 

G. RCMP Professional Standards: Negligence Admitted, Remedy Denied (2025)
 

In January–February 2025, RCMP Professional Standards (S/Sgt. Margo Halliday) acknowledged orally that Cst. Van Leersum had failed to investigate the February 10, 2022 report and should have obtained CCTV.  Superintendent Gurmakh Parmar confirmed this in writing on February 13, 2025 and even apologized.
 

But Parmar then stated the correspondence was final and did not order an investigation into the original offences, did not address the subsequent linked offences, and did not offer corrective action on the false-reporting problem.  In other words, the RCMP admitted the breach of standard but withheld remedy—a “fauxpology” that preserves the foreclosure.  

H. Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner (OPSIC): Jurisdictional Misframing and Non-Action (2023)
 

In December 2023, Dempsey filed a disclosure/complaint to OPSIC alleging RCMP negligence and obstruction in the handling of his February 2022 criminal complaints (here).  OPSIC summarily declined to investigate, characterizing the matter as a “civil dispute” because certain events later intersected with civil proceedings—despite (i) no civil action being in place during the December 2021–February 2022 break-ins, psychological operations / diffuse & disrupt activities, and device interference, and (ii) the criminal elements continuing to affect the subsequent litigation.  OPSIC did not engage with the evidentiary package (break-in chronology, Surrey file numbers, AI-harassment corpus) or the public-interest dimension of alleged wrongdoing within the federal sphere, nor did it use any discretion to refer the matter to an investigative authority.  It was tone deaf to Dempsey's emergency relocation out of BC in February 2022 (mid-winter).  The result was to remove a federal-level avenue of review and to reinforce the same civil/mental-health framing other bodies had used, completing the oversight loop in which none of the agencies or watchdogs tested the evidence on its merits.
 

III. HOW INSTITUTIONAL FORECLOSURE OPERATES

A. Pre-Loaded Mental-Health Framing
 

At every stage—Surrey RCMP, HRP (2022, 2024), Monsef’s referral, HRP Professional Standards, POLCOM, CRCC—a mental-health lens is introduced or reinforced.  Sometimes it is subtle (“no apparent mental health component noted”), sometimes direct (“non-sensical, obsessive and irrelevant,” “continues to suffer from Mental Illness”).  This framing:
 

1. discounts credibility in advance;

2. recharacterizes crime reports as wellness concerns (so they can be closed quickly); and

3. self-seals the file: every further attempt to provide evidence becomes proof of “obsession.”
    

As Aviva Orenstein shows in “Credibility Discounts” (2018), this is a recognized phenomenon: some complainants are systemically discounted for reasons unrelated to the strength of their evidence.
 

B. False or Incomplete Official Records
 

The Pothier encounter is the clearest example.  The officer said on tape: you have “beautiful evidence,” I will write it up, I will liaise with cybercrime, we know who’s involved.  The report says: nothing occurred, no evidence, victim happy.  That is not responsive reasons under Vavilov (paras. 127–128).  It is a constructed narrative designed to block future review.
 

C. Jurisdictional Deflection
 

Each body says “not us”:
 

• Surrey says it’s civil / elsewhere;

• HRP says it happened in B.C.;

• POLCOM repeats HRP;

• CRCC quotes technical grounds and omits most of the evidentiary record;

• OPSIC says it's civil.
   

But online, cross-border, and continuing-effects offences are triable where the harm is felt (see Stucky; SOCAN v. CAIP, 2004 SCC 45, para. 63). The consistent claim of “no jurisdiction” in the face of these authorities is best understood as a coordination device: it moves the complainant in circles while time-sensitive evidence expires.
 

D. Civil–Criminal Inversion
 

Police repeatedly said they would not pursue criminal investigation because there was ongoing or related civil litigation.  That inverts the correct sequence.  The civil litigation was triggered by earlier criminal-style conduct (fraud, perjury, obstruction in the BCSC matters).  Police used the victim’s attempt to get relief in civil court as a pretext not to investigate the underlying crime.
 

E. Reasonable-Grounds Inversion
 

Instead of “you’ve shown enough to start,” police said, in effect: “show us proof and then we’ll start”.  But Loewen, Tim, Hill, and Barclay all say investigation is what produces proof.  Requiring post-investigative proof as a pre-investigative condition makes investigation logically impossible—a classic Vavilov fallacy.
 

F. Oversight Alignment
 

POLCOM, CRCC, and other federal integrity channels repeated the same mistakes: jurisdictional misstatements, refusal to consider key evidence, acceptance of police characterizations over documentary records, and reliance on procedural bars despite public-interest language that would have permitted review.  At that point, oversight stops being a check and becomes part of the foreclosure.
 

IV. THE EVIDENCE POLICE IGNORED

A. AI-Generated, Time-Synchronous Harassment ("Cybertorture", UN Report A/HRC/43/49)
 

Dempsey provided a large corpus of social-media material (YouTube, TikTok, short-form video) that:
 

• appeared within minutes or hours of private events and sealed court milestones (e.g. May 13, 2023 clip vs. EHS transport and filed record);

• matched those events in verbatim scripting and symbolic imagery;

• was distributed across multiple accounts (indicating coordination);

• referenced sealed or not-yet-served court materials; and

• aligned with what Sheridan et al. (2020) describe as organized, multi-actor stalking.
   

HRP engaged with this once (Pothier meeting) and then the file was falsified.  Later police and oversight bodies treated it as if it did not exist.
 

B. Financial / Costs Fraud
 

The BCSC/BCCA/N.S. matters contained documentary proof of an impossible costs/billing outcome: ~$400,000 for nine short chambers appearances—an uptick of 9,000% over ordinary tariffs based on 737.7 hours (like the Boeing jet).  The MacKinnon affidavit put the numbers beyond debate; BCSC clerk’s notes showed 867 minutes were spent.  Under Bradshaw Construction, special costs must reflect what a reasonable client would pay a reasonably competent solicitor.  No reasonable client pays almost half a million dollars for nine short hearings.  No reputable law firm proposes that.  No unbiased judge certifies it, or enforces it.  All of that happened, and it has evaded correction for two years.  That's prima facie fraud, and it requires state-adjacent assurances and coordination.  Police declined to investigate.
 

C. Family / Biological Vector
 

Dempsey identified a family-adjacent actor—with apparent institutional links—who surfaced in key harassment content, estate-planning maneuvering, and mocking foreknowledge during virtual hearings.  The person associated with the MyFatherIsJoy and FurnaceForged YouTube channels is understood to be the biological mother of the subject's Nephew, as a known egg donor (1995 IWK fertility clinic).  Family-tasked operations are well known in psyops/intel tradecraft because they provide plausible access and emotional leverage.  Police declined even to acknowledge this line of evidence involving local actors with a discernible biological relation to a prolific actor involved in the scandal.
 

D. UN and Technological Context
 

By 2024, UN HRC/GA instruments (A/HRC/57/61; A/HRC/58/58; A/HRC/RES/58/6) were openly warning that:
 

• neurotechnology exists that can access and/or manipulate neural information and human behavior;

• these tools pose human-rights risks; and

• domestic law is lagging.
   

Dempsey’s reports—electronic effects, device loss of control, biometric references in harassment material—are squarely inside that envelope. Police labelled them “not reality”.  That position is untenable once Canada is voting for or acknowledging exactly those risks internationally.

E. Biometric Tagging & 2021 Neuromodulation / Human Experimentation Vector — Concise Hypothesis on Record
 

In view of the foregoing UN reports, and on balance in view of a totality of converging evidence (Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 (CanLII), [2013] 3 SCR 1101 at paragraph 76), Dempsey alleges the factual account detailed in the testimony is consistent with a state-adjacent deployment of invasive or minimally invasive biometric interfaces.  Candidate modalities include “neural dust” (microscale, wireless neural sensors; see Seo et al., Neuron 2016) and graphene quantum dots (GQDs)—in vivo nanoscale materials used as biosensors or neural interfaces with monitoring and potential neuromodulatory effects; see also WO 2020060606 A1 (cryptocurrency system using body-activity data).  Further research is found in at the Testimony page and 4IR portal, with over 200 additional citations (here).  On this record, foreclosure itself is probative: repeated declinations to investigate impede verification or falsification of a plausible, rights-impacting hypothesis, thereby stymieing a significant mental-privacy/cognitive-liberty concern.  Under Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41 at paragraphs 1, 58, the novelty of the hypothesis does not preclude investigation; evidence “usually becomes overwhelming only by the process of investigation.”
 

V. LEGAL STANDARDS SYSTEMATICALLY BREACHED
 

1. Hill: police must investigate crime; investigation in the absence of overwhelming evidence is reasonable.

2. Barclay: “might be criminal” is enough to start.

3. Loewen / Tim: reasonable grounds ≠ certainty.

4. Vavilov: reasons must engage with the material issues and be logically coherent, especially where fundamental interests are at stake.

5. Sherman Estate (by later analogy): if you are going to restrict public access, you must do the analysis—here, sealing was used to shield the fraud narrative, not to protect legitimate interests.

6. Stucky / SOCAN: jurisdiction exists where the harm is felt; “out of province” was a pretext.
    

In each police / oversight decision, either the standard was misstated (demanding proof before investigation) or the reasons did not engage the central evidence at all (contrary to Vavilov, paras. 127–133).